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The Original Fourth Amendment 
Laura K. Donohue† 
The meaning of the rights enshrined in the Constitution provides a critical 
baseline for understanding the limits of government action—perhaps nowhere more 
so than in regard to the Fourth Amendment. At the time it was adopted, the Fourth 
Amendment prohibited the government from entering into any home, warehouse, or 
place of business against the owner’s wishes to search for or to seize persons, papers, 
or effects, absent a specific warrant. Consistent with English common law, the nota-
ble exception was when law enforcement or citizens were pursuing a known felon. 
Outside of such circumstances, search and seizure required government officials to 
approach a magistrate and, under oath, to provide evidence of the suspected offense 
and to particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be 
seized. Scholars’ insistence that the Fourth Amendment does not entail a general 
protection against government entry into the home without a warrant does more 
than just fail to appreciate the context. It contradicts the meaning of the text itself, 
which carefully lays out the conditions that must be met before the government may 
intrude. Reclaiming this meaning is essential for understanding the scope of the 
original Fourth Amendment and for ensuring a doctrine that reflects fidelity to the 
founding principles. 
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INTRODUCTION 
As a term of art, “originalism” is a relative newcomer to con-
stitutional debate. It emerged in the conservative backlash to the 
Warren Court and the dialectic that ensued over the appropriate 
role of the judiciary in interpreting and applying the Constitu-
tion.1 Nevertheless, the basic concept—understanding the text ac-
cording to its original meaning or the intent of those who intro-
duced the provisions—is not a new idea. For centuries, lawyers, 
judges, and scholars have recognized the importance of discerning 
 
 1 See, for example, Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment 
Problems, 47 Ind L J 1, 5–6, 8 (1971) (critiquing the Warren Court on the grounds that 
“[i]f we have constitutional rights and liberties already, rights and liberties specified by 
the Constitution, the Court need make no fundamental value choices,” and stating that 
“[t]he judge must stick close to the text and the history, and their fair implications, and 
not construct new rights,” as an attack on Griswold v Connecticut, 381 US 479 (1965)) 
(citation omitted). See also generally William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Con-
stitution, 54 Tex L Rev 693 (1976) (criticizing living constitutionalism). In 1980, Professor 
Paul Brest responded with an article credited with coining the term “originalism.” See 
Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 BU L Rev 204, 204 
(1980). Academic debate followed. See generally, for example, Richard S. Kay, Adherence 
to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 
82 Nw U L Rev 226 (1988); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original 
Intent, 98 Harv L Rev 885 (1985). 
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the meaning of the law at its inception.2 In 1988, the Department 
of Justice (DOJ) made its adherence to this approach explicit, ar-
guing that fidelity to the original meaning of the Constitution was 
neither conservative nor liberal. It embodied “a jurisprudence 
faithful to our Constitution.”3 The DOJ’s Office of Legal Policy di-
rected officials, when text may be ambiguous or vague, to look to 
sources that indicated “the intent of those who drafted, proposed, 
and ratified that provision (i.e., the Founders).”4 Accordingly, all 
briefs were to “clearly set out the text and original understanding of 
the relevant constitutional provisions, along with an analysis of how 
the case would be resolved consistent with that understanding.”5 
In the ensuing decades, originalism has become an important 
mode of constitutional interpretation.6 It has been the deciding 
 
 2 See, for example, Gibbons v Ogden, 22 US (9 Wheat) 1, 188 (1824) (“[T]he enlight-
ened patriots who framed our constitution, and the people who adopted it, must be under-
stood to have employed words in their natural sense, and to have intended what they have 
said.”); Reynolds v United States, 98 US 145, 162 (1879) (“The word ‘religion’ is not defined 
in the Constitution. We must go elsewhere, therefore, to ascertain its meaning, and no-
where more appropriately, we think, than to the history of the times in the midst of which 
the provision was adopted.”); Ex parte Bain, 121 US 1, 12 (1887) (“It is never to be forgotten 
that, in the construction of the language of the Constitution here relied on, as indeed in 
all other instances where construction becomes necessary, we are to place ourselves as 
nearly as possible in the condition of the men who framed that instrument.”); United States 
v Lovett, 328 US 303, 321 (1946) (drawing an interpretive distinction between “the broad 
standards of fairness written into the Constitution (e.g. ‘due process,’ ‘equal protection of 
the laws,’ [and] ‘just compensation’),” and “very specific provisions of the Constitution,” 
which “had their source in definite grievances and led the Fathers to proscribe against 
recurrence of their experience”). See also Joseph Story, 1 Commentaries on the Constitu-
tion of the United States § 400 at 383–84 (Hilliard, Gray 1833). 
 3 Office of Legal Policy, Guidelines on Constitutional Litigation 1 (DOJ 1988). 
 4 Id at 3. 
 5 Id at 10. 
 6 During the Reagan administration’s second term, Edwin Meese was appointed at-
torney general. He gave a series of speeches in which he stated that originalism would 
guide the DOJ. One of the speeches, given at the American Bar Association’s annual meet-
ing in July 1985, became widely reported and provided political salience to what had been 
largely insulated within the realm of legal scholarship. See generally Edwin Meese III, 
Speech before the American Bar Association, in Steven G. Calabresi, ed, Originalism: A 
Quarter-Century of Debate 47 (Regnery 2007). Justice William J. Brennan Jr responded, 
spurring further public debate that included additional public remarks by Meese. See gen-
erally William J. Brennan Jr, Speech to the Text and Teaching Symposium, in Calabresi, 
ed, Originalism 55 (cited in note 6); Edwin Meese III, Speech before the D.C. Chapter of 
the Federalist Society Lawyers Division, in Calabresi, ed, Originalism 71 (cited in note 6). 
See also Steven G. Calabresi, A Critical Introduction to the Originalism Debate, 31 Harv 
J L & Pub Pol 875, 875–85 (2008) (discussing all three speeches). The movement gained 
momentum as Meese brought young attorneys to the Office of Legal Counsel. Justice Antonin 
Scalia advocated a move away from original intentions and toward public meaning. See 
generally Address by Justice Antonin Scalia before the Attorney General’s Conference on 
Economic Liberties in Washington, D.C. (June 14, 1986), in Original Meaning Jurispru-
dence: A Sourcebook 101 (Office of Legal Policy 1987). In the 1990s, these ideas began 
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factor in Supreme Court decisions.7 It elucidates the meaning of 
the Constitution, and, like the Founding, reflects all sides of the 
political spectrum. Originalism has been embraced by conserva-
tive justices, such as William Rehnquist, Antonin Scalia, and 
Clarence Thomas.8 And it has been applied to a range of tradition-
ally liberal causes, with civil rights,9 as well as the Court’s deci-
sions in Roe v Wade10 and Brown v Board of Education of Topeka,11 
defended on originalist grounds. 
 
taking root in academia. See, for example, Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling Textualism 
and Federalism: The Proper Textual Basis of the Supreme Court’s Tenth and Eleventh 
Amendment Decisions, 93 Nw U L Rev 819, 823 (1999); Michael B. Rappaport, The Origi-
nal Meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause, 52 UCLA L Rev 1487, 1493 (2005) (“The 
modern interpreter should read the language in accord with the meaning it would have 
had in the late 1780s.”). Around the turn of the century, “new originalism” emerged, cen-
tered on two tenets: the original meaning of the constitutional text equates to its public 
meaning (reflecting Scalia’s approach), and a distinction can be drawn between interpre-
tation and construction. See, for example, Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Construc-
tion: Divided Powers and Constitutional Meaning 1–7 (Harvard 1999); Keith E. Whittington, 
Constitutional Interpretation: Textual Meaning, Original Intent, and Judicial Review 1–16 
(Kansas 1999); Randy E. Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution: The Presumption of 
Liberty 92–93, 121–25 (Princeton 2004) (describing the public-meaning understanding of 
originalism and distinguishing between interpretation and construction); Randy E. Barnett, 
An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 Loyola L Rev 611, 620, 645 (1999); Lawrence B. 
Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 Fordham L Rev 453, 457 (2013) 
(distinguishing between constitutional interpretation and constitutional construction and 
advancing two claims about the latter); Lawrence B. Solum and Robert W. Bennett, Con-
stitutional Originalism: A Debate 1–4 (Cornell 2011). 
 7 See, for example, District of Columbia v Heller, 554 US 570, 576–77 (2008) (inter-
preting the Second Amendment by employing the principle that “meaning . . . excludes 
secret or technical meanings that would not have been known to ordinary citizens in the 
founding generation”). For a discussion of why Heller was a particularly strong vehicle for 
originalism, see Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 
Nw U L Rev 923, 925–26 (2009). 
 8 See Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law 38 
(Princeton 1997) (“What I look for in the Constitution is precisely what I look for in a 
statute: the original meaning of the text, not what the original draftsmen intended.”). See 
also generally Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U Cin L Rev 849 (1989); 
Rehnquist, 54 Tex L Rev 693 (cited in note 1). See also Nancie G. Marzulla, The Textualism 
of Clarence Thomas: Anchoring the Supreme Court’s Property Rights Jurisprudence to the 
Constitution, 10 Am U J Gender Soc Pol & L 351, 379 (2002) (describing Thomas as “an 
individualist . . . dedicated to an interpretative philosophy based on the text of the Consti-
tution and its context”). 
 9 See generally, for example, Steven G. Calebresi and Abe Salander, Religion and 
the Equal Protection Clause: Why the Constitution Requires School Vouchers, 65 U Fla L 
Rev 909 (2013) (arguing that the Equal Protection Clause should be applied to religious 
discrimination based on the Clause’s original understanding). 
 10 410 US 113 (1973). For an originalist defense of Roe, see Akhil Reed Amar’s fic-
tional “opinion” in Jack M. Balkin, ed, What Roe v. Wade Should Have Said: The Nation’s 
Top Legal Experts Rewrite America’s Most Controversial Decision 152, 152–69 (NYU 2005). 
 11 347 US 483 (1954). See also Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegre-
gation Decisions, 81 Va L Rev 947, 1131–40 (1995). 
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The meaning of the rights enshrined in the Constitution pro-
vides a critical baseline for understanding the limits of govern-
ment action—perhaps nowhere more so than in regard to the 
Fourth Amendment. The Amendment prohibited the government 
from entering into any home, warehouse, or place of business 
against the owner’s wishes to search for or to seize persons, pa-
pers, and effects, absent a specific warrant. The only exception 
was when law enforcement or citizens were in active pursuit of a 
known felon.12 Outside of that narrow circumstance, the govern-
ment was prohibited from search and seizure absent appearing 
before a magistrate and, under oath, providing evidence of the 
suspected offense and particularly describing the place to be 
searched and persons or things to be seized. 
Over time, the essence of the Amendment has at times be-
come lost, risking diminution of the rights that existed at the 
Founding. In 1994, for instance, Professor Akhil Reed Amar ar-
gued in the Harvard Law Review that “[t]he core of the Fourth 
Amendment . . . is neither a warrant nor probable cause, but rea-
sonableness.”13 Amar grounded his argument in the text: “We 
 
 12 There was no exception for customs officers to search for contraband. See, for ex-
ample, Bostock v Saunders, 95 Eng Rep 1141, 1145 (KB 1773) (de Grey) (recognizing an 
action in trespass against a customs inspector looking for contraband tea because the oath 
provided was not supported by probable cause, “as no evidence was given at the trial of 
any probable cause or ground of suspicion that tea was fraudulently concealed by the 
plaintiff, the jury found a verdict for him, and gave the whole damages in the declaration”). 
Warrants were presumptively required. Much later, the Supreme Court articulated the 
contours of hot pursuit in Warden v Hayden, 387 US 294, 298–300 (1967). 
 13 Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 Harv L Rev 757, 801 
(1994). See also Akhil Reed Amar, The Fourth Amendment, Boston, and the Writs of As-
sistance, 30 Suffolk U L Rev 53, 55 (1996) (“[T]he [Fourth] Amendment does not require a 
warrant for each and every search or seizure. It simply requires that each and every search 
or seizure be reasonable.”); Akhil Reed Amar, Terry and Fourth Amendment First Princi-
ples, 72 St John’s L Rev 1097, 1106 (1998): 
[T]here are several problems with [the] “warrantist” reading of the [Fourth] 
Amendment. First, it is not what the words of the Amendment say. Second, no 
Framer ever said that this is what the Amendment did or should mean. Third, 
no early treatise said that all warrantless searches and seizures were (even pre-
sumptively) illegitimate. 
See also Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Unwritten Constitution: The Precedents and Princi-
ples We Live By 129, 178 (Basic Books 2012) (“The Fourth Amendment does not bar all 
intrusions upon privacy—only unreasonable ones.”); Akhil Reed Amar, The Law of the 
Land: A Grand Tour of Our Constitutional Republic 232 (Basic Books 2015): 
[T]he [Fourth] [A]mendment does not require a warrant for each and every search 
or seizure. It simply requires that each and every search or seizure be reasona-
ble. . . . Reading into [the wording of the first clause] . . . an implicit warrant re-
quirement for all searches and seizures runs counter to text, Founding-era history, 
and common sense. Textually, as we have seen, the amendment contains no third 
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need to read the Amendment’s words and take them seriously: 
they do not require warrants, [or] probable cause, . . . but they do 
require that all searches and seizures be reasonable.”14 Amar sug-
gested that the modern Supreme Court had erred in assuming a 
link between the right of the people to be secure against unrea-
sonable search and seizure and the requirement that no warrant 
issue but upon probable cause, particularity, and oath.15 The as-
sumption that search and seizure could take place only pursuant 
to a warrant was “only one of several possible ways of understand-
ing the relationship between the” two demands.16 Amar advocated 
reading the clauses separately, looking to exceptions to the war-
rant requirement as evidence that the Founders did not contem-
plate that warrants should always issue, before asserting that 
“[t]he common law search warrants referred to in the Warrant 
Clause were solely for stolen goods.”17 
 
clause explicitly stating that “warrantless searches and seizures are inherently 
unreasonable,” or explicitly barring all “warrantless searches and seizures.” 
 14 Amar, 107 Harv L Rev at 759 (cited in note 13). 
 15 See id at 762. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id at 765–66. Amar elucidates his theory of why the Fourth Amendment took aim 
at stolen goods: “[O]nce extended beyond the limited context of the common law warrant 
for stolen goods, warrants had the potential for great evil.” Amar, 30 Suffolk U L Rev at 
63 (cited in note 13). Because the warrant insulated officers of the Crown from tort claims, 
the purpose of prohibiting general warrants focused on stolen goods and related areas. In 
all other circumstances, judicial review would provide an effective check on whether a 
search comported with what he calls “common-sense reasonableness.” Id. See also Amar, 
107 Harv L Rev at 777 (cited in note 13) (emphasizing the importance of juries in cases 
involving the Fourth Amendment). Amar’s interpretation is intriguing but problematic. It 
does not, for instance, explain why juries should not also provide an effective check for 
searches premised on stolen goods. Why have a warrant requirement at all if civil suits 
were such an effective way of protecting the right against promiscuous search and seizure? 
What protection could juries realistically perform in civil cases if the right to jury trial 
could be waived? See, for example, Patton v United States, 281 US 276, 301 (1930) (holding 
that “notwithstanding the imperative language of the statute, it was competent for the 
parties to waive a trial by jury” in civil cases). Warrants were used in a range of cases, 
from libel to pressing people into military service. What evidence is there that only the 
stolen goods warrants were the object of the second clause of the Fourth Amendment? If 
Amar is targeting stolen goods warrants because of the common-law understanding, then 
the prohibition on entry into the home must, by the same token, be read into the first 
clause. Amar’s argument also does not explain why a warrant would immunize or insulate 
an officer from civil suit. Juries could still consider malfeasance or ill motive, whether 
sufficient grounds to grant the warrant were present, and whether law enforcement 
stepped outside the contours of the warrant. In some sense this moves the inquiry to the 
judicial determination and the representation made by the law enforcement officer in 
question, but a check on government activity remains. This shift helps to explain the great 
debate over, and embrace of, judicial independence that marked the exchange between 
Brutus, Alexander Hamilton, and others. See text accompanying notes 657–65. If judges 
were to prove the gatekeeper, their independence would have to be guaranteed. 
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Amar’s argument raised important questions about the rela-
tionship of the clauses within the text of the Fourth Amendment. 
It also became influential, with about a dozen lower federal and 
state court opinions later citing his reasonableness proposition.18 
Some scholars (including Professor Michael Stokes Paulsen and 
Professor William J. Stuntz) endorsed his position.19 But many 
more criticized the article, suggesting that it was not sufficiently 
grounded in historical sources and therefore had failed to take 
account of contrary evidence.20 
 
 18 See State v Hemenway, 295 P3d 617, 635 n 12 (Or 2013); State v Ochoa, 792 NW2d 
260, 272 (Iowa 2010); United States v Hernandez-Lopez, 761 F Supp 2d 1172, 1198 n 8 (D 
NM 2010); United States v Askew, 529 F3d 1119, 1151 n 1, 1158 n 6 (DC Cir 2008); In re 
Tiffany O., 174 P3d 282, 291 n 4 (Ariz App 2007); Christopher v Nestlerode, 373 F Supp 2d 
503, 512 n 10 (MD Pa 2005); Weber v Oakridge School District 76, 56 P3d 504, 513 n 3 (Or 
App 2002); People v McKay, 41 P3d 59, 80 (Cal 2002); Tenenbaum v Williams, 193 F3d 
581, 602–03 (2d Cir 1999); Buritica v United States, 8 F Supp 2d 1188, 1194 (ND Cal 1998); 
United States v Warren, 997 F Supp 1188, 1194 (ED Wis 1998); United States v Brown, 64 
F3d 1083, 1085 (7th Cir 1995); Brown v State, 653 NE2d 77, 82 n 2 (Ind 1995); United 
States v Johnson, 22 F3d 674, 684 (6th Cir 1994). Although the Supreme Court has never 
directly cited Amar’s proposition, as late as 2004, Thomas, joined by Scalia, suggested that 
“the text of the Fourth Amendment [ ] does not mandate” a warrant requirement as part 
of the reasonableness requirement, “[n]or does the Amendment’s history, which is clear as 
to the Amendment’s principal target (general warrants), but not as clear with respect to 
when warrants were required, if ever.” Groh v Ramirez, 540 US 551, 572 (2004) (Thomas 
dissenting). 
 19 Michael Stokes Paulsen, Book Review, Dirty Harry and the Real Constitution, 64 
U Chi L Rev 1457, 1491 (1997) (calling Amar’s work “an argument that needs, and de-
serves, to be taken seriously”); William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal 
Procedure, 105 Yale L J 393, 409–10 (1995). See also Jeb Rubenfeld, Revolution by Judi-
ciary: The Structure of American Constitutional Law 32–33 (Harvard 2005); Corey M. 
Then, Note, Searches and Seizures of Americans Abroad: Re-examining the Fourth Amend-
ment’s Warrant Clause and the Foreign Intelligence Exception Five Years after United 
States v. Bin Laden, 55 Duke L J 1059, 1071 (2006). 
 20 See, for example, David E. Steinberg, The Uses and Misuses of Fourth Amendment 
History, 10 U Pa J Const L 581, 590–95 (2008); Roger Roots, Are Cops Constitutional?, 11 
Seton Hall Const L J 685, 729–34 (2001); Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original 
Fourth Amendment, 98 Mich L Rev 547, 571–90 (1999); Thomas Y. Davies, The Fictional 
Character of Law-and-Order Originalism: A Case Study of the Distortions and Evasions of 
Framing-Era Arrest Doctrine in Atwater v. Lago Vista, 37 Wake Forest L Rev 239, 263 & 
n 64, 417 n 593 (2002); Susan R. Klein, Book Review, Enduring Principles and Current 
Crises in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 24 L & Soc Inquiry 533, 538–50 (1999); Louis 
Michael Seidman, Book Review, Akhil Amar and the (Premature?) Demise of Criminal 
Procedure Liberalism, 107 Yale L J 2281, 2294–2303 (1998); Tracey Maclin, The Complex-
ity of the Fourth Amendment: A Historical Review, 77 BU L Rev 925, 929 (1997); Morgan 
Cloud, Book Review, Searching through History; Searching for History, 63 U Chi L Rev 
1707, 1732–43 (1996); Donald Dripps, Akhil Amar on Criminal Procedure and Constitu-
tional Law: “Here I Go down That Wrong Road Again”, 74 NC L Rev 1559, 1594–1623 
(1996). See also generally David E. Steinberg, An Original Misunderstanding: Akhil Amar 
and Fourth Amendment History, 42 San Diego L Rev 227 (2005); David A. Sklansky, The 
Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 100 Colum L Rev 1739 (2000); Tracey Maclin, 
When the Cure for the Fourth Amendment Is Worse Than the Disease, 68 S Cal L Rev 1 (1994). 
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As a matter of originalist scholarship, the critiques rest on 
strong ground. At the time of the Founding, prominent scholars 
and public opinion embraced the position that—outside of active 
pursuit of a known felon—the Crown could not forcibly enter a 
subject’s domicile for purposes of search and seizure without a 
specific warrant. The only way that officers could legally demand 
access to the home was with a particularized showing under oath. 
The clauses that cemented this understanding into the US Con-
stitution were deeply contextual: “[t]he right of the people to be 
secure . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures”21 meant 
that the government could not enter at will, and that general war-
rants—under which the government could gain entry—would be 
prohibited. For a specific warrant to be valid, in turn, it had to meet 
the requirements of the second part of the Fourth Amendment. 
Part of the problem with Amar’s argument appears to be that 
it relied in significant measure on a lecture presented in April 
1967 by Professor Telford Taylor at the Ohio State University Col-
lege of Law, which he published two years later as part of a book.22 
Based on minimal historical documentation, Taylor argued that 
the Framers were not concerned about warrantless searches—
and that the Fourth Amendment required only a reasonableness 
standard.23 
 
 21 US Const Amend IV. 
 22 See generally Telford Taylor, Two Studies in Constitutional Interpretation (Ohio 
State 1969). See also, for example, Amar, 107 Harv L Rev at 764–66, 789, 803 (cited in 
note 13). 
 23 Taylor, Two Studies in Constitutional Interpretation at 23–44 (cited in note 22). In 
support of his claim, for instance, that warrants were not historically required, Taylor 
noted that it would be “quite impracticable unless there are a reasonable number of offi-
cials who can read and write.” Id at 27. He continued: “Accordingly, it is hardly surprising 
[ ] that the earliest statutes authorizing searches say nothing of warrants.” Id. He did not, 
however, cite any laws—nor was the assumed connection between illiteracy and a lack of 
warrants anything more than mere conjecture. Taylor continued, suggesting that the ar-
rest and search of suspected felons without a warrant was a frequent occurrence and that 
“it is from this natural if often oppressive practice that much of the modern law of search 
and seizure has sprung.” Id at 28. Yet he provided no evidence of this assertion—to the 
contrary, he went on to quote Sir Frederick Pollock and Frederick William Maitland on 
the infrequency of arrest (not even addressing search) outside of hot pursuit. Id, citing 
Frederick Pollock and Frederic William Maitland, 2 The History of English Law before the 
Time of Edward I 582–83 (Cambridge 2d ed 1898). Taylor further contended that search 
incident to arrest suggests that warrants were not required, without realizing that this 
amounted to an exception. Taylor, Two Studies in Constitutional Interpretation at 28–29 
(cited in note 22), citing William Sheppard, The Offices of Constables, ch 8, § 2, no 4 
(Hondgkinsonne 2d ed c 1675), and Saunders Welch, Observations on the Office of Consta-
ble 12, 14 (printed for A. Millar 1754). 
03 DONOHUE ART FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 9/11/2016  8:17 PM 
2016] The Original Fourth Amendment 1189 
 
In addition to Taylor, in support of the claim that the common-
law search referred to in the Warrant Clause related solely to sto-
len goods, Amar referenced a 1765 pamphlet written by John 
Almon, the “Father of Candor,” stating that to retrieve stolen 
goods, a sworn statement must be provided to a magistrate and a 
warrant must be obtained.24 This, Amar suggested, demonstrated 
that the Warrant Clause was limited to stolen items.25 
The errors in the argument are clear. First, simply because a 
sworn statement must be made to retrieve stolen goods does not 
mean that the same is not required for searches related to other 
matters. Some of the most well-known search cases at the time, 
for instance, centered on seditious libel, not stolen goods—even as 
other statutes provided for searches for such disparate objects as 
counterfeit coins and indigents wanted for service on the high 
seas.26 Second, the fact that a warrant was required under certain 
conditions (that is, those outlined in the pamphlet) does not imply 
that in all other circumstances a warrant would not be required. 
Using a similarly faulty ratiocination, Amar cited a statute 
passed in 1789, which allowed naval inspectors to enter ships 
without warrants to search for and to seize goods violating cus-
toms.27 He noted that “[o]ther provisions of the 1789 Act author-
ized, but did not require, warrants to search houses, stores, and 
buildings.”28 Since the statute did not explicitly prohibit warrant-
less entry, he reasoned, warrants were not necessary. The ab-
sence of a prohibition, however, does not imply the presence of 
permission—particularly when provision is made for the condi-
tions under which a home could be searched. Parallel cases in 
English law, moreover, underscored the necessity of customs of-
ficers and others first obtaining a warrant, supported by probable 
cause and particularly describing the place to be searched, before 
the Crown could enter into any private residence.29 In the absence 
 
 24 Amar, 107 Harv L Rev at 765 n 21 (cited in note 13). 
 25 Id at 765. 
 26 See Part I. 
 27 Amar, 107 Harv L Rev at 766–67 (cited in note 13), citing Act of July 31, 1789, 
ch 5, § 24, 1 Stat 29, 43 (repealed 1790). 
 28 Amar, 107 Harv L Rev at 766 (cited in note 13). Amar similarly relies on this ar-
gument in his rebuttal to Professor Thomas Davies. Amar, 30 Suffolk U L Rev at 59 (cited 
in note 13). 
 29 See, for example, Bostock, 95 Eng Rep at 1146 (Nares) (distinguishing protections 
of personal homes from protections of businesses and finding that the absence of probable 
cause resulted in a judgment for the plaintiff of trespass). See also Cooper v Boot, 99 Eng 
Rep 911, 916 (KB 1785) (finding that the statute of 10 Geo 1, ch 10 imposed a duty on 
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of a warrant, the actions of the government official amounted to 
a trespass. 
Despite the shortcomings of Amar’s argument, some of its 
most effective critics have also made assumptions about the orig-
inal meaning of the Fourth Amendment that fail inspection. Five 
years after Amar published his piece, Professor Thomas Davies 
offered one of the most sustained critiques, pointing out that the 
Framers never contemplated that the government would attempt 
to conduct warrantless intrusions.30 They could not have antici-
pated that the word “unreasonable” would be transformed in fu-
ture centuries into a meter for the validity of something that 
would not have been permitted in the first place.31 
Davies’s account differed in subtle but important ways from 
two prior histories of the Fourth Amendment that embraced a 
warrant preference. In 1937, Professor Nelson Lasson published 
a manuscript in which he detailed the role of James Otis’s oration 
in Paxton’s Case,32 the controversy surrounding John Wilkes in 
England, and the Townshend Acts as precursors to the Fourth 
Amendment.33 Lasson suggested that the Founders’ concerns 
about general warrants, illustrated in each of these cases, had 
broadened by 1789 into a more comprehensive principle34 of free-
dom from unreasonable search and seizure.35 He concluded that 
the first clause of the Amendment encompassed an ideal, while 
the second clause banned general warrants.36 
In 1990, Professor William Cuddihy supplanted Lasson’s 
work with a meticulous history of the Fourth Amendment.37 Like 
 
excise officers having grounds of suspicion to lay them before a justice of peace, or com-
missioner of excise, upon oath, and that the judgment of the magistrate upon ex parte 
examination, certified by oath, served as a legal warrant); Samuel v Payne, 99 Eng Rep 
230, 230–31 (KB 1780) (noting that a justice of the peace issued a search warrant based 
on a charge that the individual possessed stolen goods). 
 30 Davies, 98 Mich L Rev at 551 (cited in note 20). 
 31 Id. 
 32 1 Quincy 51 (Mass 1761). 
 33 See generally Nelson B. Lasson, The History and Development of the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution (Johns Hopkins 1937). 
 34 See id at 101–03. 
 35 Davies, 98 Mich L Rev at 568 (cited in note 20), citing Lasson, The History and 
Development of the Fourth Amendment at 81 (cited in note 33). 
 36 Lasson, The History and Development of the Fourth Amendment at 103 (cited in 
note 33). See also Davies, 98 Mich L Rev at 568 (cited in note 20) (summarizing Lasson’s 
analysis). 
 37 See generally William J. Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment: Origins and Original 
Meaning (unpublished PhD dissertation, Claremont Graduate School, 1990) (“Cuddihy 
Dissertation”). He subsequently published his dissertation as a book. See generally 
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Lasson, Cuddihy emphasized the initial phrase as the more pro-
found statement: “The amendment’s first clause, which explicitly 
renounces all unreasonable searches and seizures, overshadows 
the second clause, which implicitly renounced only a single cate-
gory, the general warrant.”38 He concluded, “The framers of the 
amendment were less concerned with a right against general war-
rants than with the broader rights those warrants infringed.”39 To 
consider the Fourth Amendment as a prohibition on general war-
rants “disparages its intricacy. The amendment expressed not a 
single idea,” Cuddihy wrote, “but a family of ideas whose identity 
and dimensions developed in historical context.”40 
Davies faulted Lasson and Cuddihy for neglecting to clarify 
the basic question: whether or in what circumstances a warrant 
is required.41 According to Davies, this failure had given Amar an 
opening to suggest the absence of a relationship between the 
clauses.42 Davies went on to respond to Taylor and Amar in two 
ways: first, by noting the dearth of historical support for their 
claims; and second, by offering evidence that what the Framers 
objected to was not general warrants per se, but the allocation of 
the discretionary exercise of power to petty officers.43 Providing 
such officers with search and seizure powers outside of any war-
rant would have been abhorrent—thus, warrantless authorities 
were never on the table.44 Davies noted that the Founding gener-
ation “did not have a diffuse concern about the security of person 
and house.”45 Why? Because “the common-law rules regarding 
search and arrest authority provided sufficient protection against 
unjustified intrusions.”46 The real concern, Davies argued, was a 
common-law vulnerability: the potential for future legislation to 
make general warrants legal, thus undermining security against 
government intrusion.47 This, he reasoned, is why the Fourth 
 
William J. Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment: Origins and Original Meaning: 602–
1791 (Oxford 2009). 
 38 Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment at 765 (cited in note 37). 
 39 Id at 765–66. 
 40 Id at 770. 
 41 See Davies, 98 Mich L Rev at 571 (cited in note 20). 
 42 See id at 571–74. 
 43 See id at 575–83. 
 44 Id at 581–82. 
 45 Davies, 98 Mich L Rev at 590 (cited in note 20). 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id at 600–10. 
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Amendment was initially inserted into Article I, § 9 as a limita-
tion on the legislature.48 
Davies is correct that, at the Founding, there was no such 
thing as a “standard of reasonableness,” such as has marked the 
Fourth Amendment discourse since the 1967 case of Katz v United 
States.49 Careful historians could hardly conclude otherwise. As 
this Article demonstrates, Amar and Taylor are simply wrong on 
this point. Taylor’s further claim, echoed by Amar, that the Fram-
ers were unconcerned about warrantless intrusion is also unsup-
ported by history. The Founders were worried about all intru-
sions—and no warrant lacking the appropriate particularity 
could overcome the presumption against invasion of the home. 
Amar is similarly incorrect that, as a result, reasonableness—and 
not a warrant requirement—lies at the heart of the Fourth 
Amendment. Reasonableness does lay at the heart of the Fourth 
Amendment, but what it meant was that, outside of apprehend-
ing a known felon, a warrant would be required. 
Where Davies (and, indeed, Lasson and Cuddihy) errs is in 
failing to understand the first clause as itself restricting govern-
ment entry in order to prevent promiscuous search and seizure.50 
As the Supreme Court noted in 2001, “[t]he touchstone of the 
Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.”51 What “unreasonable” 
meant in the seventeenth century was “against reason,” which 
translated into “against the reason of the common law.” Warrant-
less entry, as well as general warrants (warrants that failed to 
specify the person, crime, or place to be searched), violated the 
reason of the common law and were therefore unreasonable. Davies 
is correct that the clause did not mean what it has come to be 
understood as meaning in a relativistic sense: an evaluation of 
 
 48 Id at 700 & n 437. 
 49 389 US 347 (1967). 
 50 Cuddihy rightly critiqued Davies for narrowing the category of “unreasonable 
searches and seizures” to include only general warrants. William Cuddihy, Warrantless 
House-to-House Searches and Fourth Amendment Originalism: A Reply to Professor Davies, 
44 Tex Tech L Rev 997, 998 (2012) (“Davies’s identification of the general warrant as the 
Amendment’s only ‘unreasonable’ category in 1791 massively contradicts a pre-revolutionary 
consensus on search and seizure that anathematized all legal entities that incubated general 
house searches.”). It is therefore puzzling why Cuddihy would see the first clause as a gen-
eral statement of principle requiring a warrant for entry and not also a prohibition on 
general warrants, a concept that he instead applies to the specifics required in the second 
clause of the Fourth Amendment. See text accompanying notes 37–40. 
 51 United States v Knights, 534 US 112, 118 (2001). 
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what could be considered more or less reasonable. This interpre-
tation untethers the Fourth Amendment from its original mean-
ing, undermining rights that the Framers sought to protect. 
This Article sets the historical record straight. The proper 
way to understand the Fourth Amendment is as a prohibition on 
general search and seizure authorities and a requirement for spe-
cific warrants. The first clause outlaws promiscuous search and 
seizure, even as the second clarifies precisely what will be re-
quired for a particularized warrant to be valid. The government 
could not violate the right against search and seizure of one’s per-
son, house, papers, or effects absent either a felony arrest or a 
warrant meeting the requirements detailed in the second clause. 
In making this argument, the Article provides a detailed narra-
tive of the broader context of the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment, examining the writings, laws, and legal opinions that laid 
the groundwork for its inclusion in the Constitution. 
Part I begins with the English experience, which embraced 
the premise that an Englishman’s dwelling was his castle. The 
common law recognized only a few, limited conditions under 
which the Crown could enter the home absent a warrant. Efforts 
to get around common-law prohibitions by passing statutory 
measures that allowed for the issuance of general warrants cre-
ated increasing friction between English subjects and the Crown, 
leading scholars and jurists to reject indiscriminate search and 
seizure. A notable exception was in the context of felony arrest 
(during apprehension of a known felon, or in the course of the hue 
and cry).52 
Part II of this Article turns to the colonial experience, which 
reinforced the inherited discourse. Reflecting the sanctity of the 
home, outside of limited circumstances, warrants were required 
for the government to enter. To obtain greater access, officers of 
the Crown increasingly turned to general warrants. As in England, 
 
 52 In a later response to Davies, Amar refers to Sir William Blackstone’s writing to 
support the assertion that there is no warrant requirement in the Fourth Amendment. 
See Amar, 30 Suffolk U L Rev at 56–59 (cited in note 13). He misses in this analysis that 
public safety—which included apprehending a fleeing felon immediately following the fe-
lonious act—presented an exception to the general requirement. He also focuses on the 
citizen’s arrest aspect of felony pursuit, contradicting Davies’s assertion that such arrests 
do not represent state action. The analysis rather misses the point that breaches of the 
peace and the fleeing felon exception were just that: exceptions and not the general rule. 
The fact that constables, by nature of their office, held similar powers also misses the 
point. Sir Matthew Hale, Sergeant William Hawkins, Blackstone, and others have spilled 
a considerable amount of ink discussing the level of assuredness needed during the com-
mission of a felony, or immediately afterward, for the exception to hold. See Part I.C. 
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it was not that such instruments did not exist—it was that the 
government’s expanding use of them spurred the colonists to re-
sist British rule. 
The War of Independence was fought in part because of the 
Crown’s effort to exercise writs of assistance, a form of general 
warrant wherein government officials failed to specify the precise 
place or person to be searched, or to provide evidence under oath 
to a third-party magistrate of a particular crime suspected. In the 
shadow of the French and Indian War, Britain had begun to make 
ever-greater use of the writs, sowing the seeds of revolution. Otis’s 
argument in Paxton’s Case set the stage.53 President John Adams 
later reported, “Then and there was the first scene of the first act 
of opposition to the arbitrary claims of Great Britain. Then and 
there the child Independence was born.”54 The nascent states 
went on to prohibit general warrants in their state constitutions.55 
Outside of active pursuit of a known felon, no forcible entry into 
the home would be countenanced absent a specific warrant. 
Part III details how a number of the states ratified the US 
Constitution only on the condition that the document would be 
amended. A prohibition on indiscriminate search and seizure fig-
ured largely in the debate. The object was to prevent government 
officials from intruding upon the sanctity of the home unless offi-
cials could present evidence, under oath to a magistrate, of a 
crime committed. The court would then have to issue a warrant 
under its own seal, particularly describing the place to be 
searched and the individual on whom the warrant would be 
served. The Founders’ primary concern was that the government 
not be allowed free rein to search for potential evidence of crimi-
nal wrongdoing. This concern reflected a close relationship be-
tween the interests encapsulated in the Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ments. The Supreme Court subsequently tried to capture this 
relationship in the mere-evidence rule. Although later set aside 
as unworkable, the rule was consistent with parallel English 
cases and the animating ideas behind the Fourth Amendment. 
As Part IV recognizes, the debates and discussions surround-
ing the right to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure 
 
 53 Lasson, The History and Development of the Fourth Amendment at 58–59 (cited in 
note 33). 
 54 Letter from John Adams to William Tudor (Mar 29, 1817), in 10 The Works of John 
Adams, Second President of the United States 244, 248 (Little, Brown 1856). See also 
Laura K. Donohue, The Future of Foreign Intelligence: Privacy and Surveillance in a Dig-
ital Age 75 (Oxford 2016). 
 55 See Donohue, The Future of Foreign Intelligence at 84–94 (cited in note 54). 
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are notable for what they did not include. They did not include 
exceptions for treason or threats to the government. They did not 
allow for suspensions or violations of the general rule to collect 
intelligence, to enforce customs laws, or to collect revenues. It was 
any intrusion in one’s private sphere that the Framers sought to 
confine within narrow bounds. 
It would be difficult to do justice to the full range of argu-
ments that animated the rejection of warrantless search and sei-
zure, general warrants, and specific warrants lacking the requis-
ite particularity. Yet similar themes reverberate in English and 
American treatises, legal opinions, pamphlets, and orations. The 
right to be secure in one’s home was one of the principal concerns, 
accompanied by the right to a private sphere within which 
thoughts, beliefs, writings, and intimate relations were protected 
from outside inspection. The Founding generation voiced con-
cerns about the harms that could ensue from giving the govern-
ment access to information and thus providing officials with the 
power to head off political or religious opposition. Information ob-
tained could be used to embarrass citizens or to harm their rela-
tionships with others. Even when innocent in itself, information 
could be combined to make it look as though an individual were 
engaged in illegal activity. Structural harms could also follow, 
with the targeting of the other branches’ personnel, or of state and 
local leaders, undermining separation of powers and federalism. 
This Article concludes by suggesting that, while living consti-
tutionalism may embrace a meaning of “unreasonable” beyond 
that adopted at the Founding, it is on shakier ground when it may 
look to read the rights that existed at the time the Constitution 
was drafted out of existence. At a minimum, then, this means that 
outside of active pursuit of a known felon, the Fourth Amendment 
prohibits the government from violating the sanctity of the home 
to conduct searches or seizures absent a warrant, under a gen-
eral warrant, or under a specific warrant lacking the requisite 
particularity. 
I.  INHERITED DISCOURSE 
Seventeenth- and eighteenth-century legal treatises em-
braced the position that, outside of certain circumstances, the 
Crown could not intrude on the sanctity of the home without a 
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warrant.56 Efforts to get around the rule by drafting warrants 
broadly to allow for indiscriminate search and seizure were met 
with objection. It was not that the Crown never tried to evade the 
warrant requirement—it was that common-law principles did not 
allow it.57 
A. English Cases Prohibiting General Warrants 
Three influential cases laid the groundwork for the Founders’ 
rejection of general warrants: Entick v Carrington58 in 1765, 
Wilkes v Wood59 in 1763, and Leach v Money60 in 1765. The stories 
behind the cases illustrate why English jurists and scholars re-
jected such instruments. 
1. Entick v Carrington (1765). 
In 1755, the seeds of the first controversy were sown. John 
Entick, self-styled reverend and sometime English schoolmaster, 
met political satirist John Shebbeare and publisher Jonathan 
Scott in The Horn Tavern at the junction of Little Knightrider and 
Sermon Lane, London.61 In the presence of their solicitor, Arthur 
Beardmore, the men launched a weekly essay paper, The Monitor, 
“to commend good men and good measures, and to censure bad 
 
 56 For discussion of the fleeing felon exception and its relationship to the hue and 
cry, see Part I.C. 
 57 See, for example, James Oldham, 1 The Mansfield Manuscripts and the Growth of 
English Law in the Eighteenth Century 204 (UNC 1992) (quoting the manuscript report of 
Leach v Money, 19 How St Tr 1001 (KB 1765)). In the words of Chief Justice Mansfield: 
“Usage, no doubt, has great Weight; but Usage against clear principles and authorities of 
Law never weighs. Where the inconvenience of Setting the Error right would be greater, 
than in letting it continue in the way it was; that would be a reason for Establishing the 
Usage.” And as Justice Yates added: “[A]n Usage from the 1st year of Rome would not give 
them any Sanction at all; for no Usage or Custom whatever, can ever establish anything 
that is in its first Principles illegal.” Oldham, 1 The Mansfield Manuscripts at 204 (cited 
in note 57). Based on this commentary, Professor James Oldham concludes, “Usage, there-
fore, did not control.” Id. Oldham goes on to ask how, then, jurists identified first principles 
and suggests that they looked to statute, reason, and authorities, writing that “principles 
fixed by common law cases were not to be overcome by contrary usage.” Id at 205. See also 
id (“[W]here a question had not been settled by judicial determination, custom and usage 
remained relevant.”). 
 58 19 How St Tr 1029 (CP 1765). 
 59 19 How St Tr 1153 (CP 1763). 
 60 19 How St Tr 1001 (KB 1765). 
 61 Entick, 19 How St Tr at 1033. See also David Feldman, The Politics and People of 
Entick v. Carrington, in Adam Tomkins and Paul Scott, eds, Entick v Carrington: 250 
Years of the Rule of Law 5, 25 (Hart 2015). 
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ones.”62 The rebellious nature of the enterprise could hardly be 
ignored. The founders’ aim was nothing less than to arouse “that 
spirit of LIBERTY and LOYALTY, for which the British nation was 
anciently distinguished, but which was in a manner lulled asleep 
by that golden opiate, which weak and wicked Ministers for many 
years, had too successfully tendered to persons of all ranks, as a 
necessary engine of government.”63 
Such was the derision with which the paper treated the polit-
ical elite that on November 6, 1762, the second Earl of Halifax, 
George Montagu Dunk, member of the King’s Privy Council and 
newly appointed secretary of state for the Northern Department, 
launched a campaign against it. The warrant that Halifax signed 
on that day decried The Monitor’s “gross and scandalous reflec-
tions and invectives upon his majesty’s government, and upon 
both houses of parliament,” naming Entick as the individual res-
ponsible.64 Halifax directed King George III’s messengers to ob-
tain and deliver Entick’s person and papers to him.65 
Five days later, the King’s chief messenger, Nathan Carrington, 
and three “messengers in ordinary” executed the warrant.66 At 
eleven o’clock in the morning, the King’s messengers opened 
Entick’s front door and entered his home.67 For the next four 
hours they used “force and arms” to accomplish their purpose.68 
Outraged at the intrusion, Entick brought a trespass suit on 
grounds of the most ancient of English rights: that of an English-
man to be secure in his own home against unreasonable govern-
ment intrusion.69 
Charles Pratt, chief justice of the Common Pleas, presided 
over the trial.70 In ruling against Halifax and for Entick, Pratt 
observed that “[t]he great end, for which men entered into society, 
 
 62 1 The Monitor: or, British Freeholder, The Dedication *1 (printed for J. Scott 3d 
ed 1760). 
 63 Id at *1–2. 
 64 Entick, 19 How St Tr at 1034. Seditious libel was a misdemeanor. It was custom-
arily tried in the Court of King’s Bench. See, for example, Robert Scott, 1 The History of 
England; during the Reign of George III 390 (J. Robins and Co 1824) (noting that the at-
torney general filed a bill for seditious libel in the Court of King’s Bench). The action for 
trespass came through the Court of Common Pleas. Entick, 19 How St Tr at 1030. 
 65 Entick, 19 How St Tr at 1033–34. 
 66 Id at 1034. 
 67 Id at 1034–35. 
 68 Id at 1030. 
 69 Entick, 19 How St Tr at 1032. 
 70 Pratt, Charles, in H.C.G. Matthew and Brian Harrison, eds, 45 Oxford Dictionary 
of National Biography 211, 211–12 (Oxford 2004). He became Lord Camden in 1765. Id. 
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was to secure their property.”71 The common law rejected the 
proposition that the Crown could enter its subjects’ domiciles at 
will: “[E]very invasion of private property, be it ever so minute, is 
a trespass.”72 The protection of private property extended to letters, 
papers, and documents. “Papers are the owner’s goods and chat-
tels,” Pratt explained, “they are his dearest property; and are so far 
from enduring a seizure, that they will hardly bear an inspection.”73 
For Pratt, it was not the physical break-in or the rummaging 
in drawers that constituted the essence of the Crown’s miscon-
duct, but rather the invasion of the indefeasible rights of personal 
security, liberty, and private property.74 Every man in his home 
was entitled to live free from the gaze of the Crown. The right to 
privacy ought not to be infringed. The wrong occurred not just 
when property was confiscated or incriminating evidence ob-
tained, but at the moment the King’s messengers entered.75 
Pratt took pains to distinguish what had happened in the 
case of the general warrant for seditious libel from the standards 
adopted for a specific warrant in criminal law. In the latter in-
stance, “[t]here must be a full charge upon oath of a theft commit-
ted.”76 A warrant must be executed in the presence of an officer of 
the law. When a private person suspected criminal activity, evi-
dence had to be provided under oath to a constable, who then de-
termined the reasonableness of the grounds for the suspicion. 
In this case, nothing had been described, nor the target of the 
search distinguished. Pratt explained, “no charge is requisite to 
prove, that the party has any criminal papers in his custody[;] no 
person present to separate or select[;] no person to prove in the 
owner’s behalf the officer’s misbehaviour.”77 General searches, 
such as that to which Entick had been subject, raised the specter 
of the Star Chamber.78 They had been rejected in its aftermath. 
 
 71 Entick, 19 How St Tr at 1066. The sufficiency of the warrant was a matter of law 
and thus within the judge’s domain and not the jury’s. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. 
 74 See Boyd v United States, 116 US 616, 630 (1886) (noting that Pratt laid down the 
basic principles of the Fourth Amendment). 
 75 See John E.F. Wood, The Scope of the Constitutional Immunity against Searches 
and Seizures, 34 W Va L Q 1, 14 (1927). 
 76 Entick, 19 How St Tr at 1067. 
 77 Id. 
 78 The Star Chamber was an English court named after the building in which the 
court sat in the palace of Edward the Confessor at Westminster. It operated in the six-
teenth and early seventeenth centuries until Parliament abolished it in 1641. The court 
became a political tool, notorious for secret proceedings that violated the rule of law and 
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Even to prevent the most serious crimes, such searches were not 
allowed. Pratt suggested that “such a power would be more per-
nicious to the innocent than useful to the public.”79 
2. Wilkes v Wood (1763). 
Entick was not the first time that Pratt had confronted—and 
condemned—a general warrant. Two years earlier, he had found 
himself embroiled in a case involving John Wilkes (one of Entick’s 
close associates and a darling of the American Revolution), as well 
as a parallel case involving efforts to fine the printer of Wilkes’s 
writing. Together with a prominent case from the American colo-
nies, these judicial challenges—and the legal treatises on which 
they were based—were to profoundly shape the Founding Fa-
thers’ introduction and understanding of the Fourth Amendment. 
Wilkes, an English politician raised by commoners, found ex-
pression in his pen.80 In 1762, after placing a handful of essays in 
The Monitor, Wilkes helped to start a political weekly to counter 
The Briton, a progovernment publication, naming its counter-
poise the North Briton.81 The paper dedicated much of its space to 
lampooning George III’s Scottish favorite, John Stuart, third Earl 
of Bute.82 As Bute was the beloved tutor to the Prince of Wales, 
George III’s accession to the throne in 1760 immediately im-
proved Bute’s circumstances.83 In May 1762, Bute became first 
lord of the treasury and leader of the House of Lords.84 He entered 
into complex negotiations with the French, bringing the Seven 
 
seen as representing the worst exercise of arbitrary power. Edward P. Cheyney, The Court 
of Star Chamber, 18 Am Hist Rev 727, 727 (1913). 
 79 Entick, 19 How St Tr at 1073. 
 80 See Wilkes, John, in H.C.G. Matthew and Brian Harrison, eds, 58 Oxford Diction-
ary of National Biography 953, 954 (Oxford 2004). 
 81 See id; Arthur H. Cash, John Wilkes: The Scandalous Father of Civil Liberty 68–
69 (Yale 2006). 
 82 See, for example, John Wilkes, North Briton No 2, in 1 The North Briton 6, 6–7 
(printed for John Mitchell and James Williams 1764) (“My joy and exultation are now 
complete, for I have lived to see my countryman, the Earl of Bute . . . presiding over the 
finances of this kingdom.”). The first volume of the North Briton appeared June 5, 1762, 
and continued weekly thereafter until April 2, 1763, which is the date of North Briton 
No 44. North Briton No 45 was published on April 23, 1763, and North Briton No 46 on 
November 12, 1763. Wilkes printed the first collected edition in his own home in 1763. Bib-
liography of the ‘North Briton.’, in 9 Notes and Queries: A Medium of Intercommunication for 
Literary Men, General Readers, Etc. 104, 104–06 (John C. Francis 7th series Jan–June 1890). 
 83 See Stuart, John, in H.C.G. Matthew and Brian Harrison, eds, 53 Oxford Diction-
ary of National Biography 173, 174–75 (Oxford 2004). 
 84 Id at 176. 
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Years’ War to conclusion.85 November of that year saw the prelim-
inaries signed in Fontainebleau, France.86 
The North Briton and others vehemently attacked the terms of 
peace. Upon first hearing of the agreement, the journal inveighed: 
Almost every thing won from the French by the wisdom or 
valour of a Whig administration, these vipers, bred and nour-
ished in the bosom of our country, sacrificed to France from a 
lust of power, and the interested views of their faction, ever 
propitious and favourable to the designs of the ancient enemy 
of this kingdom.87 
Formal publication of the terms of agreement between England 
and France fared little better. “It is with the deepest concern, aston-
ishment, and indignation,” Wilkes wrote, “that the Preliminary 
articles of Peace have been received by the public.”88 He decried 
their substance: “They are of such a nature, that they more re-
semble the ancient treaties of friendship and alliance between 
France and her old firm, ally Scotland, than any which have ever 
subsisted between that power, and her natural enemy, England.”89 
Wilkes continued, “Almost all the glorious advantages we had 
gained over our most restless and perfidious foe, our ministers 
have given away.”90 Wilkes worried that French commerce would 
benefit to the detriment of England.91 More lamentably, 
[t]he French king, by a stroke of his pen, has regained what 
all the power of that nation, and her allies, could never have 
recovered; and England, once more the dupe of a subtle ne-
gociation [sic], has consented to give up very nearly all her 
conquests, the purchase of such immense public treasure, 
and the blood of so many noble and brave families.92 
 
 85 Wilkes, John at 954 (cited in note 80); Stuart, John at 175–76 (cited in note 83). 
 86 See Stuart, John at 176 (cited in note 83). 
 87 John Wilkes, North Briton No 25, in 2 The North Briton 136, 136–37 (printed for 
John Mitchell and James Williams 1764). 
 88 John Wilkes, North Briton No 28, in 2 The North Briton 154, 154 (cited in note 87). 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id at 156. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Wilkes, North Briton No 28 at 156 (cited in note 88). 
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Despite political opposition, the Treaty of Paris passed the 
House of Lords and the House of Commons by decisive majori-
ties.93 But hostility against Bute continued, forcing his resigna-
tion as prime minister in April 1763.94 
George Grenville took Bute’s place—both in government and 
as an object of Wilkes’s derision. “The NORTH BRITON,” Wilkes 
wrote, “has been steady in his opposition to a single, insolent, in-
capable, despotic minister; and is equally ready, in the service of 
his country, to combat the triple-headed, Cerberean administra-
tion, if the SCOT is to assume that motley form.”95 Wilkes pilloried 
Grenville for sanctioning the treaty, which had “saved England 
from the certain ruin of success.”96 According to Wilkes, the agree-
ment had sacrificed any immediate advantages of trade or terri-
tory to England’s “inveterate enemies.”97 He lamented seeing the 
Crown “sunk even to prostitution.”98 
This time, Wilkes had gone too far. Three days after North 
Briton No 45 was issued, Halifax signed a general warrant, di-
recting the same Carrington who would later execute the warrant 
against Entick, and three messengers, “to make strict and dili-
gent search for the authors, printers and publishers of a seditious 
and treasonable paper, intitled, The North Briton,” and “to appre-
hend and seize [them], together with their papers, and to bring in 
safe custody before me, to be examined.”99 
With the warrant in hand, on the morning of April 30, 1762, 
the four messengers and Constable Robert Chisholm arrived at 
Wilkes’s home.100 It took more than two hours for Wilkes to agree 
to leave the premises.101 He insisted that his status as a member 
of Parliament protected him.102 Eventually, he agreed to go to 
Halifax’s home—just a few doors down Great George Street.103 
Thereafter, Robert Wood, secretary to Lord Egremont, secretary 
 
 93 Stuart, John at 176 (cited in note 83). 
 94 Id. 
 95 John Wilkes, North Briton No 45, in 2 The North Briton 261, 261 (cited in note 87). 
 96 John Wilkes, North Briton No 31, in 2 The North Briton 173, 175 (cited in note 87). 
 97 Wilkes, North Briton No 45 at 264–65 (cited in note 95). 
 98 Id at 267. 
 99 The General Warrant on Which John Wilkes Was Arrested, 30 April 1763, in D.B. 
Horn, ed, English Historical Documents 1714–1815 61, 61–62 (Methuen 1967). 
 100 Wilkes, 19 How St Tr at 1155. 
 101 See id.  
 102 Cash, John Wilkes at 106 (cited in note 81). 
 103 Id at 107. 
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of state for the Southern Department, oversaw the search and sei-
zure of Wilkes’s possessions.104 
Wilkes’s butler, present at the time, recounted the events 
that transpired: 
[T]hey rummaged all the papers together they could find, in 
and about the room; [ ] they (the messengers) fetched a sack, 
and filled it with papers. [ ] Blackmore then went down 
stairs, and fetched a smith to open the locks. . . . [A] messen-
ger, then came, and would whisper Mr. Wood, who bade him 
speak out; he then said he brought orders from lord Halifax 
to seize all manuscripts.105 
When the locksmith arrived, the men took all of the papers out of 
Wilkes’s drawers and put them, along with his pocketbook, into 
the sack.106 Wilkes challenged his imprisonment and the legality 
of the warrant, bringing a claim of trespass and false imprison-
ment against Wood.107 
Wilkes’s status in the minds of many parliamentarians was 
that of a boil on the backside of a pig. As William Barrington, sec-
ond Viscount Barrington, wrote to the British envoy in Berlin in 
May 1763, “Nothing is at present talk’d of here but the Affair of a 
very impudent worthless man named Wilks, a Member of Parlia-
ment, who was lately taken up by the Secretaries of State for writ-
ing a most seditious Libel personally attacking the King.”108 But 
the “mob,” as Barrington despaired, and not a few others—who 
sought no favor from the monarch—supported Wilkes, if not for 
 
 104 Wilkes, 19 How St Tr at 1156.  
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id at 1153, 1179. The Kingdom of Great Britain at that time had two secretaries 
of state, with Halifax placed in the more junior position of secretary of state of the North-
ern Department, responsible for northern England, Scotland, and relations with the 
Protestant countries in northern Europe, and Charles Wyndham, second Earl of 
Egremont, serving in the more senior role of secretary of state of the Southern Depart-
ment, which focused on southern England, Wales, and Ireland, as well as Roman Catholic 
and Muslim countries abroad. Halifax explained during the trial that although the two 
offices were carried on in separate departments, together they formed one complete secre-
tary’s office. See id at 1161. Thus, as Egremont’s secretary, Wood was heavily involved in 
Wilkes’s prosecution. Wood also had been involved in the preliminaries of the Treaty of 
Paris. 
 108 Letter from Lord Barrington to Mr. Mitchell (May 13, 1763), in Henry Ellis, ed, 
4 Original Letters, Illustrative of English History 464, 464 (printed for Harding and Le-
pard 1827). 
03 DONOHUE ART FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 9/11/2016  8:17 PM 
2016] The Original Fourth Amendment 1203 
 
the substance of what he had written, then for the reason that the 
Crown had gone too far.109 
Pratt ruled that Wilkes’s arrest and detention infringed par-
liamentary privilege.110 Libel being no breach of the peace, the 
Crown must release Wilkes.111 The decision floored the ministry. 
Wilkes spun the verdict as a defense of liberty, giving a rousing 
speech to a crowd of thousands, which accompanied him from 
Westminster Hall back to his home on Great George Street.112 
Forced to release Wilkes from prison on Friday, May 6, 1763, by 
Monday, May 9, Halifax had ordered Attorney General Charles 
Yorke to prosecute Wilkes for seditious libel. That same day Yorke 
filed charges in the Court of King’s Bench. Wilkes brought suit.113 
The trial began at nine o’clock in the morning on December 
6, 1763, at the Court of Common Pleas at Westminster.114 Wilkes’s 
lawyer, John Glynn, argued that more was at stake than the sim-
ple execution of a warrant against one man. The case “touched 
the liberty of every subject of this country, and, if found to be le-
gal, would shake that most precious inheritance of English-
men.”115 Glynn explained, “In vain has our house been declared, 
by the law, our asylum and defence, if it is capable of being en-
tered, upon any frivolous or no pretence at all, by a secretary of 
state.”116 
The seizing of Wilkes’s papers stood as the most serious of the 
charges at hand: “for other offences, an acknowledgement might 
make amends; but [ ] for the promulgation of our most private 
concerns, affairs of the most secret personal nature, no reparation 
whatsoever could be made.”117 English law, counsel argued, “never 
admits of a general search-warrant.”118 Beyond the privacy inva-
sion, significant risk accompanied the proposition “[t]hat some 
papers, quite innocent in themselves, might, by the slightest al-
teration, be converted to criminal action.”119 The warrant, signed 
 
 109 Id at 464–65. 
 110 See The Case of John Wilkes, Esq on a Habeas Corpus, 19 How St Tr 981, 993 
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 111 Id. 
 112 Cash, John Wilkes at 115–16 (cited in note 81). 
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three days before Halifax actually received information support-
ing its execution, failed to name Wilkes.120 It did not include spe-
cific items to be seized, nor particular places to be searched.121 For 
Glynn, it was “an outrage to the constitution.”122 
After more than twelve hours of witnesses and argument, 
Pratt summarized the evidence that had been presented, noting 
that the action in question was one of trespass, to which Wood 
had initially pleaded not guilty but later shifted to defend based 
on a special justification.123 Pratt inveighed the jury to consider 
extraordinary damages to make the point that such behavior 
would not be tolerated in the future.124 After a mere half hour of 
deliberation, the jury returned a verdict for Wilkes, awarding a 
stunning £1,000 in damages.125 Two days later, The London 
Chronicle reflected, “By this important decision, every English-
man has the satisfaction of seeing, that his house is his castle.”126 
3. Leach v Money (1765). 
Pratt’s view of general warrants was hardly unique. His chief 
constitutional rival was William Murray, first Earl of Mansfield. 
Lord chief justice of the Court of King’s Bench, Mansfield was 
Pratt’s senior in age (and according to Jeremy Bentham, dignity), 
and his equal in argument.127 He was also a Tory, which meant 
that his political perspective differed from that of his junior, Whig 
colleague.128 Despite their political differences, the men agreed on 
the illegality of indiscriminate search and seizure. 
In 1765, Mansfield, like Pratt, found himself confronted with 
the execution of a general warrant in response to the publication 
 
 120 See id at 1161, 1169. 
 121 See The General Warrant on Which John Wilkes Was Arrested at 61–62 (cited in 
note 99). 
 122 Wilkes, 19 How St Tr at 1154. 
 123 Id at 1166, 1168. 
 124 See id at 1167. 
 125 Id at 1168. 
 126 14 The London Chronicle 550 (Dec 8, 1763). 
 127 John Bowring, 19 The Works of Jeremy Bentham 119–21 (Tait 1842). See also generally 
Murray, William, in Matthew and Harrison, eds, 45 Oxford Dictionary of National Biography 
992 (cited in note 70); Pratt, Charles (cited in note 70). For discussion of Mansfield’s central role 
in cases involving seditious libel, see James Oldham, 2 The Mansfield Manuscripts and the 
Growth of English Law in the Eighteenth Century 775–860 (UNC 1992); James Oldham, 
English Common Law in the Age of Mansfield 209–35 (UNC 2004). 
 128 See Murray, William at 996 (cited in note 127); Pratt, Charles at 212 (cited in 
note 70). 
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of North Briton No 45—in this case, as it was served on the al-
leged printer of the publication, Dryden Leach.129 And Mansfield, 
like Pratt, found the execution of the general warrant to be a vio-
lation of the common law.130 
The facts mirrored those of Wilkes. On April 29, 1763, a con-
stable and four King’s messengers entered Leach’s open front 
door and found both him and freshly printed copies of the first two 
issues of the North Briton.131 They arrested Leach.132 For the next 
six hours, the same Carrington that executed the general war-
rants against Entick and Wilkes, in this instance assisted by John 
Money, James Watson, and Robert Blackmore, searched Leach’s 
home.133 Halifax, being “employed in other business belonging to 
his said office of secretary of state,” was unable to meet with the 
prisoner for four days, during which time Leach was detained.134 
When he finally met with Leach, Halifax concluded that Leach 
had not printed the pamphlet and ordered his release.135 Leach 
brought suit against the King’s messengers for breaking and en-
tering into his home, for seizing his person and papers, and for 
imprisoning him for four days.136 
Leach first came before Pratt at the Court of Common Pleas 
on December 10, 1763.137 The defendants argued that they should 
be exempt from the suit, as they were protected by a statute in-
troduced under George II entitled, “An act for the rendering jus-
tices of the peace more safe in the execution of their office; and for 
indemnifying constables and others acting in obedience to their 
warrants.”138 Leach argued in response that they were covered 
neither by that statute nor by the statute of James I, “An Act for 
ease in pleading against troublesome and contencious Suites, pse-
cuted against Justices of the Peace Maiors Constables and ctaine 
other his Majesties Officers, for the lawfull execucion of their Of-
fice,”139 nor the subsequent act to enlarge and make perpetual the 
 
 129 Leach, 19 How St Tr at 1003–04. 
 130 Id at 1027–28. 
 131 Id at 1007, 1009. 
 132 Id at 1009. 
 133 Leach, 19 How St Tr at 1005. 
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 135 Id at 1009. 
 136 Id at 1005–06. 
 137 Leach, 19 How St Tr at 1006. 
 138 24 Geo II, ch 44 (1751), in 20 Statutes of the Realm 279, 279. See also Leach, 19 
How St Tr at 1010. 
 139 7 James I, ch 5 (1609), in 4 Statutes at Large 1161, 1161. See also Leach, 19 How 
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same.140 The jury found for the plaintiff and awarded him £400.141 
The defendants filed a bill of exceptions in the Court of King’s 
Bench, seeking relief.142 
Mansfield presided over the case. The solicitor general began 
by attempting to establish the status of the King’s messengers as 
emissaries—the long arm—of the justices of the peace.143 Sedi-
tious libel represented “an offence against government and the 
public peace; [ ] effectually undermin[ing] government.”144 The 
secretary of state “is a centinel for the public peace: it is his duty 
to prevent the violation of it, and to bring the offenders to justice; 
and it is necessary that he should be invested with this power, in 
order to enable him to execute this his duty.”145 As for the vague-
ness of the warrant, such power, he argued, “is not illegal: and the 
abuse of it is no objection to the warrant itself. Such warrants are 
agreeable to long practise and usage.”146 
Leach’s counsel, John Dunning—an effective barrister in his 
own right—responded that the secretary of state was not a jus-
tice, conservator, or constable—nor were the King’s messengers 
in ordinary immune by nature of their office.147 The generality of 
the warrant made it invalid.148 The document described the of-
fense but not the individual responsible: 
Here is no probable cause, nor any reason for justifying the 
officer under a probable cause. It is not like the cases of ap-
prehending traitors or felons. Here is only information from 
one of their own body, “that the author of the paper had been 
seen going into Leach’s house; and that Leach was the printer 
of the composition in general;” not of this particular paper.149 
Hearsay, even if true, was insufficient evidence of the crime al-
leged.150 Yet, on the basis of the same, they had imprisoned Leach 
for four days and thoroughly searched his home. The warrant it-
self was thus illegal. 
 
 140 21 James I, ch 12 (1623), in 4 Statutes at Large 1220, 1220. See also Leach, 19 
How St Tr at 1010. 
 141 Leach, 19 How St Tr at 1006. 
 142 Id at 1011. 
 143 Id at 1015–18. 
 144 Id at 1013. 
 145 Leach, 19 How St Tr at 1013. 
 146 Id at 1018. 
 147 Id at 1020–22. 
 148 See id at 1022–24. 
 149 Leach, 19 How St Tr at 1022. 
 150 Id at 1022–23. 
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If a warrant could be issued, counsel argued, directing those 
executing it to find the person responsible for a particular mur-
der, without naming the target of the warrant, “[s]uch a power 
would be extremely mischievous, and might be productive of great 
oppression.”151 He continued, “To ransack private studies in order 
to search for evidence, and even without a previous charge on 
oath, is contrary to natural justice, as well as to the liberty of the 
subject.”152 Dunning concluded, “To search a man’s private papers 
ad libitum, and even without accusation, is an infringement of the 
natural rights of mankind.”153 
Mansfield agreed. Under common law, in certain cases, con-
stables could exercise arrest without an accompanying warrant.154 
As a statutory matter, the authority to arrest under general war-
rant had been extended to certain contexts, such as writs of assis-
tance and warrants to take up disorderly people.155 Here, how-
ever, no common-law authority provided the power to 
apprehend, nor had Parliament created an explicit exception. 
“Therefore,” Mansfield concluded, the authority had to “stand 
upon principles of common law.”156 A critical misstep was the ab-
sence of a third party, standing in discernment of the evidence, to 
authorize arrest, search, and seizure: “The magistrate ought to 
judge; and should give certain directions to the officer.”157 Mansfield 
noted, “[Sir Matthew] Hale and all others hold such an uncertain 
warrant void: and there is no case or book to the contrary.”158 The 
judgment in favor of Leach stood. 
B. English Legal Treatises’ Condemnation of General 
Warrants 
The law lords’ rejection of general warrants in Entick, Wilkes, 
and Leach traced its origin, at least as argued in the seventeenth 
century, to the 1215 Magna Carta.159 General warrants lacked 
specificity: the person to be arrested, the place to be searched, or 
evidence of the crime for which the individual or information was 
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being sought. General warrants for arrest, as well as for search 
and seizure, implicated liberty and property rights and earned 
the enmity of those subject to their execution. It made little sense 
to talk about liberty rights if the King’s subjects could be impris-
oned without cause; nor could the right to property be secure if 
the King could subject property to search on any occasion, and 
subsequently construct charges against the owner. 
To protect these rights, the line was drawn at the walls of the 
home. The most famous articulation of this principle came in 1604 
in Semayne’s Case,160 when Sir Edward Coke wrote, “[T]he house 
of every one is to him as his [ ] castle and fortress.”161 Coke re-
turned to the principle in his Institutes: “[F]or a mans house is his 
castle, & domus sua cuique est tutissimum refugium [and each 
man’s home is his safest refuge].”162 The Crown might well over-
come certain restrictions as applied to ordinary subjects, but the 
principle—the right of a man to be secure in his own home—
spanned the centuries. 
Although Coke articulated a strong right against Crown in-
terference in the domestic affairs of the King’s subjects, the mon-
archy did not always toe the line. While entry without a warrant 
was generally prohibited, with a warrant the walls could be 
breached. And so pressure was placed on general warrants, which 
gave the Crown’s officers the greatest latitude. 
The Tudors and the Stuarts relied on the general warrant to 
head off political opposition.163 Henry VIII’s daughter, Mary I, 
made broad use of search powers to try to reestablish the Catholic 
Church.164 In 1559, Mary I’s successor, Elizabeth I, formed a High 
Commission to counter “seditious and slanderous persons” setting 
“forth false rumours, tales, and seditious slanders” against the 
Queen “and the said good laws and statutes.”165 Citing the laws 
reestablishing the Church of England,166 Elizabeth I directed the 
 
 160 77 Eng Rep 194 (KB 1604). 
 161 Id at 195. 
 162 Edward Coke, The Third Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England: Concerning 
High Treason, and Other Pleas of the Crown, and Criminall Causes 162 (Flesher 1644) 
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 163 See Donohue, The Future of Foreign Intelligence at 76–77 (cited in note 54). 
 164 See Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment at 56–57 (cited in note 37) (discussing the 
proclamations of 1555). 
 165 Establishment of the Court of High Commission, in George Burton Adams and 
H. Morse Stephens, eds, Select Documents of English Constitutional History 310, 310 
(Macmillan 1916). 
 166 An Acte for the Uniformitie of Common Prayoure and Dyvyne Service in the 
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Commission to prosecute “all and singular heretical opinions, se-
ditious books, contempts, conspiracies, false rumours, tales, sedi-
tions, misbehaviours, slanderous words or shewings, published, 
invented or set forth.”167 She gave the Commission “full power and 
authority” to address “all such errors, heresies, crimes, abuses, 
offences, contempts and enormities spiritual and ecclesiastical 
wheresoever, which by any spiritual or ecclesiastical power, au-
thority or jurisdiction can or may lawfully be reformed, ordered, 
redressed, corrected, restrained or amended, to the pleasure of 
Almighty God.”168 To root out all “fornications and ecclesiastical 
crimes,” the Commission was empowered “to use and devise all such 
politic ways and means for the trial and searching out of all the 
premises, as . . . shall be thought most expedient and necessary.”169 
Instead of eliminating the High Commission, James I ex-
panded its reach, collapsing the distinction between religious 
matters and those overseen by the Privy Council. He gave the 
Commission the authority to find heretical materials, as well as 
documents “offensive to the state,” and to go after not just the 
authors of such works but also the publishers and printers and 
those involved in their dissemination.170 To carry out general 
searches, both the Commission and the Privy Council relied on 
the associated writs.171 
As successive monarchs expanded the use of general war-
rants, Englishmen increasingly found themselves at the receiving 
end of their execution.172 General warrants became seen as the 
epitome of unreasonableness and foremost among the egregious 
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powers exercised by the Crown.173 Coke took the lead in attacking 
their legitimacy—a move not without irony, as he had previously, 
as attorney general, exercised them.174 
The context was one of heightened religious tension. Elizabeth I 
had followed the acts of 1559 with further steps “[t]o accelerate ac-
ceptance and flush out dissenters.”175 A series of statutes expanded 
her power.176 James I held the course as opposition mounted. In 
November 1605, the Crown discovered a scheme to blow up the 
Houses of Parliament—and, with them, the King—on the first 
day of the new session.177 The ultimate purpose of the so-called 
Gunpowder Plot was to trigger a series of events that would lead 
to the installation of the King’s nine-year-old daughter as a Cath-
olic monarch.178 James I signed two general warrants to find those 
responsible.179 Coke helped to execute the writs, breaking into a 
Catholic residence in the Inner Temple and confiscating books.180 
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Coke, however, was not solely to be an instrument of state 
power. In 1621, the same king that had instructed him to search 
for those responsible for the Gunpowder Plot issued a general 
warrant to detain Coke while his home was searched “for all such 
papers and writeings as doe anie way concerne his Majestie’s ser-
vice.”181 The warrant directed the King’s officers “to open all such 
studies, clossetts, chests, trunkes, deskes or boxes, where you 
shall understaund or probably conceave anie such papers.”182 
The incident proved formative for Coke’s understanding of 
the legality of general warrants. He later hearkened back to the 
position in which he had been placed during the search to argue 
in Westminster that the 1628 Petition of Right include a clause 
prohibiting imprisonment without cause: “But for that that no 
cause should be shown upon the commitment, the honest man 
and the honest judge shall be most miserable,” he stated.183 “I was 
committed to the Tower and all my books and study searched, and 
37 manuscripts were taken away. . . . I was inquired after what I 
had done all my life before. So then there may be cause found out 
after the commitment.”184 
It was not the first occasion on which Coke had objected in 
Parliament to general warrants. In March 1628, he protested, “No 
free man ought to be committed but the cause must be showed in 
particular. If it be for treason or murder the particular must not 
be showed, but the general must. . . . It is against reason to send 
a man to prison and not to show the cause.”185 Royal prerogative, 
or reason of state, would not suffice to exempt the Crown: 
[I]f [imprisonment] be per mandatum domini regis, or “for 
matter of state”; and then we are gone, and we are in a worse 
case than ever. If we agree to this imprisonment “for matters 
of state” and “a convenient time,” we shall leave Magna Carta 
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ligence at 78 (cited in note 54). 
 182 Warrant Dec 30, 1621 at 1330 (cited in note 181). See also Cuddihy, The Fourth 
Amendment at 141 (cited in note 37). 
 183 Coke to Parliament, Committee of the Whole House, Proceedings and Debates, ff. 
100–100v, in CD, III, 149-51 (Apr. 29, 1628), in Sheppard, ed, 3 The Selected Writings of 
Edward Coke 1270, 1271 (cited in note 181). 
 184 Id. See also Donohue, The Future of Foreign Intelligence at 78 (cited in note 54). 
 185 Coke to Parliament, Committee of the Whole House, Proceedings and Debates, ff. 
21–21v, in CD, II, 100–101 (March 25, 1628), in Sheppard, ed, 3 The Selected Writings of 
Edward Coke 1232, 1234 (cited in note 181). 
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and the other statutes and make them fruitless, and do what 
our ancestors would never do.186 
Coke more fully articulated his understanding of the illegal-
ity of general warrants in his Institutes.187 “One or more Justice 
or Justices of Peace cannot make a warrant upon a bare surmise 
to break any mans house to search for a Felon, or for stoln goods, 
for they being created by Act of Parliament have no such author-
ity granted unto them by any Act of Parliament.”188 Common law 
demanded that the Crown first produce evidence that the individ-
ual had committed a crime: 
[I]t should be full of inconvenience, that it should be in the 
power of any Justice of Peace being a Judge of Record upon a 
bare suggestion to break the house of any person of what 
state, quality, or degree soever, and at what time soever, ei-
ther in the day or night upon such surmises.189 
Coke reiterated the origins of the prohibition of general war-
rants, citing the Great Charter, stating that to issue such writs 
“is against Magna Carta, [Neither will we pass upon him, nor con-
demn him, but by the lawful judgment of his peers, or by the law 
of the land]: and against the statute of 42 E. 3. cap. 3. &c.”190 
What made the use of general warrants particularly odious 
was that they retained for the Crown the particulars of suspicion, 
making them vulnerable to abuse. In contrast, by requiring a spe-
cific warrant, the Crown would be forced to produce evidence in 
open court. Requiring this went to the heart of the rule of law, 
“because Justices of Peace are Judges of Record, and ought to pro-
ceed upon Record, and not upon surmises.”191 General warrants 
 
 186 Coke to Parliament, Committee of the Whole House, Proceedings and Debates, f. 99, 
in CD, III, 94–96 (Apr. 26, 1628), in Sheppard, ed, 3 The Selected Writings of Edward Coke 
1266, 1268 (cited in note 181). 
 187 See Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment at 106 (cited in note 37) (crediting Coke with 
isolating general warrants as the device that made it possible to indiscriminately search 
individuals’ papers). 
 188 Edward Coke, The Fourth Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England: Concerning 
the Jurisdiction of Courts 176 (Flesher 1644). See also Donohue, The Future of Foreign 
Intelligence at 78 (cited in note 54). 
 189 Coke, The Fourth Part of the Institutes at 176–77 (cited in note 188). 
 190 Id at 177 (translation for this Article from the original Latin: “Nec super eum ibi-
mus, nec super eum mittemus, nisi per legale judicium Parium suorum, vel per legem 
Terræ”). But see Lysander Spooner, An Essay on the Trial by Jury 26–28 (Jewett 1852) 
(critiquing Coke’s understanding of Magna Carta). 
 191 Coke, The Fourth Part of the Institutes at 177 (cited in note 188). See also Donohue, 
The Future of Foreign Intelligence at 78 (cited in note 54). The history of Magna Carta is 
convoluted, at best. By way of summary, the original document, signed in 1215 between 
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thus violated not just a statute dating back to 1368, but Magna 
Carta itself: “[E]rrores ad sua principia referre, est refellere, To 
bring errors to their first, is to see their last.”192 
In the years that have elapsed since Coke wrote his treatise, 
scholars have excavated the context of Magna Carta to point out 
that the text Coke cited—the clause that has come to be known 
as Article 39—meant something very different in the thirteenth 
century.193 Coke’s understanding of the right against general 
searches as stemming from Magna Carta, however, was hardly 
novel. In 1589, Privy Council clerk Robert Beale bemoaned the 
death of Magna Carta, if every agent of the High Commission “by 
 
King John and his barons, was known as the Articles of the Barons. See J.C. Holt, Magna 
Carta 245 (Cambridge 2d ed 1992). In 1225, the Charter of the Forest was divided from 
the rest of the document, at which point the title “Magna Carta” was used to refer to the 
remaining text. See Anthony Arlidge and Igor Judge, Magna Carta Uncovered 21–22 (Hart 
2014). Because the document was reissued by Henry III and Edward I, they were gener-
ally given credit for the introduction of Magna Carta as the first statute, until eighteenth-
century legal scholars drew attention to John’s role in the Baron’s Charter. See Michael 
Dillon, Magna Carta and the United States Constitution: An Exercise in Building Fences, 
in Daniel Barstow Magraw, Andrea Martinez, and Roy E. Brownell II, eds, Magna Carta 
and the Rule of Law 81, 84 (ABA 2015). See also Nicholas A. Robinson, The Charter of the 
Forest: Evolving Human Rights in Nature, in Magraw, Martinez, and Brownell, eds, 
Magna Carta 311, 318–21 (cited in note 191). As the document evolved, some clauses pre-
viously included were altered. See Daniel B. Magraw, Andrea Martinez, and Roy E. 
Brownell II, Introduction: Magna Carta and the Rule of Law, in Magraw, Martinez, and 
Brownell, eds, Magna Carta 1, 7–8 (cited in note 191). What began as clauses 39 and 40 
in the year 1215 became clauses 32 and 33 in the year 1216, clauses 35 and 36 in 1217, 
and clause 29 from 1225 onward. See generally Appendices C, F, G, and I, in Magraw, 
Martinez, and Brownell, eds, Magna Carta 389, 405, 413, 425 (cited in note 191) (reprint-
ing the versions of Magna Carta from the years 1215, 1216, 1217, and 1225, respectively). 
Coke, writing in the seventeeth century, referred back to clause 29 as the statutorily en-
forceable clause (not the original clauses 39 and 40). The current trend in American schol-
arship, however, is to refer to the Baron’s Charter numbering, in which clauses 39 and 40 
incorporated what Coke later cited in support of the proposition that general warrants 
violated the Charter. See generally Magraw, Martinez, and Brownell, eds, Magna Carta 
(cited in note 191). See also generally Arlidge and Judge, Magna Carta Uncovered (cited 
in note 191); Claire Breay, Magna Carta: Manuscripts and Myths (British Library 2002); 
Holt, Magna Carta (cited in note 191).  
 192 Coke, The Fourth Part of the Institutes at 98 (cited in note 188). 
 193 See, for example, Edward Jenks, The Myth of Magna Carta, 4 Indep Rev 260, 269–
73 (1904) (arguing that the notion of “due process” is absent in the Magna Carta, attrib-
uting the symbolic ascension of the document to Coke’s work, and arguing that the docu-
ment reflected aristocratic privilege, not the rights of men and citizens or the foundation 
of liberty); Max Radin, The Myth of Magna Carta, 60 Harv L Rev 1060, 1061–62, 1071 
(1947) (agreeing with Jenks on the due process point and noting that most scholarship on 
the charter begins with nineteenth-century sources, but arguing that the Charter is best 
“regarded as a clarified statement of what most persons regarded as fundamental feudal 
law”). See also Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment at 110 (cited in note 37) (“As framed at 
Runneymede, Article Thirty-Nine bore little resemblance to Coke’s description of it.”); 
Holt, Magna Carta at 2–9 (cited in note 191). 
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a warrant under the handes of the Comissioners, shall enter into 
mens howses, break vpp their chestes and chambers, . . . carry 
away what they list, and afterward pick matter to arrest and com-
mitt them.”194 Other critics of general warrants followed suit.195 
Coke’s analysis, moreover, was not the first reconstruction of 
Magna Carta. Rights related to taxation by consent and parlia-
mentary approval, indictment by grand jury, and the importance 
of due process of law were all similarly, ex post facto, read into 
the language and meaning of the Charter.196 
Coke persuaded Parliament to include a prohibition on the 
use of general warrants in the Petition of Right.197 The document 
was ratified by the House of Commons and the House of Lords on 
May 26 and 27, 1628, and accepted by King Charles I on June 2. 
Parliament objected that merely receiving the petition was insuf-
ficient, demanding that the King give royal assent. This he did on 
June 7, 1628, admitting “the illegality of warrants by the king’s 
special command, not assigning grounds of arrest or detainer” 
and making effectual the remedy by habeas corpus.198 
Coke’s work reflected a growing concern about the Crown’s 
use of general warrants. His writing clarified why such power sat 
uneasily in the English constitutional tradition.199 By rooting his 
objection in Magna Carta, he recalled ancient rights. Coke did not 
claim that the Crown never made use of the instruments—this 
 
 194 Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment at 114 & n 39 (cited in note 37) (quotation marks 
omitted). 
 195 Id at 114 (noting that “at least four critics” invoked Magna Carta). 
 196 Id at 113. 
 197 See Arlidge and Judge, Magna Carta Uncovered at 134–35 (cited in note 191). The 
Petition of Right is considered to have been passed in 1627, although it did not receive 
royal assent until June 1628 owing to the practice at the time of giving statutes the year 
in which the session of Parliament convened. The third Parliament of Charles I convened 
on March 17, which was considered 1627 in the Old Style calendar. 
 198 General Warrant, in A. Wood Renton, ed, 6 Encyclopaedia of the Laws of England, 
Being a New Abridgment by the Most Eminent Legal Authorities 63, 63 (Sweet & Maxwell 
1898). The Law Lexicon, or Dictionary of Jurisprudence defines “general warrant” nar-
rowly as 
a process which used to issue from the state secretary’s office, to take up (without 
naming any persons in particular) the author, printer, and publisher of such 
obscene and seditious libels as were particularly specified in it. It was declared 
illegal and void for uncertainty by a vote of the House of Commons. Com. Jour. 
22nd April, 1766. 
J.J.S. Wharton, The Law Lexicon, or Dictionary of Jurisprudence 275 (Spettigue and 
Farrance 1848). 
 199 See Donohue, The Future of Foreign Intelligence at 78–79 (cited in note 54). 
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plainly was not accurate.200 Rather, he objected that they had be-
come routine instruments of political power. The impact could be 
felt throughout society, “[f]or though commonly the Houses or 
Cottages of poore and base people be by such Warrants searched 
&c. yet if it be lawfull, the houses of any subject, be he never so great, 
may be searched, &c. by such Warrant upon bare surmises.”201 
With his opposition to those in power increasingly clear, Coke 
earned the enmity of the Crown. As Coke lay on his deathbed, 
Charles I issued a general warrant to search his home and to seize 
“all such papers and manuscripts” considered appropriate for con-
fiscation.202 Similar orders accompanied a search of Coke’s papers 
at the Inner Temple, as they were considered “disadvantageous” 
to the Crown.203 The action was intensely personal: Charles I him-
self opened the trunks and made note of what they contained.204 
While the manuscripts of the Institutes were among those 
items confiscated, the Crown’s effort to silence Coke came too late. 
Legal scholars went on to take Coke at face value, cementing his 
critique into English thought.205 In 1678, Sir Matthew Hale, an 
intellectual giant most famous for his 1739 History of the Common 
Law of England, wrote in the first volume of his Pleas of the 
Crown: Or, a Methodical Summary, “A general Warrant to search 
for Felons or stoln Goods, not good.”206 Two years later, Parlia-
ment directed publication of Hale’s manuscript. 
 
 200 Id. 
 201 Coke, The Fourth Part of the Institutes at 177–78 (cited in note 188). 
 202 Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment at 145 (cited in note 37). 
 203 Id. See also Donohue, The Future of Foreign Intelligence at 79 (cited in note 54). 
 204 See Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment at 145 (cited in note 37). Among the items 
seized were Coke’s original manuscripts for the Commentary on Littleton, his second, 
third, and fourth Institutes, his will, and other documents. The will was never returned. 
John Lord Campbell, 1 The Lives of the Chief Justices of England: From the Norman Con-
quest till the Death of Lord Mansfield 336 (Murray 1849). 
 205 Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment at 120–21 (cited in note 37). For this proposition, 
Professor Cuddihy cites William Sheppard’s A Sure Guide for His Majesties Justices of the 
Peace and John Bond’s A Complete Guide for Justices of Peace, According to the Best Ap-
proved Authors. See id. See also Donohue, The Future of Foreign Intelligence at 79 (cited 
in note 54). 
 206 Matthew Hale, Pleas of the Crown: Or, a Methodical Summary of the Principal 
Matters Relating to That Subject 93 (Atkyns 1682) (citing “C. Jur. Courts, 177”). Hale 
wrote his magnum opus roughly a decade after Coke’s Institutes, but he hid the manuscript 
during the interregnum period and directed that it not be published even posthumously. 
Parliament later directed publication of the volume in 1680, but the first edition was not 
released until 1736 as History of the Pleas of the Crown. See Cuddihy, The Fourth Amend-
ment at 270 (cited in note 37); Donohue, The Future of Foreign Intelligence at 79 (cited in 
note 54). 
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When Historia Placitorum Coronae (“History of the Pleas of 
the Crown”) finally appeared in 1736, it became enormously in-
fluential.207 In it, Hale stated, “[A] general warrant to search in 
all suspected places is not good, but only to search in such partic-
ular places, where the party assigns before the justice his suspi-
cion and the probable cause thereof, for these warrants are judi-
cial acts, and must be granted upon examination of the fact.”208 
He continued: 
[T]herefore I take those general warrants dormant, which are 
made many times before any felony committed, are not justi-
fiable, for it makes the party to be in effect the judge; and 
therefore searches made by pretense of such general war-
rants give no more power to the officer or party, than what 
they may do by law without them.209 
As with search provisions, a general warrant for arrest was 
equally void. “[A] general warrant upon a complaint of a robbery 
to apprehend all persons suspected, and to bring them before” the 
law, Hale wrote, “was ruled void, and false imprisonment lies 
against him that takes a man upon such a warrant.”210 
It was to this publication that Mansfield appealed in Leach,211 
even as Sergeant William Hawkins cited Coke and Hale in his 
Pleas of the Crown: “I do not find any good Authority, That a Jus-
tice can justify sending a general Warrant to search all suspected 
 
 207 Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment at 269 (cited in note 37). 
 208 Matthew Hale, 2 Historia Placitorum Coronae 150 (Rider 1800). Hale elaborated: 
The party that demands it ought to be examined upon his oath touching the 
whole matter. . . . The warrant ought to be under the hand and seal of the jus-
tice. . . . It must have a certain date, but the place, tho it must be alledged in 
pleading, need not be expressed in the warrant. . . . [T]he warrant ought to con-
tain the cause specially, and should not be generally to answer such matters as 
shall be objected against him, because it cannot appear. . . . [I]n warrants of the 
peace and good behaviour the cause must be shewn, that the party may come 
provided with his sureties. 
Id at 110–11. 
 209 Id at 150. 
 210 Matthew Hale, 1 Historia Placitorum Coronae 580 (Rider 1736). 
 211 Leach, 19 How St Tr at 1027. Coke and Hale were hardly the only legal scholars 
to reject general warrants. By 1680, political writer Henry Care moved the discussion fur-
ther in English Liberties, arguing for a requirement of specificity in warrants. See William 
Hawkins, 2 A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown 81–82 (Professional Books 1973) (P.R. 
Glazebrook, ed); Thomas Wood, An Institute of the Laws of England: Or, the Laws of 
England in Their Natural Order, According to Common Use 91 (Lintot 1754); Hale, 2 
Historia Placitorum Coronae at 107, 113–14 (cited in note 208). 
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Houses in general for stolen Goods.”212 Hawkins added, “inasmuch 
as Justices of Peace claim this Power rather by Connivance, than 
any express Warrant of Law, and since the undue Execution of it 
may prove so highly prejudicial to the Reputation as well as the 
Liberty of the Party,” general writs—particularly for arrest—
were void.213 Hawkins looked to Coke and Hale’s disapproval, stat-
ing that first probable cause must be demonstrated, particularity 
attached, and a warrant issued prior to arrest.214 A number of in-
fluential English legal treatises and abridgements followed 
Hawkins’s Pleas, condemning general warrants.215 
Parliament built upon the foundation constructed by English 
legal scholars. Initially, concern stemmed from parliamentarians’ 
objection to the exercise of powers that they had not created, and 
the use of general warrants against members, making legislative 
privilege and self-interest—and not individual rights—central to 
their concerns.216 Parliament sent agents of the Crown to the 
Tower of London for conducting searches against its members and 
considered certain “general warrant[s] dormant,” as they acted 
“against law and the liberties of the subject.”217 In 1681, nearly 
four decades after Coke’s Institutes, the House of Commons listed 
as a reason for the impeachment of Chief Justice Sir William 
Scroggs that he had “granted divers general warrants for attach-
ing the persons and seizing the goods of his majesty’s subjects, not 
named or described particularly in the said warrants, by means 
whereof many have been vexed, their houses entered into, and 
 
 212 Hawkins, 2 A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown at 84 (cited in note 211). See also 
Donohue, The Future of Foreign Intelligence at 79 (cited in note 54). 
 213 Hawkins, 2 A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown at 84 (cited in note 211). 
 214 Id at 85. 
 215 See, for example, The Law of Arrests in Both Civil and Criminal Cases 173–74, 
186 (Lintot 1742): 
A Justice of the Peace (it is said) cannot justify the Granting a general Warrant, 
to search all suspected Houses in general for stolen Goods; for such a Warrant 
seems in the very Face of it to be illegal, because it would be very hard to leave 
it to the Discretion of a common Officer to arrest what Persons, and search what 
Houses he should think fit. 
See also Matthew Bacon, 7 A New Abridgment of the Law 190 (Strahan 7th ed 1832) 
(“[T]he sheriff ought not to make a blank warrant.”); Charles Viner, 15 A General Abridge-
ment of Law and Equity 13–14 (Robinson 2d ed 1793). See also Cuddihy, The Fourth 
Amendment at 120–21 (cited in note 37); Donohue, The Future of Foreign Intelligence at 
78 (cited in note 54). 
 216 Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment at 12–14, 124 (cited in note 37). 
 217 Id at 125–26 (quotation marks omitted) (quoting a Committee report of March 1–
2, 1640–41). 
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they themselves generally oppressed contrary to law.”218 By “con-
trary to law,” what Parliament meant was that it had not passed 
any statute laying out an exception to the general rule—not, as 
Coke had stated, that the instruments themselves were contrary 
to law.219 
Like Coke’s treatise, Parliament’s actions reflected growing 
public resistance—and opposition—to the use of general war-
rants. Soon after Pratt’s judgment in Entick, the House of Com-
mons passed a resolution condemning the use of general warrants 
for libels.220 During debate, Parliament underscored its rather 
personal concern at the exercise of such warrants, altering “not 
warranted by law” to “illegal” and adding, “and, if executed on the 
person of a member of this House, is also a breach of the privilege 
of this House.”221 Three days later, Parliament amended the reso-
lution to make general warrants universally illegal, outside of 
specific cases provided via statute.222 
The issue of general warrants had been the subject of parlia-
mentary debate even before Entick and the resolution discussed 
above. The House of Commons had considered the issue in Janu-
ary 1765. Members of the House of Commons recognized that 
while the use of general warrants to detain people, or to recover 
seditious or libelous materials, was objectionable, it was even 
worse to allow the Crown to trawl through an individual’s private 
 
 218 Id at 126. 
 219 See id at 13–14. 
 220 Proceedings Related to General Warrants and the Seizure of Papers, in William 
Cobbett, ed, 16 The Parliamentary History of England, from the Earliest Period to the Year 
1803 207, 208 (Hansard 1813) (detailing the April 22, 1766, proceedings of the House of 
Commons). The proposed resolution read: “That a General Warrant to apprehend the au-
thor, printer, or publisher, of a libel, is illegal.” See id. 
 221 Id. But note that Parliament still reserved to itself the right to authorize general 
warrants, which it did the following year in the 1767 Townshend Revenue Act. An Act for 
Granting Certain Duties in the British Colonies and Plantations in America, Revenue Act, 
7 Geo III, ch 46 (1766), in 27 Statutes at Large 505. 
 222 Proceedings Related to General Warrants and the Seizure of Papers at 209 (cited 
in note 220) (“That a General Warrant for seizing and apprehending any person or persons 
being illegal, except in cases provided for by act of parliament, is, if executed upon a mem-
ber of this House, a breach of the privilege of this House.”). An effort on April 29, 1766, to 
introduce a statute solidifying the change, allowing general warrants only in cases of trea-
son or felony without benefit of clergy, under certain regulations, failed. Id at 209–10. 
Nevertheless, on May 2, 1766, a bill was presented to the House of Commons to limit gov-
ernment exercise of search and seizure. Its title was amended to “A Bill to prevent the 
inconveniencies and dangers to the subject from searching for and seizing papers, by es-
tablishing proper regulations, in such cases where searching for and seizing papers is jus-
tifiable by law.” The bill passed the Commons on May 14, 1766, but failed to muster the 
necessary votes to pass the House of Lords. Id at 210. 
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papers.223 The reasoning? “[P]apers, though often dearer to a man 
than his heart’s blood, and equally close, have neither eyes nor 
ears to perceive the injury done to them, nor tongue to complain 
of it, and of course, may be treated in a degree highly injurious to 
the owners.”224 Documents could be broken into parts and rejoined 
“so as to make of them engines capable of working the destruction 
of the most innocent persons.”225 The same was true even of spe-
cific warrants, which failed to first specify what documents were 
to be seized, because “in that case, all a man’s papers must be 
indiscriminately examined, and such examination may bring 
things to light which it may not concern the public to know, and 
which yet it may prove highly detrimental to the owner to have 
made public.”226 The issue was more than mere embarrassment—
it was concern that individuals had a right to a private sphere 
beyond the gaze of others. 
Government supporters countered that 
to question the legality of general warrants, would be im-
peaching the character of the highest and most respectable 
tribunal, next to the House of Lords, in the whole realm; a 
tribunal, whose judges for many years past, that general war-
rants have been in use, have been allowed to be men of the 
soundest capacity and most unbiassed integrity.227 
They argued that since the men exercising the warrants were 
lawyers, and therefore respectful of liberty, their integrity should 
not be impugned.228 But reliance on the respect owed to those ex-
ercising the powers did not win the day. 
As the Crown’s use of executive writs continued, Parliament 
became increasingly concerned, leading one member, in 1766, to 
declare that “a general warrant is such a piece of nonsense as de-
serves not to be spoken of, being no warrant at all, and incapable 
of answering any one purpose, in any case whatever, that a legal 
warrant would not better attain.”229 
 
 223 Debate in the Commons on General Warrants, in Cobbett, ed, 16 The Parliamen-
tary History of England 6, 10 (cited in note 220). 
 224 Id. 
 225 Id. 
 226 Id at 10–11. 
 227 Debate in the Commons on General Warrants at 12–13 (cited in note 223). 
 228 Id at 13. 
 229 A Speech in Behalf of the Constitution against the Suspending and Dispensing Pre-
rogative, &c., in Cobbett, ed, 16 The Parliamentary History of England 251, 287 (cited in 
note 220). See also Donohue, The Future of Foreign Intelligence at 80 (cited in note 54). 
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In 1768, William Blackstone announced in his Commentaries 
on the Laws of England that the question of the legality of general 
warrants under the common law, had it ever existed, had since 
been well settled: 
Sir Edward Coke indeed hath laid it down, that a justice of 
the peace cannot issue a warrant to apprehend a felon upon 
bare suspicion; no, not even till an indictment be actually 
found: and the contrary practice is by others held to be 
grounded rather upon connivance, than the express rule of 
law; though now by long custom established.230 
There was a distinction to be drawn between specific war-
rants for arrest and those that lacked the necessary particulari-
zation.231 The former, discussed at length by Hale, required that 
evidence be submitted, under oath, to a competent judge, who 
would then issue a warrant for arrest. Such warrants, issued in 
open court, bore the seal of a justice of the peace.232 
However, “[a] general warrant to apprehend all persons sus-
pected, without naming or particularly describing any person in 
special, is illegal and void for [its] uncertainty; for it is the duty of 
the magistrate, and ought not to be left to the officer, to judge of 
the ground of suspicion.”233 Blackstone continued: 
[A] warrant to apprehend all persons guilty of a crime therein 
specified, is no legal warrant: for the point, upon which [its] 
authority rests, is a fact to be decided on a subsequent trial; 
namely, whether the person apprehended thereupon be really 
guilty or not. It is therefore in fact no warrant at all: for it will 
not justify the officer who acts under it.234 
 
 230 William Blackstone, 4 Commentaries on the Laws of England 287 (Clarendon 
1769) (citations omitted). See also Donohue, The Future of Foreign Intelligence at 80 (cited 
in note 54). 
 231 See Donohue, The Future of Foreign Intelligence at 80–81 (cited in note 54). 
 232 Blackstone, 4 Commentaries at 287–88 (cited in note 230). See also Donohue, The 
Future of Foreign Intelligence at 80–81 (cited in note 54). 
 233 Blackstone, 4 Commentaries at 288 (cited in note 230) (citation omitted). See also 
Donohue, The Future of Foreign Intelligence at 81 (cited in note 54). 
 234 Blackstone, 4 Commentaries at 288 (cited in note 230). Blackstone went on to rec-
ognize the exception to the warrant requirement for the arrest of felons, discussed in 
Part I.C. Professor Amar looks to this exception as stating a rule, in the process getting 
the common-law understanding backward. See Amar, The Law of the Land at 232–33 
(cited in note 13) (citing constables’ felony-arrest powers as evidence that the Fourth 
Amendment does not include a warrant requirement). 
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Even as they rejected general warrants, English legal trea-
tises acknowledged an exception wherein entry to the home, ab-
sent a warrant, satisfied common-law principles. In order to en-
sure the King’s peace, special rules accompanied the capture and 
search of felons. 
C. Keeping the King’s Peace: The Known-Felon Exception 
For eighteenth-century English subjects, the walls of the 
home served as a barrier to government intrusion. An ancient ex-
ception to this rule stemmed from the importance of maintaining 
the King’s peace. Following the Norman invasions, the concept 
had evolved into a general safeguard of public order.235 Anyone 
committing a criminal offense could be sued by the King “as for a 
Thing committed against his Commandment, and against his 
Peace.”236 The notion stemmed, in part, from the sanctity of the 
King’s home, as extended to the land he controlled.237 Violating 
the King’s peace was an act of personal disobedience, making the 
wrongdoer the King’s enemy.238 With the matter so close to the 
monarch’s interests, it was his justices who tried breaches of the 
peace, even as the King formally was entered as a party to the 
plea.239 
Initially, only felonies counted as contra pacem domini regis 
(“against the King’s peace”).240 They included the most serious of-
fenses, not least because, when coupled with the actual murder of 
another individual, neither the breach of the peace nor the com-
mission of the crime could be amended.241 As a result, severe pen-
alties followed: execution, forfeiture of land or goods, or both.242 
 
 235 See Frederick Pollock and Frederick William Maitland, 1 The History of English 
Law before the Time of Edward I 44–45 (Cambridge 2d ed 1898). See also James Fitzjames 
Stephen, 2 A History of the Criminal Law of England 203 (Macmillan 1883). 
 236 Statute of Westminster I, 3 Edw I, ch 1 (1275), in 1 Statutes of the Realm 26, 27. 
 237 Pollock and Maitland, 1 The History of English Law at 45 (cited in note 235). 
 238 Id. 
 239 A.H.F. Lefroy, Anglo-Saxon Period of English Law: II, 26 Yale L J 388, 389 (1917). 
See also Pollock and Maitland, 1 The History of English Law at 44 (cited in note 235) (“All 
criminal offences have long been said to be committed against the king’s peace.”). 
 240 Alternatively, it is possible that only crimes contra pacem constituted felonies. 
Lefroy, 26 Yale L J at 389 (cited in note 239). As a historical matter, it is difficult to give 
priority to one or the other. Suffice it to say that the two were interchangeable. Over time, 
it became standard to claim any criminal wrong as contra pacem. Id. 
 241  Pollock and Maitland, 2 The History of English Law at 461–63 (cited in note 23); 
Lefroy, 26 Yale L J at 391 (cited in note 239). 
 242 Emlin McClain, 1 A Treatise on the Criminal Law as Now Administered in the 
United States § 18 at 21 (Callaghan 1897). McClain goes on to note that the meaning of 
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Over time, breaches of the King’s peace broadened to include lesser 
offenses—a phenomenon that nineteenth-century English legal 
scholars Sir Frederick Pollock and Frederick William Maitland at-
tributed to the ease with which peace spread. But “[i]t was other-
wise with felony.”243 That became, and remained, the name “for 
the worst, the bootless crimes.”244 
The rejection of felonious acts was reflected in the etymology 
of the word, which Coke traced to “fell,” “fel,” or “gall”—the origi-
nal meaning being an individual full of bitterness, as “gall” and 
“venom” were closely associated.245 Thomas Blount’s 1670 lexicon, 
which cited Coke, listed murder, theft, suicide, rape, and the will-
ful burning of houses as examples, distinguishing them “from 
lighter offences, in that the punishment thereof is death.”246 The 
term carried moral approbation and social condemnation. Accord-
ingly, Johnson’s Dictionary in 1768 defined a “felon” as not just 
“[o]ne who has committed a capital crime,” but as “[c]ruel; traitor-
ous; [and] inhuman,” while “felonious” meant “[w]icked; traitor-
ous; villainous; [and] malignant.”247 
Under English law, certain officers of the Crown served as 
conservators of the King’s peace.248 It fell to them to apprehend 
felons. There was no preliminary investigation before a magis-
trate. Instead, agents of the Crown had the authority to arrest 
individuals caught in the act.249 Certain conditions therefore had 
 
the word “felony” was not entirely settled, “and by some authorities the test was the lia-
bility to forfeiture rather than the liability to capital punishment.” Id. But “[a]s used in 
the American colonies, the popular distinction seems to have been [ ] between offenses 
punishable with death and those not so punishable.” Id. 
 243 Pollock and Maitland, 2 The History of English Law at 464 (cited in note 23) (em-
phasis omitted). 
 244 Id. 
 245 Blackstone dismissed Coke’s attribution, preferring Sir Henry Spelman’s “fee-lon” 
(or “pretium feudi”). Blackstone, 4 Commentaries at 95 (cited in note 230). But Pollock and 
Maitland sided with Coke in the etymology of the word. Pollock and Maitland, 2 The His-
tory of English Law at 464–65 (cited in note 23). 
 246 Thomas Blount, Nomo-Lexikon: A Law-Dictionary at “felony” (Newcomb 1670) 
(adding “yet not alwayes” and citing petit larceny as an example). 
 247 Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language at “felon,” “felonious” 
(Jones 3d ed revised 1768). 
 248 The officers included “the king, treasurer, steward, high chancellor, constable, 
marshal, [ ] the judges of the king’s bench, master of the rolls, . . . the sheriff, coroner, 
justices of the peace, the constable, bailiffs, [and] watchmen.” Horace L. Wilgus, Arrest 
without a Warrant, 22 Mich L Rev 541, 547 (1924). Magna Carta removed the right to hold 
pleas of the Crown from the sheriff, constable, coroner, and bailiffs. Id at 547 & n 38. 
 249 See, for example, id at 547 (discussing the Assize of Clarendon (1166), as well as 
the Ordinance of 1195, which “command[ed] all men to arrest outlaws, robbers, thieves 
and the harborers of such,” and the Ordinance of 1252, which “mention[ed] ‘disturbers of 
our peace’”). Pollock and Maitland later stated that the rule at the time was “that felons 
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to be met for felony arrests to occur. The arrests had to be directed 
toward: (a) a specific individual, (b) for a particular crime, (c) that 
was serious in nature (that is, a felony); and (d) the agent needed 
a high level of confidence that the individual had actually engaged 
in the illegal activity—specifically, that the officer, or the person 
approaching the officer to demand the arrest, had witnessed the 
person commit the crime. In this way, individuality, particularity, 
severity, and certainty proved essential. When these require-
ments were met, the law allowed the officers, witnesses, or per-
sons responding to the hue and cry to chase and apprehend the 
felon, to break down the doors of any homes in which the felon 
had sought refuge, and to seize any items found in the individual’s 
possession.250 
Persons effecting arrest in this manner still risked legal pen-
alties for trespass, assault, or murder, in the event that they were 
wrong in their knowledge that the target had committed the fel-
ony.251 For the hue and cry, though, only those who raised the 
alarm, and not those responding to it, were held responsible for 
the outcome. Thus, the legitimacy of the seizure of the person, or 
the search that accompanied the seizure, turned in some measure 
on the suspect’s actual guilt, as demonstrated ex post facto, in a 
court of law. A brief discussion of the public safety powers of ar-
rest and search, and the hue and cry, helps to underscore the spec-
ificity of the known-felon exception. 
1. Public safety: powers of arrest and search.252 
Seventeenth- and eighteenth-century English legal scholars 
agreed that in the case of a felony, when an individual was known 
to have committed the crime, a warrant was not required for ar-
rest. Nor was a warrant required for a search incident to the ar-
rest, which sought to secure the safety of those effecting the arrest 
and to preserve evidence for trial. These were exceptions to the 
 
ought to be summarily arrested and put in gaol.” Pollock and Maitland, 2 The History of 
English Law at 582 (cited in note 23). 
 250 Blackstone, 4 Commentaries at 289–91 (cited in note 230). 
 251 Wilgus, 22 Mich L Rev at 563 (cited in note 248); Pollock and Maitland, 2 The 
History of English Law at 582–83 (cited in note 23). 
 252 Note the distinction between powers of arrest and powers of imprisonment. As 
Professor Horace Wilgus explained in the early twentieth century, “An arrest is the begin-
ning of an imprisonment. It is . . . [t]he taking of one under a real or assumed authority, 
into custody to answer some legal charge, civil or criminal.” Wilgus, 22 Mich L Rev at 543 
(cited in note 248) (citation omitted). 
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general rule that required officers of the Crown to first obtain a 
warrant before forcible entry into a dwelling. 
Hale explained in 1736 in his History of the Pleas of the 
Crown that certain ministers—justices of the peace, sheriffs, cor-
oners, constables, and watchmen—were empowered to “arrest fel-
ons, and those that are probably suspected of felony,” prior to in-
dictment or conviction.253 The qualifications required for those in 
office, as well as the potential for officials to be held in violation 
of the law for abusing their authority, acted as restraints on the 
power.254 The officers had unique and carefully circumscribed au-
thorities, underscoring the carefulness accorded to the exception. 
Justices of the peace could arrest only individuals whom they 
actually witnessed commit a felony or breach of the peace, or 
whom others witnessed commit the same.255 They could not pro-
ceed against lesser offenses, nor could they proceed absent a high 
 
 253 Hale, 2 Historia Placitorum Coronae at 85 (cited in note 208). 
 254 Id. It appears that the offices of judge and sheriff derive from King Alfred’s reign 
in 886, from which Saunders Welch conjectured in 1754 that the office of constable grew. 
As Welch wrote: “But whether Alfred introduced this office into England from the Saxon 
Constitution, or whether the Saxons incorporated this office, on account of its utility, into 
the civil polity of their own country, history is silent. However the former is most proba-
ble.” Saunders Welch, An Essay on the Office of Constable v–vi (printed for C. Henderson 
1758). These offices proved insufficient to prevent attacks upon the highways. See id at viii: 
But the Constables, it seems, though aided by the military power, are not even 
then capable of protecting us from the violence of a few paultry villains, who 
turn public robbers: for a third institution has been not many years invented to 
supply the pretended defects of our wretched constitution. 
 Following the restoration of the Stuarts, crime in London began to spiral out of control. 
Parliament responded with two statutes, passed during the fourth year of the reign of 
William and Mary, providing for a reward of £40 to the apprehender of any highwayman, 
extended during the sixth year of the reign of George I to any street robber via language 
naming the streets of London, Westminster, and other cities, towns, and places for pur-
poses of robberies to be deemed highways. Id at ix. Robberies continued, with a reward 
increased to £100 promised by proclamation “to the apprehender and prosecutor to convic-
tion.” Id at x. Thieves began using the system to collect the rewards, with innocent people 
punished. The records of Tyburn, England, showed that at one point nineteen or twenty 
people were sometimes convicted at once, “[a]nd it became no uncommon thing for a charge 
of one thousand pounds to accrue to the government at a single sessions; the far greater 
part of which became the plunder of the society.” Id. Civil officers were designed, then, to 
prevent reliance on thieves and the public for apprehension of individuals engaged in fel-
onies. Id at xii–xiii. 
 255 Hale, 2 Historia Placitorum Coronae at 86 (cited in note 208). 
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level of assuredness that a crime had been, or was being, commit-
ted.256 In the event that the arrest would be based on another per-
son’s witnessing of the event, then the justice of the peace was 
required to issue a warrant in writing under his seal before the 
individual could be arrested.257 By statute, and consistent with the 
common law, sheriffs were similarly empowered to arrest felons.258 
Coroners, finding that the body under their inspection had 
been murdered and the party responsible for the assault was 
clear, had the power to order the arrest of the party responsible 
for having committed the felony.259 Their power was strictly lim-
ited to ordering the arrest of individuals suspected of killing oth-
ers; they had no further powers of questioning or arrest.260 
Constables acted as conservators of the peace at common 
law.261 They therefore had the power “to quell all affrays, riots, 
routs, and actual assaults, by commanding the parties, in the 
king’s name to keep the peace . . . and to apprehend all persons 
 
 256 Id (quoting a fourteenth-century statute as saying, “[I]f the justice of peace hath 
either from himself or by a credible information from others knowledge of a felony done, 
and just cause of suspicion of any person, he may himself arrest and commit that person”). 
 257 Id. 
 258 Id at 86–87. 
 259 Statute of Westminster I, 3 Edw I, ch 9 (1275), in 1 Statutes of the Realm 26, 29. 
See also Hale, 2 Historia Placitorum Coronae at 88 (cited in note 208). 
 260 Hale, 2 Historia Placitorum Coronae at 87 (cited in note 208). Coroners’ authority 
appears to have narrowed over time. See, for example, 4 Edw I, ch 1 (1275), in 1 Statutes 
of the Realm 40, 40: 
A coroner of our Lord the King ought to inquire of these Things. [First] to the 
Places where any be slain, or suddenly dead, or wounded, or where Houses are 
broken . . . and shall forthwith command four of the next Towns, or five or six, 
to appear before [him] in such a place: and when they are come thither the Cor-
oner upon the Oath of them shall inquire in this manner, that is to wit; [If they 
know where the Person was slain, whether it were in any house, field, bed, tav-
ern, or company,] and who were there: Likewise it is to be inquired, who were 
culpable either of the Act, or of the Force, and who were present, either Men or 
Women, and of what age soever they be, if they can speak, or have any Discre-
tion: and how many soever be found culpable by Inquisition in any of the man-
ners aforesaid, they shall be taken and delivered to the Sheriff, and shall be 
committed to the Gaol. 
 261 Hale, 2 Historia Placitorum Coronae at 88 (cited in note 208). See also William 
Sheppard, The Offices and Duties of Constables 34 (Hodgkinsonne 1641) (stating the au-
thority and duty of constables as “foreseeing, that nothing be done that tendeth either 
directly, or by any meanes to the breach of the Peace . . . in quieting or pacifying those that 
are occupyed in breach of the Peace . . . [and] in punishing such as have already broken 
the Peace”). 
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who,” within their eyesight, broke the peace “by assaulting, strik-
ing, or by fighting.”262 
Even here, Saunders Welch, an eighteenth-century justice of 
the peace, as well as a high constable, warned against intermed-
dling in the affray or assault.263 As a routine matter, the injured 
person “ought to apply to a magistrate for his warrant.”264 Welch 
advised that the only time a constable should intervene under his 
own authority was when any person appeared “to be dangerously 
wounded, and the party wounded” charged another person pre-
sent.265 In such circumstances, constables were to detain the per-
son accused, “as the delay of a warrant may be the escape of a 
murderer.”266 
The law obliged constables to follow the directions of justices 
of the peace, sheriffs, and coroners to apprehend felons. They 
risked indictment and a fine for failing to do so.267 Once a consta-
ble apprehended a suspect, the law required the constable imme-
diately to bring the prisoner before a justice of the peace.268 The 
rationale was that, as conservators of the peace, constables had 
the power to apprehend without legal process, but they could not 
discharge prisoners upon their own authority, “the intention of 
such arrest being the delivery of the Party to the magistrates, to 
 
 262 Welch, Observations on the Office of Constable at 6 (cited in note 23). See also 
Sheppard, The Offices and Duties of Constables at 34 (cited in note 261) (noting that a 
breach of the peace was understood as “not onely that fighting, which wee commonly call 
the Breach of the Peace, but also that every Murder, Rape, Manslaughter, and felonie 
whatsoever, and every Affraying, or putting in feare of the Kings people”). 
 263 Welch, a wholesale grocer, was appointed high constable of Holborn for a three-
year term in 1746, renewed thereafter in 1749 and 1752. In 1749, Welch was appointed as 
one of the vestrymen to present a memorial drafted on behalf of the Bloomsbury vestry “to 
prevent and suppress the frequent robberies and other outrages committed in this parish” 
to John Russell, fourth Duke of Bedford. He was also appointed by one of the barons of the 
exchequer to be the receiver of the moneys to be raised to recruit men to assist the consta-
bles and watchmen of the parish. In 1753, Welch became a magistrate in the Middlesex 
Commission of the Peace. Welch wrote a pamphlet, Observations on the Office of Constable, 
in 1754, revised in a second edition in 1758. Ruth Paley, Welch, Saunders (1711–1784), in 
Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford online ed 2015) (visited Apr 8, 2016). 
 264 Welch, Observations on the Office of Constable at 7 (cited in note 23). 
 265 Id. 
 266 Id at 7–8. Amar adopts an expansive understanding of constables’ authority to 
arrest felons, without understanding the limits on them, as outlined by Hale, Welch, and 
others, in their exercise of such powers. See, for example, Amar, 30 Suffolk U L Rev at 58 
(cited in note 13). 
 267 See, for example, Sheppard, The Offices of Constables at ch 8, § 2, no 4 (cited in 
note 23); Welch, Observations on the Office of Constable at 23–28, 34–35 (cited in note 23).  
 268 Hale, 2 Historia Placitorum Coronae at 89 (cited in note 208). 
03 DONOHUE ART FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 9/11/2016  8:17 PM 
2016] The Original Fourth Amendment 1227 
 
be dealt with according to law.”269 Penalties applied for unlawful 
discharge.270 
The emphasis was always on public safety.271 Thus, as Hale 
wrote, constables were empowered to arrest “suspicious night 
walkers . . . and men that ride armed in fair or markets or else-
where.”272 They also could arrest individuals in the middle of a 
public fight, but, “if the affray be past, and no danger of death, 
the constable cannot arrest the parties without a warrant from a 
justice of the peace.”273 
Hale was careful to distinguish between the powers of arrest 
(a) when a felony was “certainly committed,” (b) in cases of “sus-
picion of felony,” and (c) when there was a “danger of felony, tho 
none be committed, as in case of affrays or dangerous wounding.”274 
In the first instance, “it is of all hands agreed,” Hale noted, 
that the constable could “arrest and imprison the felon,” including 
breaking “open doors to take the felon, if the felon be in the house, 
and his entry denied after demand and notice that he is consta-
ble.”275 Hale explained why such powers had been granted: because 
a constable is “a conservator of the peace, and is not only permitted 
but by law injoind to take a felon, and if he omits his duty herein, 
he is indictable and subject to a fine and imprisonment.”276 
In the second case, when a felony has been committed and 
there is a suspect—such as a robbery upon person A, and “A. sus-
pects B. upon probable grounds to be the felon, and acquaints the 
constable with it”—then the constable could apprehend B upon 
the suspicion.277 Under these circumstances, the constable had a 
responsibility first to “inquire and examine the circumstances 
 
 269 Welch, Observations on the Office of Constable at 7 (cited in note 23). 
 270 Id (“If at any time you should forget this caution, you will be subject to an indict-
ment, or action of false imprisonment: for your discharge amounts to a confession that you 
had no lawful power to arrest.”). 
 271 In his rebuttal to Davies, Amar looks at the powers granted to constables “by vir-
tue of their office” as proof that they had special powers, without appreciating that the 
reason they did was to allow them to respond to the most serious transgressions—namely, 
breaches of the peace—and to apprehend fleeing felons before they could endanger people 
further. This was a notable exception to the warrant requirement. See Amar, 30 Suffolk 
U L Rev at 57 & n 15, 59 (cited in note 13). 
 272 Hale, 2 Historia Placitorum Coronae at 89 (cited in note 208). See also Sheppard, 
The Offices of Constables at ch 8, § 2, no 4 (cited in note 23). 
 273 Hale, 2 Historia Placitorum Coronae at 90 (cited in note 208). 
 274 Id (emphasis omitted). 
 275 Id. 
 276 Id at 90–91. 
 277 Hale, 2 Historia Placitorum Coronae at 91 (cited in note 208). 
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and causes of the suspicion of A.”278 If satisfied, the constable and 
the accuser had to proceed together to effect the arrest.279 Thus, 
when an actual felony had been committed in fact and a constable 
established probable cause that a particular individual was re-
sponsible, then arrest powers, absent a warrant, followed. 
Hale laid out the danger of not allowing such powers: “[I]f the 
constable should not be allowd this latitude in cases of this na-
ture, many felons would escape.”280 There were, nevertheless, 
checks on the power. The innocence of the party arrested should 
still be assumed, before being brought before a justice of the 
peace, who then was required to “consider the circumstances, and 
possibly in some cases discharge or bail him, and upon his trial, 
if innocent, he will be discharged.”281 But the seriousness of the 
crime was of the utmost importance. At a minimum, Hale ex-
plained, “there must be a felony in fact done, and the constable 
must be ascertained of that, and aver it in his plea.”282 
Regarding entry into homes, as in the first case, should “the 
supposed offender fly and take house, and the door will not be 
opened upon demand of the constable and notification of his busi-
ness, the constable may break open the door, tho he have no war-
rant.”283 The norm, therefore, was clear: in order to enter into a 
 
 278 Id. 
 279 Id. 
 280 Id. 
 281 Hale, 2 Historia Placitorum Coronae at 91 (cited in note 208). 
 282 Id at 91–92. 
 283 Id at 92. But note that there is disagreement among seventeenth- and eighteenth-
century legal scholars as to this point. Coke considered such arrest to be illegal: “[N]either 
the Constable, nor any other can break open any house for the apprehension of the party 
suspected or charged with the felony.” Coke, The Fourth Part of the Institutes at 177 (cited 
in note 188). For Coke, only a King’s indictment could justify breaking down doors to effect 
arrest based on suspicion. A warrant issued by a justice of the peace was insufficient. 
Richard Burn agreed with Coke, as did Michael Foster and Hawkins. Richard Burn, 1 The 
Justice of the Peace, and Parish Officer 99 (Strahan 12th ed 1772) (“[W]here one lies under 
a probable suspicion only, and is not indicted, it seems the better opinion at this day (Mr. 
Hawkins says) that no one can justify the breaking open doors in order to apprehend him.”) 
(emphasis omitted); Michael Foster, A Report of Some Proceedings on the Commission of 
Oyer and Terminer and Goal Delivery for the Trial of the Rebels in the Year 1746 in the 
County of Surry, and of Other Crown Cases 321 (Clarendon 1762) (agreeing with Coke that 
an officer may not enter a private home to arrest someone without a warrant); William 
Hawkins, 2 A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown 139 (6th ed 1787) (citing Hale in support 
of the claim that “where one lies under a probable suspicion only, and is not indicted, it 
seems the better [ ] opinion at this day, That no one can justify the breaking open doors in 
order to apprehend him”). Sir Edward Hyde East and Sir William Oldnall Russell also 
agreed, although they suggested that actual guilt or innocence, as demonstrated in court, 
determined whether the officer effecting arrest would be liable for trespass. Edward Hyde 
East, 1 A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown 322 (Strahan 1803): 
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home, the constable was required to first have a warrant—unless 
he was in pursuit of a felon. Under such circumstances, the war-
rant requirement could be waived. 
There were other limits on the powers. Unlike the first in-
stance (in which the constable knew to a certainty that the indi-
vidual had engaged in a felony), it was much more questionable 
in the second instance (in which there was only a strong suspicion, 
based on a witness who had been examined by the constable) 
whether the constable could actually use lethal force against the 
suspected felon.284 
As for the third case, Hale provided an example in which an 
individual had wounded, but not killed, another person: 
If A. hath wounded B. so that he is in danger of death, and A. 
flies and takes his house, and shuts the doors, and will not 
open them, the constable of the vill where it is done, or upon 
 
[Y]et a bare suspicion of guilt against the party will not warrant a proceeding to 
this extremity [the breaking of doors], unless the officer be armed with a magis-
trate’s warrant grounded on such suspicion. It will at least be at the peril of 
proving that the party so taken on suspicion was guilty. 
See also William Oldnall Russell, 1 A Treatise on Crimes and Misdemeanors 745 (Butterworth 
1819). Blackstone, Joseph Chitty (who relied on Hale), and Henry John Stephen took a dif-
ferent view. Blackstone, 4 Commentaries at 289 (cited in note 230); Joseph Chitty, 1 A 
Practical Treatise on the Criminal Law 23 (Butterworth 1816); Henry John Stephen, 4 
New Commentaries on the Laws of England 359 (Voorhies 1846). Hale, however, is not as 
clearly opposed to Coke as Blackstone and Chitty might lead one to believe. As noted in 
the text above, Hale states that when a constable suspects an individual of having com-
mitted a felony, “if the supposed offender fly and take house, and the door will not be 
opened upon demand of the constable and notification of his business, the constable may 
break the door, tho he have no warrant.” Hale, 2 Historia Placitorum Coronae at 92 (cited 
in note 208). See also id at 90–95. On the face of it, this appears to limit the warrantless 
exception for home arrests to cases of hot pursuit in which a felon is known. In another 
part of his work, citing a statement in an early Year Book, later quoted in Burdett v Abbott, 
104 Eng Rep 501 (KB 1811), Hale suggests that entry to arrest without a warrant under 
suspicion of a felony committed was legal. Hale, 2 Historia Placitorum Coronae at 93–94 
(cited in note 208). See also Burdett, 104 Eng Rep at 560. Although Semayne’s Case is at 
times credited as describing entry without a warrant, the scenario it details closely aligns 
with descriptions of how a warrant was served. Compare, for example, Semayne’s Case, 77 
Eng Rep at 195–96, with Chitty, 1 A Practical Treatise on the Criminal Law at 50 (cited 
in note 283). 
 284 Hale, 2 Historia Placitorum Coronae at 92 (cited in note 208) (“[I]t may be more 
questionable, whether if he fly and cannot be apprehended, the officer may kill him, where 
he is suspected and innocent, if he cannot be otherwise taken, as he may a felon, as before 
is shewn.”). Hale notes that the law is unclear on this point, although it may, under some 
circumstances, be allowed, on the grounds that the constable is bound to the duties of his 
office “in case of a probable suspicion, as well as in case of an actual felony,” because the 
constable could not judge the actual guilt until trial, and because the effort of the individ-
ual to escape suggests potential guilt. Id. 
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hue and cry, may break the doors of the house to take him, if 
upon demand he will not yield himself to the constable.285 
Should there be further disorder in the house, the constable was 
empowered to enter the home “to keep the peace and prevent the 
danger.”286 
English law allowed for two kinds of search related to the ar-
rest of a felon: first, of the person arrested, and second, of the area 
where the felon was located. The primary purposes of these 
searches were to ensure public safety at the time of the arrest and 
to seize evidence of the crime itself. 
William Sheppard, writing in the seventeenth century, ex-
plained that after a felony occurred, constables were required to 
make diligent search for him that did it, in all such places 
within their Liberty as they shall understand to be likely to 
finde him in . . . and albeit it be a mans house he doth dwell 
in, which they doe suspect the Fellon to be in, yet they may 
enter in there to search; and if the owner of the house, upon 
request, will not open his dores, it seems the Officer may 
break open the dores upon him to come in to search.287 
He added, “And so also it seems the Officer may search for goods 
stoln, as he may for the Fellon himself that doth steal them.”288 
Seventy-five years later, Welch directed constables, “If the 
watch or yourself apprehend any suspicious persons, let them be 
carefully search’d.”289 He further advised: “[I]f any thing uncom-
mon, as fire-arms, or other offensive weapons, be found upon 
them be sure to secure them, and take in writing with great ex-
actness, the first account they give of themselves.”290 
 
 285 Id at 94. 
 286 Id at 95. 
 287 Sheppard, The Offices of Constables at ch 8, § 2, no 10 (cited in note 23). 
 288 Id. See also Sheppard, The Offices and Duties of Constables at 65–66 (cited in 
note 261): 
[In the event that another person brings claims of felony against an individual,] 
the Constable in this case of his owne authoritie, without warrant from a Justice 
of Peace, may search for the goods, and the Felon; and if he find the goods, seise 
them, and if he finde the felon, apprehend him; yet for the most part, the Con-
stable not knowing his Authoritie, or the danger, is so fearfull and remisse 
herein, that he doth nothing untill he hath the warrant of a Justice of Peace, to 
provoke and enable him so to doe. 
 289 Welch, Observations on the Office of Constable at 12 (cited in note 23). 
 290 Id. 
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Jurists echoed Welch’s understanding. Even as late as 1887, 
in Dillon v O’Brien,291 the Court of the Exchequer noted that “in 
cases of treason and felony, constables (and probably also private 
persons) are entitled, upon a lawful arrest . . . to take and detain 
property found in his possession which will form material evi-
dence in his prosecution for that crime.”292 
The importance of protecting the public by keeping the King’s 
peace animated the known-felon exception.293 As such, the excep-
tion bore a close relationship to the hue and cry, which extended 
the authority to apprehend known felons beyond officers of the 
Crown. 
2. The hue and cry. 
The hue and cry was an ancient tradition reserved for the 
most serious of crimes. Alfred the Great’s institution of “hun-
dreds,” a type of regional administrative division, during his 
ninth-century reign as King of the Anglo-Saxons appears to have 
originated the practice.294 In the thirteenth century, Henrici de 
Bracton wrote in De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliæ (“On the 
Laws and Customs of England”): “[I]f one has committed a felony 
and, after the hue has been raised, is arrested at once, pursuit 
shall end.”295 All persons between the ages of fifteen and sixty who 
heard the hue and cry were obliged to assist.296 Those who did so 
were protected from legal penalties—although the person who 
first raised the hue and cry, should it turn out to be false, was not. 
During the reign of Edward I, the hue and cry was incorporated 
into the Statute of Westminster.297 The Statute of Winchester also 
 
 291 16 Cox Crim Cas 245 (Ex 1887). 
 292 Id at 249. 
 293 For this reason, constables similarly had the power to arrest rogues and vagrants. 
Sheppard, The Offices and Duties of Constables at 95 (cited in note 261). As with consta-
bles, the powers of arrest and search for those breaking the law granted to watchmen were 
the same—namely, to prevent breaches of public order. Id at 96–98. 
 294 Chitty, 1 A Practical Treatise on Criminal Law at 26 (cited in note 283). See also 
Statute of Winchester, 13 Edw I, ch 4–6 (1285), in 1 Statutes of the Realm 96, 97; De Of-
ficio Coronatoris, 4 Edw I (1275–76), in 1 Statutes of the Realm 40, 40–41. See also gener-
ally Henrici de Bracton, 2 On the Laws and Customs of England (Hein 1997) (Samuel E. 
Thorne, trans). 
 295 Bracton, 2 On the Laws and Customs of England at 328 (cited in note 294). This is 
a translation from Bracton’s Latin: “[S]i quis feloniam fecerit et statim captus fuerit, levato 
huthesio, cessabit secta.” Id (citations omitted). 
 296 Id. See also Statute of Winchester, 13 Edw I, ch 6 (1685), in 1 Statutes of the Realm 
96, 97–98. 
 297 Statute of Westminster I, 3 Edw I, ch 9 (1275), in 1 Statutes of the Realm 26, 28–29. 
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included it, requiring that people in neighboring towns and coun-
ties pursue the felon in response to the hue and cry.298 Later stat-
utes expanded it to require pursuit by horse, as well as by foot.299 
In the early seventeenth century, Coke noted that when a hue 
and cry had been raised against a felon, and the felon took refuge 
in a home “and defended with force,” Crown agents had the au-
thority to “lawfully break the house” to effect arrest.300 Coke re-
turned to the subject in the third part of his Institutes, in which 
he distinguished between two kinds of hue and cry: that derived 
from common law and that conducted consistent with statutory 
authority.301 
“Hue and Cry by the Common law, or for the King,” Coke ex-
plained, “is, when any felony is committed, or any person griev-
ously & dangerously wounded, or any person assaulted and of-
fered to be robbed either in the day or night.”302 In such 
circumstances, the party aggrieved could approach a constable 
“and acquaint him with the causes, describing the party, and tell-
ing which way the offender is gone, and require him to raise Hue 
and Cry.”303 The idea behind the doctrine was that the felon be 
caught before he had a chance to escape. Accordingly, it was the 
constable’s duty to then “raise the power of the towne, as well in 
 
 298 Statute of Winchester, 13 Edw I, ch 1 (1285), in 1 Statutes of the Realm 96, 96: 
Our Lord the King, for to abate the power of Felons . . . doth command, That 
[Cries] shall be solemnly made in all Counties, Hundreds, Markets, Fairs, and 
all other Places where great Resort of People is, so that none shall excuse himself 
by Ignorance, that from henceforth every Country be so well kept, that immedi-
ately upon such Robberies and Felonies committed, fresh Suit shall be made 
from Town to Town and from Country to Country. 
(brackets in original). The Statute of Winchester additionally required night watchmen to 
raise a hue and cry in the event that strangers should resist arrest, stating: 
And if they will not obey the Arrest, they shall levy Hue and Cry upon them, and 
[such as keep the Town shall follow with Hue and Cry with all the Town, and 
the Towns near, and so Hue and Cry shall be made from Town to Town,] until 
that they be taken and delivered to the Sheriff. 
Statute of Winchester, 13 Edw I, ch 4 (1285), in 1 Statutes of the Realm 96, 97 (brackets 
in original). See also Statute of Winchester, 13 Edw I, ch 6 (1685), in 1 Statutes of the 
Realm 96, 97–98 (requiring all persons ages fifteen to sixty to “follow the Cry with the 
Country” and “to keep Horses and Armor” for the purpose). 
 299 Chitty, 1 A Practical Treatise on Criminal Law at 27 (cited in note 283), citing 27 
Eliz, ch 13, § 8 (1584–85), in 4 Statutes of the Realm 720, 722. 
 300 Semayne’s Case, 77 Eng Rep at 196. 
 301 Coke, The Third Part of the Institutes at 116–18 (cited in note 162). 
 302 Id at 116. 
 303 Id. 
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the night as in the day,” to find the offender.304 Public safety de-
manded it.305 
Under statutory provisions, the situations in which the hue 
and cry could be raised were limited to five: (a) when a watchman 
attempted to detain a suspicious nightwalker and he attempted 
escape; (b) when outlaws trespassed in forests, chases, parks, or 
warrens, with the intent to rob or murder travelers; (c) when 
Welsh outlaws or men indicted for treason or felony attempted to 
escape into Herefordshire; (d) when individuals stole horses or 
carriages and attempted to escape; and (e) when a man, during 
the daytime, had been robbed and the perpetrator attempted to 
escape.306 
A century later, Hale explained, “Hue and cry is the old com-
mon law process after felons and such as have dangerously 
wounded any person.”307 By then, several statutes recognized it.308 
 
 304 Id (citation omitted). See also Sheppard, The Offices of Constables at ch 8, § 2, 
no 13 (cited in note 23): 
The Constable is to levy Hue and Cry when there is cause, and to send it East, 
West, North, and South; and it is best to express in the Hue and Cry, the nature 
of the thing stoln, colour, and marks, and to describe the number of Fellons, their 
Horse, Apparel, &c. And this Officer receiving a Hue and Cry after a Fellon, 
must, with all speed, make diligent pursuit, with Horse and Foot, after the of-
fendors from Town to Town the way it is sent, and make diligent search in his 
own Town: And the Constable and Hundred both may be punished for neglect 
herein. 
 305 See, for example, Welch, Observations on the Office of Constable at 17 (cited in note 
23) (writing with regard to the hue and cry that “[t]he wisdom of the law has rendered 
warrants in apprehending felons unnecessary, as such a delay might be the escape of the 
offenders”). 
 306 See id at 16–17. See also, for example, Statute of Trespassers in Parks, 21 Edw I 
(1293), in 1 Statutes of the Realm 111, 111–12: 
[I]f any Forester, Parker, or Warrener shall find any Trespassers wandering 
within his Liberty, intending to do Damage therein, and that will not yield them-
selves to the Foresters, Warreners, or Parkers, after Hue and Cry made to stand 
unto the Peace, but do continue their malice, and disobeying the King’s Peace, 
do flee, or defend themselves with Force and Arms, 
and the officials respond by killing them, they shall not be accused of murder. However, 
when the foresters, parkers, warreners, or others “maliciously pretend against any Person 
passing through their Liberties, that they came thither for to trespass or misdo, when of 
truth they did nothing . . . and so kill them [they shall be executed].” Id at 112. 
 307 Hale, 2 Historia Placitorum Coronae at 97 (cited in note 208) (emphasis omitted). 
 308 See, for example, id at 98, quoting Statute of Westminster I, 3 Edw I, ch 9 (1275), 
in 1 Statutes of the Realm 26, 29: 
That all be ready and apparelled at the summons of the sheriff & a cry de pays 
to pursue and arrest felons as well within franchises as without; and if they do 
it not and be thereof attaint, le roy prendra a eux grevement, they are to be in-
dicted and fined for the neglect. 
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Constables had the authority to raise a hue and cry to appre-
hend a felon.309 Their decision to do so extended “only to two 
things, first that a felony has been really committed, and the sec-
ond, that the person [arrested] is properly suspected.”310 The first 
was “absolutely necessary to justify an arrest; a mistake here 
[was] fatal.”311 A mistake in the second condition, however, could 
be excused if appropriate efforts had first been taken to ascertain 
that the individual being sought was the right person. 
By the eighteenth century, Welch thus advised constables 
that when they did not themselves witness the felony, and, in-
stead, the information had been brought to them of both the crime 
and the person responsible, they were to 
examine well if it be upon his own knowledge, or the report 
of another; if upon his own, charge him in the king’s name to 
aid and assist you; if upon the report of another, extend your 
enquiry to him, and act in the same manner: by this means 
you produce to the magistrate your prisoner and his accuser 
at the same time.312 
 
See also Hale, 2 Historia Placitorum Coronae at 98 (cited in note 208), citing De Officio 
Coronatoris, 4 Edw I (1275–76), in 1 Statutes of the Realm 40, 41: 
Hue and cry shall be levied for all murders, burglaries, men-slain, or in peril to 
be slain, as other-where is used in England, and all shall follow the hue and 
steps as near as they can; and he that doth not, and is convict thereof, shall be 
attached to be before the justices in eyre. 
See also Hale, 2 Historia Placitorum Coronae at 98 (cited in note 208), citing Statute of 
Winchester, 13 Edw I, ch 1 (1285), in 1 Statutes of the Realm 96, 96 (“From henceforth 
every country shall be so well kept, that immediately upon robberies and felonies commit-
ted fresh suit shall be made from town to town, and from country to country.”), and Statute 
of Winchester, 13 Edw I, ch 4 (1285), in 1 Statutes of the Realm 96, 97: 
If any will not obey the arrest of the town, where night-walkers pass, they shall 
levy hue and cry upon them; and such as keep the town, (viz. the baliff or con-
stable), shall follow with hue and cry with all the town and the towns near; and 
so hue and cry shall be made from town to town, until they are taken and deliv-
erd to the sheriff; and for arrestments of such strangers none shall be punished. 
 309 See Hale, 2 Historia Placitorum Coronae at 91 (cited in note 208). See also Welch, 
Observations on the Office of Constable at 16 (cited in note 23) (informing constables that 
they had “power to raise hue and cry, with horse and foot, to search all suspected places, 
and break open doors in the pursuit of felons; and to extend this pursuit to every parish 
round [them], by giving notice to their respective constables”). 
 310 Welch, Observations on the Office of Constable at 17 (cited in note 23). 
 311 Id at 17–18. 
 312 Id at 18. 
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When such conditions were not met, the constable was “to refer 
the parties to a justice of the peace, and act upon his warrant.”313 
The hue and cry persisted until 1827.314 
D. Summary 
For centuries, English legal scholars read the common law as 
prohibiting the Crown from forcibly entering a domicile to conduct 
search and seizure, outside of narrow constraints. In the event of 
a public felony, officers could arrest the perpetrator and search 
him on the spot. Alternatively, should the felon flee, then officers, 
or individuals responding to the hue and cry, could breach the 
walls of a house where the felon was present and seize him. They 
could simultaneously search for and seize any instruments used 
in the commission of the crime. The items taken had to be mater-
ial to the felony charged, such as poison, firearms, stolen goods, 
or treasonous materials,315 or they had to be weapons that could 
be used against those performing the arrest, making their confis-
cation essential for public safety. 
By the early nineteenth century, outside of the known-felon 
exception, a warrant, supported by reasonable suspicion and evi-
dence presented under oath, was required to search for or to seize 
persons or items—and only certain types of items, at that.316 Mag-
istrates were required “to examine upon oath the party requiring 
a warrant, as well to ascertain that a felony or other crime [had] 
 
 313 Id (referencing Hale in support of this instruction). Like constables, coroners had 
the authority to give effect to the hue and cry, demanding that men seek out individuals 
suspected of felonies. Hale, 2 Historia Placitorum Coronae at 88 (cited in note 208). This 
power reached back to the thirteenth century, with a statute passed during the time of 
Edward I outlining the authorities of coroners reading, “Huy shall be levied for all Mur-
thers, Burglaries, and for Men slain, or in Peril to be slain, as otherwise is used in England, 
and all shall follow the Huy and Steps, as near as can be.” De Officio Coronatoris, 4 Edw I 
(1275–76), in 1 Statutes of the Realm 40, 41 (citations and brackets omitted). 
 314 7 & 8 Geo IV, ch 27 (1827), in 67 Statutes of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Ireland 152, 154. 
 315 Dillon, 16 Cox Crim Cas at 249. See also Crozier v Cundey, 108 Eng Rep 439, 439 
(KB 1827) (finding trespass for seizing goods not named in the warrant and not “likely to 
furnish evidence of the identity of the articles stolen and mentioned in the warrant”); Rex 
v Barnett, 172 Eng Rep 563, 564 (CP 1829) (finding that the money seized was “not in any 
way material as evidence on the charge made against the prisoner,” and ordering its return); 
Regina v Frost, 173 Eng Rep 771, 771 (CP 1839) (noting that “[t]he Court will not order that 
money taken from a prisoner charged with high treason be restored to him, unless it be made 
appear to the Court that the money forms no part of the proof against him”). 
 316 See, for example, Bostock v Saunders, 95 Eng Rep 1141, 1144–45 (KB 1773); 
Cooper v Boot, 99 Eng Rep 911, 916–17 (KB 1785). Some commentators went so far as to 
suggest that at no time could the Crown seize a person’s private papers as evidence of 
libel, treason, or other high crimes. See notes 220–26 and accompanying text. 
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actually been committed, as also to prove the cause and probabil-
ity of suspecting the party against whom the warrant [was] 
prayed.”317 The circumstances sworn to had to meet a standard of 
“probable cause as might induce a discreet and impartial man to 
suspect the party to be guilty.”318 The warrant had to include the 
name of the party to be apprehended and the cause.319 Absent 
these requirements, the person who entered on a deficient war-
rant could be held liable to an action of trespass, upon suit by the 
individual aggrieved.320 
Search warrants, in turn (as opposed to arrest warrants), had 
to specify the precise place to be searched.321 Their object could be 
stolen goods,322 coins,323 naval and military stores,324 goods from 
 
 317 Chitty, 1 A Practical Treatise on the Criminal Law at 33–34 (cited in note 283). 
 318 Id at 34. Coke had argued that only the individual with knowledge or “suspicion 
of the felony” could make an arrest. For him, justices of the peace had no authority to issue 
warrants for arrest. But Hale took a different approach, saying that a justice of the peace 
could “issue a warrant to apprehend a person suspected of felony, tho the original suspi-
cion be not in himself, but in the party that prays his warrant; and the reason is, because 
he is a competent judge of the probabilities offered to him of such suspicion.” Edward L. 
Barrett Jr, Personal Rights, Property Rights, and the Fourth Amendment, 1960 S Ct Rev 
46, 50 n 12 (analyzing materials from Coke’s Institutes and Hale’s Historiam Placitorum 
Coronae). This appears to be the source of the “probable cause” standard subsequently 
embraced by Chitty. 
 319 Chitty, 1 A Practical Treatise on the Criminal Law at 39–41 (cited in note 283). If 
the person’s name was not known, the person had to be described with specificity, such as 
“the body of a man whose name is unknown, but whose person is well known, and who is 
employed as the driver of cattle, and wears a badge, No. 573.” Id (quotation marks omitted). 
 320 Entick, 19 How St Tr at 1073. Most commonly, warrants were issued by a justice 
of the peace for all treasons, felonies, and breaches of the peace or offenses for which the 
party was punishable with corporal punishment. Chitty, 1 A Practical Treatise on the 
Criminal Law at 35 (cited in note 283). But note that in extraordinary cases, the secretar-
ies of state, speaker of the House of Commons or Lords, justices of Gaol Delivery or Oyer 
and Terminer, justices at sessions, or a judge of the Court of the King’s Bench could issue 
a warrant. Id at 34–35. 
 321 Chitty, 1 A Practical Treatise on the Criminal Law at 57 (cited in note 283). 
 322 Id at 64, citing 22 Geo III, ch 58, § 2 (1782), in 9 Statutes at Large 242, 242 (de-
scribing the statute as making it “lawful for any one justice of the peace, upon complaint 
made before him, upon oath, that there is reason to suspect that stolen goods are know-
ingly concealed in any dwellinghouse . . . by warrant under his hand and seal, to cause 
every such place to be searched in the day-time”) (emphasis omitted). 
 323 11 Geo III, ch 40, § 3 (1771), in 8 Statutes at Large 156, 156 (providing justices of 
the peace “on Complaint made” before them “upon the Oath of one credible Person, . . . to 
cause the Dwelling-house, Room, Workshop, Outhouse, Yard, Garden, or other Place be-
longing to such suspected Person or Persons, to be searched for Tools and Implements for 
coining such Copper Monies”). 
 324 39 & 40 Geo III, ch 89, § 11 (1800), in 14 Statutes at Large 431, 434 (giving com-
missioners of the navy, upon the oath of one or more credible persons, the authority to 
search any “Dwelling House, Warehouse, Workshop, Outhouse, Yard, Garden or other 
Place, or on board any Ship, Vessel, Barge, Boat, or other Craft,” and to issue a warrant 
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onboard ships,325 or idle and disorderly persons needed to serve in 
the army or navy.326 A warrant to search for and to seize private 
papers, however, was considered illegal. The reason, according to 
one English legal scholar, was “apparent”: 
In the one, I am permitted to seize my own goods which are 
placed in the hands of a public officer, till the felon’s convic-
tion shall entitle me to restitution. In the other, the party’s 
own property would be seized before, and without conviction, 
and he have no power to reclaim the goods, even after his in-
nocence is cleared by acquittal.327 
Search warrants had to include particulars similar to those 
required for warrants for arrest: an oath, before a justice, of a fel-
ony committed, with the party complaining having probable cause 
to suspect that the object being sought was in a particular place 
and demonstrating his reasons for such suspicion.328 The warrant 
had to specify that the search would be undertaken during day-
light hours and directed by a constable or other public officer, with 
the complaining party present (to identify property that has been 
stolen).329 The “goods found, together with the person in whose 
custody they [were] taken,” were then to be brought before a jus-
tice of the peace.330 
Underlying these rules was the importance of the sanctity of 
the home. As Almon, writing as the Father of Candor, eloquently 
explained in 1765: 
Nothing, as I apprehend, can be forcibly taken from any man, 
or his house entered, without some specific charge upon oath. 
 
to search such places during the daytime); 39 & 40 Geo III, ch 89, § 12 (1800), in 14 Stat-
utes at Large 431, 434 (giving the principal officers or commissioners of the navy the au-
thority to search and detain any barge, boat, or other craft to which there was reason to 
suspect that naval stores had been diverted); 39 & 40 Geo III, ch 89, § 13 (1800), in 14 
Statutes at Large 431, 436 (extending the same power to constables, peace officers, and 
watchmen). 
 325 2 Geo III, ch 28, § 7 (1761), in 25 Statutes at Large 164, 167 (making it lawful for 
a justice of the peace upon “Information made to him on Oath” to cause to search for items 
onboard vessels). 
 326 26 Geo II, ch 4, § 6 (1765), in 21 Statutes at Large 318, 320 (empowering commis-
sioners “to make, or cause to be made a general Search within their respective parishes 
[and] townships . . . for all such persons as they can find, who are or shall appear to them 
to be within the description of this act.”). See also Chitty, 1 A Practical Treatise on the 
Criminal Law at 64–65 (cited in note 283). 
 327 Chitty, 1 A Practical Treatise on the Criminal Law at 65 (cited in note 283). 
 328 Id. 
 329 Id. 
 330 Id. 
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The mansion of every man being his castle, no general 
search-warrant is good. It must either be sworn that I have 
certain stolen goods, or such a particular thing that is crimi-
nal in itself, in my custody, before any magistrate is author-
ized to grant a warrant to any man to enter my house and 
seize it. Nay further, if a positive oath be made, and such a 
particular warrant be issued, it can only be executed upon 
the paper or thing sworn to and specified, and in the presence 
of the owner, or of somebody intrusted by him, with the cus-
tody of it. Without these limitations, there is no liberty or free 
enjoyment of person or property, but every part of a man’s 
most valuable possessions and privacies, is liable to the rav-
age, inroad and inspection of suspicious ministers, who may at 
any time harass, insult and expose, and perhaps, undo him.331 
The following year, William Pitt, first Earl of Chatham, elab-
orated in Parliament on the underlying rationale for limiting the 
state’s ability to search. He emphasized that outside of narrow 
circumstances, the Crown and its officers could not enter the 
home: 
The poorest man may, in his cottage, bid defiance to all the 
forces of the Crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the 
wind may blow through it; the storm may enter; the rain may 
enter; but the King of England may not enter; all his force 
dares not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement.332 
Chatham’s words, like those of Coke, Hale, Hawkins, Blackstone, 
and Almon, reflected growing indignation at the Crown’s flagrant 
disregard for the sanctity of the home. 
Thus it was that, by the time of the US Founding, English 
legal treatises, prominent law lords, the Court of Common Pleas, 
the Court of King’s Bench, Parliament, and the general public had 
 
 331 The Father of Candor, A Letter Concerning Libels, Warrants, Seizure of Papers, 
and Security for the Peace, &c. 58 (printed for Almon 3d ed 1765) (“Father of Candor”). In 
1819, Chitty reiterated that 
a man’s own house is regarded as his castle, which is only to be violated when 
absolute necessity compels the disregard of smaller rights, in order to secure 
public benefit; and, therefore, in all cases where the law is silent and express 
principles do not apply, this extreme violence [entering another’s home without 
permission] is illegal. 
Chitty, 1 A Practical Treatise on the Criminal Law at 52 (cited in note 283). 
 332 See Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations Which Rest 
upon the Legislative Power of the States of the American Union 320 n 2 (Little, Brown 2d 
ed 1871) (quoting Chatham). 
03 DONOHUE ART FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 9/11/2016  8:17 PM 
2016] The Original Fourth Amendment 1239 
 
come to embrace the broad understanding that, outside of pursuit 
of a known felon, a warrant must issue prior to search or seizure 
within the home.333 They rejected general warrants and required 
 
 333 This understanding persisted in English law. In 1816, Chitty explained that when 
a suspected felon is at large, “he may in some cases, before an indictment has been found, 
be apprehended, either without warrant, by a private individual, or by a constable or other 
officer ex officio; or, under a warrant granted by a Justice of the Peace or a Judge.” Chitty, 
1 A Practical Treatise on the Criminal Law at 11 (cited in note 283). A constable could 
“break open doors to take a felon, if he be in the house, and entry denied after demand, 
and notice given that he is a constable.” Id at 23. Constables could not, however, arrest 
individuals for mere breaches of the peace if they did not personally witness the affray. Id. 
Justices of the peace, sheriffs, and coroners had similar powers of arrest. Id at 24–26. 
Felons could also be pursued “with horn and voice” under the common-law process of hue 
and cry. Id at 26–28. The reason for the fleeing felon exception to the warrant requirement 
was to prevent escape. Id at 31. Even then, it might be more prudent to obtain the author-
ity of a magistrate through a warrant. Id. General warrants were not allowed: 
[A] general warrant to seize and apprehend all persons suspected, without nam-
ing or describing any person in particular, is illegal and void for its uncertainty; 
for it is the duty of the magistrate, and not to be left to the officer, to judge of the 
ground of suspicion. . . . [A] warrant to apprehend all persons guilty of a crime 
therein specified, is not a legal warrant. 
Id at 41–42. But note that in the midst of public disorder, a warrant could be issued to 
arrest those engaged in the affray. Id at 42. Subsequent cases reflected this understand-
ing. See, for example, Beckwith v Philby, 108 Eng Rep 585, 585–86 (KB 1827) (finding a 
felony arrest by a constable based on probable cause without a warrant to be reasonable 
when the individual arrested was believed to be in the midst of stealing a horse). This 
general approach continued into the early twentieth century. See, for example, Earl of 
Halsbury, et al, eds, 9 The Laws of England, Being a Complete Statement of the Whole Law 
of England § 523 at 246 n (c) (Butterworth 1909): 
If a treason or a felony has been committed, anyone may without a warrant ar-
rest a person against whom there is reasonable ground of suspicion; a constable 
may arrest anyone whom he has reasonable ground to suspect of having com-
mitted, or being about to commit, a felony. In cases of misdemeanour, with some 
exceptions, there is no power to arrest without a warrant. 
(citations omitted). See also id § 601 at 292 (“A warrant cannot issue unless there is an 
information in writing and on oath.”); id § 609 at 296 (“Anyone may without a warrant 
arrest a person whom he sees on the point of committing or attempting to commit treason 
or felony, but there is no power of arrest if the attempt has ceased.”) (citations omitted); 
id § 610 at 297 n (q) (“[E]xcept where there is a breach of the peace, there is no power at 
common law to arrest without a warrant for a mere disturbance.”). A warrant had to 
include 
the offence on which it is founded and that an information has been sworn, or 
facts on which it is based proved on oath, and names or otherwise describes the 
offender; and it orders the person or persons to whom it is directed to apprehend 
the offender and bring him before the justice issuing the warrant. 
Id § 618 at 307–08. For search warrants, 
[a] justice of the peace has at common law the power, on an information being 
sworn before him alleging a suspicion that larceny has been committed, to issue 
a search warrant authorising a search in any house etc. in the day time for stolen 
goods and the arrest of any person found in possession of such goods. Except in 
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certain particulars even for specific warrants to be valid.334 The 
Crown nevertheless persisted in attempting to enter homes with-
out a warrant and to execute general warrants under statutory 
provisions. But the practice was controversial, particularly in co-
lonial America, where special rules under English law explicitly 
allowed for general searches in relation to customs.335 As the 
Crown sought to make greater use of the associated instrument 
(the writ of assistance), tension increased, mirroring the frictions 
that followed the English Civil War. 
II.  COLONIAL EXPERIENCE 
At the most general level, early American colonists reviled 
search and seizure on the grounds that they unduly interfered 
with private life. Colonial enmity extended beyond general war-
rants to any government entry into the home. Response to such 
searches tended to be immediate and visceral—not part of an in-
tellectualized objection to promiscuous search.336 Thus it was that 
impost officers in Massachusetts Bay found themselves unable to 
search for illegally imported spirits—despite having the legal au-
thority to do so.337 The question was not whether a warrant was 
 
the case of stolen goods there is no power at common law to issue a warrant au-
thorising the search of a house. But provision is made by statute for the issue of 
a search warrant in certain specified cases. 
Id § 625 at 310 (citations omitted and emphasis added). 
 334 To some extent, the persistence of general warrants in relation to customs and 
excise may have been a product of the prevalence of smuggling and the seriousness with 
which the Crown treated matters related to the treasury. See generally, for example, 
Geoffrey Morley, The Smuggling War: The Government’s Fight against Smuggling in the 
18th and 19th Centuries (Sutton 1994). 
 335 In 1662, for instance, the Earl of Southampton lamented that even as he granted 
general warrants at the request of the customs officers, he was assaulted and vexed by 
those upon whom the warrants were being served. Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment at 
127 (cited in note 37). Within a short time, however, the Earl changed his stance and re-
fused to serve them. Within two decades, customs officials had imposed their own re-
strictions, bringing even customs in alignment with the other areas by requiring that of-
ficers first demonstrate to a magistrate, under oath, the facts on which search and seizure 
rested. Id at 127 n 109 (citing the Dictionary of Rates and Laws Relating to Customs, 1682, 
available at the British Library). 
 For twentieth- and twenty-first-century US cases recognizing this history, see 
Thornton v United States, 541 US 615, 629–31 (2004) (Scalia concurring); Miller v United 
States, 357 US 301, 306–09 (1958); Accarino v United States, 179 F2d 456, 460–62 (DC Cir 
1949); People v Chiagles, 142 NE 583, 583–84 (NY 1923). 
 336 Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment at 185–86 (cited in note 37). 
 337 See id. 
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general or specific; efforts to serve either kind of instrument re-
sulted in hostility.338 
It was not just the upper class that objected. In 1734, for in-
stance, after a sea captain was slain when he used a cannon to 
prevent a marshal of the Vice Admiralty Court from boarding his 
vessel, the public spontaneously assembled and objected that the 
ship was the captain’s home.339 According to a local newspaper, 
“[a] greasy Fellow with a leather apron” declared: 
[M]y house is my castle, and so is my ship, and therefore . . . 
I lay it down as a fundamental Law of Nations, that if the 
greatest Officer of the King has, was to come with a thousand 
Warrants against me for any crime whatsoever, if he offers to 
take me out of my castle, I can kill him, and the law will bear 
me out.340 
The debate was not under what conditions the Crown could enter 
dwellings—the conversation that marked the legal discourse 
across the ocean—but whether homes could be entered at all. 
Reflecting this attitude, from the earliest colonial times, 
there were fewer conditions under which officials in the Americas 
could enter homes to search or to seize items. Entire tracts of Brit-
ish search and seizure law, such as those relating to religious and 
political conformity, never made their way across the Atlantic. 
The reason why is a matter of some speculation. To some ex-
tent, the use of general warrants for this purpose had been an 
invention of the Tudors, meant to consolidate power in England. 
Individuals seeking to flee from political or religious persecution 
might understandably choose not to import general warrants, a 
tool related to efforts to control dissent, into the New World. 
But political and religious matters were not the sole areas in 
which more limited powers traversed the Atlantic. General war-
rants related to the guilds or to recreation by the working classes 
also remained uniquely English.341 And while promiscuous search 
and seizure related to bankruptcy, vagrancy, and game poaching 
continued to mark English law, only a few colonies adopted simi-
lar instruments.342 Nor did the use of general warrants for mili-
tary service cross the water. Fewer situations in which general 
 
 338 Id at 185. 
 339 Id at 188. 
 340 Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment at 188 (cited in note 37) (ellipsis in original), 
quoting The South–Carolina Gazette (Oct 26–Nov 2, 1734). 
 341 Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment at 227 (cited in note 37). 
 342 Id. 
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searches could be executed (such as hue and cry or collection of 
revenues) marked colonial times.343 
Regardless of why this was the case, as a practical matter, by 
the end of the seventeenth century, England had approximately 
twice as many subject matter areas in which the Crown indulged 
in promiscuous search and seizure.344 And unlike in England, 
where such searches became the norm, in the American colonies 
they did not—except with regard to customs and writs of assis-
tance, in which cases general searches, effected by officers of the 
Crown, became more common, increasing tension and providing 
a focal point for colonial discontent. 
A writ of assistance served as a particular form of general 
warrant, providing customs agents (and later, naval officers) with 
the authority to search places ranging from ships and warehouses 
to private dwellings in order to look for goods that failed to meet 
the customs requirements. The name derived from the language 
of the writs themselves: all individuals present were required to 
“assist” the official engaged in the search.345 
Seeds of conflict between colonists and the Crown with re-
gard to these writs were laid in 1678, when Edward Randolph 
became the chief agent of the commissioners of customs in New 
England.346 A meticulous, if partisan, administrator, Randolph 
was highly critical of the colonial government. His appointment 
followed a visit he had made to Boston in the summer of 1676, 
after which he had reported to the Crown that the Massachusetts 
Bay Company was abusing its charter, tolerating illegal trade, 
and exerting tyrannical power over its citizens and neighbors.347 
Returning to the colonies, Randolph became appalled at the colo-
nists’ disdain for the Crown. He identified a small group of Loyalists 
and began planning a new form of government, which he referred 
to as the “Dominion of New England.” The aim was to replace 
Massachusetts Bay and other nearby colonies, including what 
eventually became New York. Randolph’s reports led to the an-
nulment of the Massachusetts Bay Company’s charter.348 
During the 1689 colonial uprising, Randolph—unpopular 
with the local population—found himself imprisoned before being 
 
 343 Id at 227–28. 
 344 Id at 228. 
 345 Amar, 30 Suffolk U L Rev at 77–78 (cited in note 13). 
 346 Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment at 254 (cited in note 37). 
 347 Randolph, Edward, in H.C.G. Matthew and Brian Harrison, eds, 46 Oxford Dict-
ionary of National Biography 5, 5–6 (Oxford 2004). 
 348 Id at 5. 
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repatriated to England.349 In April 1692, Randolph returned to the 
colonies and launched a three-year examination of nearly every 
port on the Eastern Seaboard, along the way strongly endorsing 
the use of general warrants.350 He documented inadequate record 
keeping, illegal trade, and corruption, with his final report lead-
ing to the introduction in Westminster of a new statute to cut off 
illegal colonial trade.351 The legislation created a system of admi-
ralty courts to enforce regulations and to punish smugglers. Jur-
ies were to be constituted by Englishmen.352 The law required of-
ficers to take oaths to uphold their legal obligations, under threat 
of removal and penalty.353 The lord treasurer, commissioners of 
the treasury, and commissioners of customs would, “for the tyme 
being,” appoint customs officers in any city, town, river, port, har-
bor, or creek in the colonies.354 The statute gave the officials broad 
powers of search and seizure. It allowed officers of the Crown to 
issue writs of assistance to search ships, warehouses, or homes to 
find smuggled goods.355 
 
 349 Id. For an example of the colonial uprising in 1689, see Cotton Mather and Others, 
The Declaration of the Gentlemen, Merchants, and Inhabitants of Boston, and the Country 
Adjacent (Green 1689), excerpted at http://perma.cc/2KMW-MN7X. Mathers’s declaration 
was served, following the overthrow of James II, on the recently appointed Boston gover-
nor, Sir Edmund Andros, objecting to his levying of new taxes, suspension of assemblies, 
and curtailment of citizens’ rights. 
 350 Randolph, Edward at 6 (cited in note 347). See also Cuddihy, The Fourth Amend-
ment at 255–56 (cited in note 37). 
 351 Randolph, Edward at 6 (cited in note 347). See also An Act for Preventing Frauds 
and Regulating Abuses in the Plantation Trade, 7 & 8 Wm III, ch 22 (1695–96), in 7 Stat-
utes of the Realm 103. The statute specified illegal trade to, from, or within the Asian, 
African, or American colonies or plantations. 
 352 Jurors had to be either natives of England or Ireland or born in the plantations. 
Note that the allowance of juries for admiralty matters related to customs departed from 
the practice in England at the time, where juries did not sit in courts of admiralty. See 7 
& 8 Wm III, ch 22, § 10 (1695–96), in 7 Statutes of the Realm 103, 105. 
 353 7 & 8 Wm III, ch 22, § 3 (1695–96), in 7 Statutes of the Realm 103, 103. 
 354 7 & 8 Wm III, ch 22, § 10 (1695–96), in 7 Statutes of the Realm 103, 105. 
 355 7 & 8 Wm III, ch 22, § 5 (1695–96), in 7 Statutes of the Realm 103, 104. Randolph 
also repeatedly proposed that the American colonies be consolidated under direct author-
ity from the Crown. Although he managed to convince the Board of Trade of the plan, he 
died before it was enacted. See Randolph, Edward at 5–6 (cited in note 347). Colonial law 
paralleled that of England. In 1695, the province of Maryland passed a law authorizing 
officers 
to Enter into any Ship or Vessell Tradeing to and from this Province or into any 
house Warehouse or other building and open any Trunk Chest Cask or fardle 
and Search to make in any part of place of such Ship or Vessell houses or build-
ings as af where such Navall Officer shall suspect any such furrs or Skinns to be. 
An Act for Laying an Imposition on Severall Commoditys Exported out of This Province 
(Oct 1695), reprinted in William Hand Browne, ed, 19 Proceedings and Acts of the General 
Assembly of Maryland: September 1693–June 1697 276, 277 (Maryland Historical Society 
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Formal instructions to colonial officers following passage of 
the statute directed them to take special steps to enforce it using 
writs of assistance.356 Further incentive was provided by the stat-
ute itself: a third of the contraband seized would be awarded to 
the governor of the colony, with another third supplied to the per-
son providing information leading to the seizure of the goods, and 
the remaining third being retained for the Crown.357 
Increasing use of promiscuous searches and seizures fol-
lowed, with violence frequently accompanying exercise of the 
powers.358 Colonists became ever more concerned by intrusions 
into their homes and businesses.359 Because the writs of assis-
tance acted as a legal instrument, there was no judicial re-
course.360 The documents gave officials carte blanche to access 
ships, warehouses, and homes, and all persons, papers, and ef-
fects contained therein, violating the oldest of English rights: that 
of a person to be secure in his home.361 By the mid-eighteenth cen-
tury, tension simmered. As the geopolitics shifted, a renewed ef-
fort to employ writs of assistance brought it to a roiling boil. 
A. Paxton’s Case: The Child Independence 
In the mid-eighteenth century, Great Britain controlled the 
thirteen colonies. Its lands reached from the Atlantic Ocean to the 
Appalachian Mountains. Beyond the frontier, from La Nouvelle-
Orléans in the south, through Fort Détroit on the Great Lakes, 
 
1899). Virginia and other colonies similarly introduced legislation requiring general war-
rants for the execution of customs laws. Over time, these powers steadily expanded, as did 
the objects of their affection (extending, for example, to contraband, tobacco, and other 
items). See Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment at 213–15 (cited in note 37). 
 356 Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment at 258 & n 30 (cited in note 37), citing Instruc-
tions Nos 1035 and 1039, in Leonard Woods Labaree, ed, 2 Royal Instructions to British 
Governors, 1670–1776 752, 752, 762 (Appleton 1935). 
 357 7 & 8 Wm III, ch 22, § 1 (1695–96), in 7 Statutes of the Realm 103, 103. 
 358 See Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment at 259–62 (cited in note 37). 
 359 See id at 185–88. 
 360 See M.H. Smith, The Writs of Assistance Case 39 (California 1978). 
 361 See generally id (tracing the history of writs of assistance); E.R. Adair and F.M. 
Greir Evans, Writs of Assistance, 1558–1700, 36 Eng Hist Rev 356 (1921). See also Gordon 
S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic 3–45 (UNC 1998) (discussing the colonists’ 
conceptions of the British constitution). M.H. Smith recognizes, “Juridically, the search 
warrant and the writ of assistance were poles apart,” noting that the former were judicial 
instruments and the latter legal instruments granted under a parliamentary act, requir-
ing citizens to assist under threat of being held in violation of the law. Smith, The Writs of 
Assistance Case at 39 (cited in note 360). Smith nevertheless concedes that both at the 
time and in the intervening years the writs were treated and considered as general search 
warrants. Id. 
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and up to Québec in the north, lay New France. Although more 
than three times as large as New England, it had just 70,000 set-
tlers, in contrast to 1.5 million colonists to the east.362 The Euro-
pean countries’ expansionist tendencies, coupled with a lack of 
clarity as to territorial borders, contributed to frequent skir-
mishes for more land. War followed. 
In 1752, angered by the Virginia governor’s continued grants 
of land to parts of the Ohio River Basin, the French and their al-
lied Native American tribes in the region (the Seneca, the Lenape 
in Delaware, and the Shawnee) seized or evicted all English-
speaking traders from the region.363 Virginia responded by send-
ing a delegation of four military officers, plus an interpreter and 
a guide, to inform the French that the colony would not stand for 
such actions. Chosen to lead the parley was twenty-one-year-old 
George Washington, then a major in the British colonial forces. 
The French met Washington with a polite but firm refusal to 
recognize Virginia’s claim. “As to the Summons you send me to 
retire,” Commandant Jacques Legardeur de St. Pierre, the elderly 
French officer to whom Washington delivered the Virginia gover-
nor’s demands, wrote in reply, “I do not think myself obliged to 
obey it.”364 The governor responded by promoting Washington to 
lieutenant colonel and directing him to return to Ohio to prevent 
the French from claiming the territory.365 
Washington did return with a force of 160 men, only to find 
himself outnumbered.366 Upon hearing of Washington’s defeat, 
British Prime Minister Thomas Pelham-Holles decided to push 
for a swift, undeclared retaliation. Members of his cabinet disag-
reed.367 His opponents leaked the plans, giving notice to the 
French and catapulting what would have been a minor alterca-
tion on the edges of the empire into a full-blown military conflict. 
The French and Indian War, in turn, became the opening salvo in 
the Europeans’ Seven Years’ War. 
 
 362 Linda Kealey, North America from North of the 49th Parallel, in Teresa A. Meade 
and Merry E. Wiesner-Hanks, eds, A Companion to Gender History 492, 493 (Blackwell 2006). 
 363 See Spencer C. Tucker, 1 Almanac of American Military History 145–46 (ABC-
CLIO 2013). 
 364 Letter from Jacques Legardeur de Saint-Pierre to Robert Dinwiddie (Dec 15, 
1753), in The Journal of Major George Washington 31 (printed for Jefferys 1754). 
 365 Tucker, 1 Almanac of American Military History at 145–46 (cited in note 363). 
 366 Scott Weidensaul, The First Frontier 319 (Houghton Mifflin 2012). 
 367 See French and Indian War/Seven Years’ War, 1754–63 (US Department of State, 
Office of the Historian), archived at http://perma.cc/BYH7-C93D. 
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It was in the context of the French and Indian War that Gov-
ernor William Shirley, sensing the coming conflict, returned to 
the Province of Massachusetts Bay.368 He took decisive steps to 
assist in the war effort, turning to writs of assistance to prevent 
French Canada from benefiting from illegal commerce.369 Instead 
of relying on legislation for legal authority, however, Shirley drew 
on his executive powers as governor—a rationale widely regarded 
as illegitimate for such purposes, not least because legislation 
passed by England in 1660 and 1662 required a warrant for 
searching buildings.370 The colony’s impost laws and correspond-
ing local measures allowed homes to be entered only via specific, 
not general, warrants.371 Nevertheless, Shirley directed his newly 
appointed customs officers, among them Charles Paxton and 
Thomas Lechmere, to use the writs to prevent illegal trade.372 
 
 368 See Donohue, The Future of Foreign Intelligence at 81 (cited in note 54). 
 369 Id. 
 370 An Act to Prevent Frauds and Concealments of His Majesty’s Customs and Subs-
idies, 12 Car II, ch 19, § 1 (1660), in 5 Statutes of the Realm 250, 250. The Act authorized, 
upon an oath made to the lord treasurer, any barons of the exchequer, or the chief magis-
trate of the place of the offense or nearby region, the same persons 
to issue out a Warrant to any person or persons thereby enableing him or them 
with the assistance of a Sheriffe Justice of Peace or Constable to enter into any 
House in the day time where such Goods are suspected to be concealed, and in 
case of resistance to breake open such Houses, and to seize and secure the same 
goods soe concealed, And all Officers and Ministers of Justice are hereby re-
quired to be aiding and assisting thereunto. 
12 Car II, ch 19, § 1 (1660), in 5 Statutes of the Realm 250, 250. See also An Act for Pre-
venting Frauds and Regulating Abuses in His Majesties Customes, 14 Car II, ch 11, § 44 
(1662), in 5 Statutes of the Realm 393, 394: 
And it shall be lawfull to or for any person or persons, authorized by Writt of 
Assistance under the Seale of his Majestyes Court of Exchequer to take a Con-
stable Headborough or other Publique Officer inhabiting neare unto the place 
and in the day time to enter and go into any House Shop Cellar Ware-house or 
Room or other place and in case of resistance to breake open Doores Chests 
Trunks and other Package there to seize and from thence to bring any kind of 
Goods & Merchandize whatsoever prohibited or uncustomed and to put and se-
cure the same in His Majesties Store house in the Port next to the place where 
such seizure shall be made. 
 371 See, for example, Nathaniel B. Shurtleff, ed, 3 Records of the Governor and Com-
pany of the Massachusetts Bay in New England, Printed by Order of the Legislature 372 
(White 1854) (including language of the impost law of September 20, 1654, requiring im-
post officers to sue in a court of law to recover monies due). 
 372 Paxton was assigned “Surveyor of all Rates, Duties, and Impositions arising and 
growing [ ] within” the Port of Boston on January 8, 1752. Josiah Quincy Jr and Horace 
Gray, Reports of Cases Argued and Adjudged in the Superior Court of Judicature of the 
Province of Massachusetts Bay, between 1761 and 1772 403–04, 406 (Little, Brown 1865). 
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Paxton, responsible for the Port of Boston, soon came into 
the possession of information indicating that the brother of 
Thomas Hutchinson, himself a well-known Loyalist to the 
Crown, had illegal goods stored in his warehouse.373 When Paxton 
arrived to conduct a search, Hutchinson challenged him, arguing 
that the writ was invalid, making Paxton vulnerable to charges 
of breaking and entering.374 He nevertheless gave him access to 
the storehouse. 
Shirley, informed of Hutchinson’s objection, directed his cus-
toms officers to obtain a writ from the colony’s Superior Court of 
Judicature that would serve in place of his executive order.375 In 
June 1755, Paxton did so.376 Two months later, the Massachusetts 
Bay Superior Court issued the requested writ, directing that jus-
tices of the peace allow Paxton and his deputies “from Time to 
time at his or their Will as well in the day as in the Night to enter 
and go on board” any vessel, “to View & Search” and to carry out 
the duties of customs officers. During the daytime, the writ em-
powered Paxton “to enter and go into any Vaults, Cellars, Ware-
houses, Shops or other Places to search and see whether any 
Goods, Wares or Merchandises, in [the] same Ships, Boats or Ves-
sells, Vaults, Cellars, Warehouses, Shops or other Places are or 
shall be there hid or concealed,” and, further, “to open any 
Trunks, Chests, Boxes, fardells or Packs made up or in Bulk, 
whatever in [which] any Goods, Wares, or Merchandises are sus-
pected to be packed	or concealed.”377 Within the next five years, 
all seven of Paxton’s fellow commissioners of customs in Boston 
had obtained similar writs.378 
 
 373 Hutchinson, Thomas, in H.C.G. Matthew and Brian Harrison, eds, 29 Oxford Dic-
tionary of National Biography 33, 33–34 (Oxford 2004). See also Donohue, The Future of 
Foreign Intelligence at 81 (cited in note 54). 
 374 Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment at 379 (cited in note 37). See also Donohue, The 
Future of Foreign Intelligence at 81–82 (cited in note 54). 
 375 Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment at 379 (cited in note 37). See also Donohue, The 
Future of Foreign Intelligence at 82 (cited in note 54). 
 376 Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment at 379 (cited in note 37). See also Donohue, The 
Future of Foreign Intelligence at 82 (cited in note 54). 
 377 Quincy and Gray, Reports of Cases Argued at 404–05 (cited in note 372). The case 
itself is unreported in formal volumes. Instead, the record is based on notes taken during 
two hearings. President Adams recorded the first proceeding, and Josiah Quincy Jr made 
notations on the second one. See John Adams, Minutes of the Argument, in L. Kinvin 
Wroth and Hiller B. Zobel, eds, 2 Legal Papers of John Adams 106, 123–34 (Belknap 1965). 
Adams’s abstract of the argument was printed in 1773 in a paper in Boston. See Smith, 
The Writs of Assistance Case at 548 (cited in note 360). See also Donohue, The Future of 
Foreign Intelligence at 82 (cited in note 54). 
 378 Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment at 379 (cited in note 37). 
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The language of these writs drew from the legislation passed 
by Westminster in 1660 and 1662. As previously discussed, the stat-
utes allowed for house-to-house searches, without any demonstra-
tion of illegal acts by those subject to search. There was no further 
involvement of the judiciary. Anyone served with such a writ, 
moreover, was forced to comply. 
In 1760, Lord Chatham, secretary of state for the Southern 
Department, upped the ante. He directed Sir Francis Bernard, 
who had become governor of the Province of Massachusetts Bay, to 
use writs of assistance to stop trade not only with French Canada, 
but also with the French Indies.379 The governor and royal customs 
officers were to “make the strictest, & most diligent Enquiry into 
the State of this dangerous and ignominious Trade.”380 Every step 
authorized by law was to be taken “to bring all such heinous Of-
fenders to the most exemplary, and condign Punishment.”381 
When King George II died, the writs entered a twilight: 
within six months of the death of the reigning monarch, all writs 
of assistance expired.382 Colonial officials therefore had only until 
April 1761 to obtain a renewal—creating a window for those who 
opposed the instruments to challenge them. The Society for Pro-
moting Trade and Commerce within the Province stepped for-
ward, petitioning the Massachusetts Bay Superior Court to hear 
its case.383 
Like other colonial mercantile organizations, the Society had 
a strong influence on government policies and frequently found 
its position reflected in council and parliamentary decisions.384 In 
the period leading up to the Revolution, the Society took on in-
creasing political importance—not least by openly challenging the 
customs officers. 
 
 379 Id at 380 n 19 (citing historical newspapers and other documents). See also 
Donohue, The Future of Foreign Intelligence at 82–83 (cited in note 54). 
 380 Quincy and Gray, Reports of Cases Argued at 407 (cited in note 372). 
 381 Id at 408. 
 382 1 Anne, ch 2, § 5 (1701), in 8 Statutes of the Realm 5, 6: 
[N]o . . . Writ of Assistance . . . shall be determined abated or discontinued by 
the Demise of the said late King but all and every such Writ Commission Process 
and Proceedings shall be and are hereby revived and continued and shall be in 
full Force and Vertue[.] . . . But every such Commission and Writ shall be and 
continue in full Force and Vertue for the Space of Six Months next ensuing 
notwithstanding any such Demise[,] unless superseded and determined by Her 
Majesty Her Heirs or Successors. 
 383 Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment at 381 (cited in note 37). 
 384 See Charles M. Andrews, The Boston Merchants and the Non-importation Move-
ment 160–80 (Wilson 1917). 
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Lechmere, by then surveyor general of the customs, lodged a 
petition in opposition to the Society, defending the extension of 
the writs.385 The same person who had challenged Paxton’s use of 
the executive writ, Hutchinson, had by then become chief justice 
of the Superior Court.386  
James Otis Jr argued the case on behalf of the Society. Born 
in West Barnstable, Massachusetts, Otis had graduated from 
Harvard and subsequently entered into legal practice.387 His fa-
ther later used his friendship with Shirley to secure a position 
for Otis as, first, justice of the peace and, then, deputy advocate-
general of the Massachusetts Vice-Admiralty Court.388 When the 
Crown approached Otis to argue the case on its behalf, Otis re-
signed.389 The Boston merchants took this as an opportunity, sec-
uring his representation.390 He agreed to do it pro bono, later ex-
plaining in court, “The only principles of public conduct that are 
worthy [of] a gentleman, or a man are, to sacrifice estate, ease, 
health and applause, and even life itself to the sacred calls of his 
country.”391	
Otis’s declamation against general warrants is one of the 
most celebrated orations in US history.392 President Adams, who 
witnessed the moment, later recalled, “Otis was a flame of Fire!”393 
Otis had “breathed into this nation the breath of life.”394 He kin-
dled the Revolution: “Every man of an crowded Audience ap-
peared to me to go away, as I did, ready to take up Arms against 
Writs of Assistants.”395 
 
 385 Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment at 381 n 22 (cited in note 37) (citing Lechmere’s 
petition). 
 386 For further discussion of Hutchinson and his rather tense relationship with the 
Otis family, see Malcolm Freiberg, Prelude to Purgatory: Thomas Hutchinson in Provincial 
Massachusetts Politics, 1760–1770 *8–9 (unpublished PhD thesis, Brown University, 1950). 
 387 Otis, James, Junior, in H.C.G. Matthew and Brian Harrison, eds, 42 Oxford Dict-
ionary of National Biography 99, 99–100 (Oxford 2004). 
 388 Id at 99. 
 389 J.A. Spencer, 1 History of the United States from the Earliest Period to the Admin-
istration of James Buchanan 249 (Johnson, Fry 1858). 
 390 See Donohue, The Future of Foreign Intelligence at 83 (cited in note 54). 
 391 The Massachusetts Spy *3 (Apr 29, 1773) (“Brief of James Otis”) (reporting Otis’s 
speech before the Superior Court in Paxton’s Case). See also Donohue, The Future of For-
eign Intelligence at 83 (cited in note 54). 
 392 See Donohue, The Future of Foreign Intelligence at 83 (cited in note 54). 
 393 Smith, The Writs of Assistance Case at 253 (cited in note 360). 
 394 Id at 252. 
 395 Id at 253. 
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Legal tracts on both sides of the Atlantic later credited Otis’s 
argument with being a central moment in the shift to independ-
ence. In the nineteenth century, one law dictionary explained, 
“The issuing of [writs of assistance] was one of the causes of the 
American republic. They were a species of general warrant, being 
directed to ‘all and singular justices, sheriffs, constables and all 
other officers and subjects,’ empowering them to enter and search 
any house.”396 They had been put into disuse “owing to the eloquent 
argument of Otis before the supreme court of Massachusetts 
against their legality.”397 Another dictionary noted, “The use of the 
writ of assistance was one of the causes of the revolt of the American 
colonies.”398 Modern scholars similarly hail Otis’s argument as lay-
ing “the foundation for the breach between Great Britain and her 
continental colonies.”399 
Otis denounced general warrants as a tyrannical exercise of 
power. “I will to my dying day oppose,” he stated, “with all the 
powers and faculties God has given me, all such instruments of 
slavery on the one hand, and villainy on the other, as this writ of 
assistance is.”400 For Otis, the writ was “the worst instrument of 
arbitrary power, the most destructive of English liberty, and the 
fundamental principles of the constitution, that ever was found in 
an English law-book.”401 For him, the threat was real. Otis used 
prose that bordered on sedition, warning that it was precisely this 
kind of power that had “cost one King of England his head and 
another his throne.”402 
Just as Coke had disdained the actual practice of the Crown, 
it mattered naught to Otis that British legislation appeared to 
allow such instruments. “Your Honours will find in the old book, 
concerning the office of a justice of peace, precedents of general 
warrants to search suspected houses,” he noted.403 “But in more 
modern books you will find only special warrants to search such 
and such houses specially named, in which the complainant has 
 
 396 John Bouvier, 1 A Law Dictionary, Adapted to the Constitution and Laws of the 
United States of America, and of the Several States of the American Union 708 (Lippincott 
15th ed 1892). 
 397 Id. 
 398 Renton, ed, 6 Encyclopaedia of the Laws of England at 63 (cited in note 198). 
 399 Lawrence Henry Gipson, The Coming of the Revolution, 1763-1775 39 (Harper & 
Row 1962). 
 400 Smith, The Writs of Assistance Case at 552 (cited in note 360) (reproducing the 
speech of Otis). See also Donohue, The Future of Foreign Intelligence at 84 (cited in note 54). 
 401 Smith, The Writs of Assistance Case at 552 (cited in note 360). 
 402 Id. 
 403 Id at 553. 
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before sworn that he suspects his goods are concealed.”404 Only 
specific warrants—even under the 1662 Act,405 which empowered 
a justice of the peace to search for stolen goods—were legal. As 
a result, “the writ prayed for in this petition being general is 
illegal.”406 
Otis went on to highlight the problems with general war-
rants. Directed against all persons, “every one with this writ may 
be a tyrant.”407 Worse, the instrument gave the person wielding it 
the imprimatur of law.408 The writ had no expiration, nor was any 
return required.409 No one, therefore, ever could be held account-
able in court for use of the power.410 It was not just the target of 
the search, moreover, whose freedom was thereby limited. Any-
one carrying such a document could direct others to assist him, 
thus impacting their liberty as well.411 
At stake were the same rights that Coke had extolled in 
Semayne’s Case and traced to Magna Carta: “[O]ne of the most 
essential branches of English liberty,” Otis noted, “is the freedom 
of one’s house. A man’s house is his castle; and while he is quiet, 
he is as well guarded as a prince in his castle.”412 The writ in ques-
tion, “if it should be declared legal, would totally annihilate this 
privilege.”413 
One of the greatest dangers of allowing promiscuous search 
was that the powers of the state could become an instrument of 
personal power. Otis referenced a recent case, recognizable to 
those present. As an act of personal retribution, a customs officer 
had used a writ of assistance to harass a constable (the constable 
had called the official before him to answer charges related to a 
breach of the Sabbath, or for swearing).414 Otis underscored his 
concern: “Every man prompted by revenge, ill humour or wanton-
ness to inspect the inside of his neighbour’s house, may get a writ 
 
 404 Id. 
 405 See Smith, The Writs of Assistance Case at 334–35 (cited in note 360). 
 406 Id at 533. 
 407 Id. 
 408 Id. See also Donohue, The Future of Foreign Intelligence at 84 (cited in note 54). 
 409 Smith, The Writs of Assistance Case at 553 (cited in note 360). See also Donohue, 
The Future of Foreign Intelligence at 84 (cited in note 54). 
 410 Smith, The Writs of Assistance Case at 553 (cited in note 360). See also Donohue, 
The Future of Foreign Intelligence at 84 (cited in note 54). 
 411 Smith, The Writs of Assistance Case at 553 (cited in note 360). See also Donohue, 
The Future of Foreign Intelligence at 84 (cited in note 54). 
 412 Smith, The Writs of Assistance Case at 553–54 (cited in note 360). 
 413 Id at 554. 
 414 Id. 
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of assistance; others will ask it from self defence; one arbitrary 
exertion will provoke another, until society will be involved in tu-
mult and in blood.”415 Reason, and the British constitution, de-
manded that the court find such instruments illegal. For Otis, 
the common law served as the ultimate protector of individual 
rights. Precedent fell subject to the principles of the law. 
“Though it should be made in the very words of the petition it 
would be void, [as] ‘AN ACT AGAINST THE CONSTITUTION 
IS VOID.’”416 
B. Influence of English Law 
Paxton’s Case served as a stark colonial example of the rejec-
tion of general warrants. It underscored how overreaching by the 
government undermined individual rights. In the course of his ar-
gument, Otis referenced Coke, Hale, and Magna Carta,417 even as 
he noted that the Crown’s failure to stay within the prescribed 
limits of government had led to the execution of Charles I and to 
the overthrow of James II—the first shot of the American Revol-
ution, indeed. Otis’s argument underscores the fact that the 
Founding generation was intimately familiar with the arguments 
of the great English legal theorists and their denunciation of gen-
eral warrants. 
Coke’s Institutes, Hale’s History of the Pleas of the Crown, and 
Blackstone’s Commentaries had a profound influence on the 
 
 415 Id. See also Donohue, The Future of Foreign Intelligence at 84 (cited in note 54). 
 416 Smith, The Writs of Assistance Case at 364 (cited in note 360). 
 417 See id at 544–45. 
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American Founders.418 Thomas Jefferson considered these trea-
tises central to understanding American law.419 In his later years, 
Jefferson wrote that the Institutes and Commentaries “are pos-
sessed & understood by every one.”420 The former, in particular, 
“[are] executed with so much learning and judgment that I do not 
recollect that a single position in it has ever been judicially de-
nied.”421 Seven months later he again noted, “Coke has given us 
the first view of the whole body of law worthy now of being stud-
ied. . . . Coke’s Institutes are a perfect Digest of the law as it stood 
in his day.”422 
To be fair, Jefferson did not always perceive Coke with a 
spirit of good will. As a nineteen-year-old law student, Jefferson 
had lamented: 
I am sure to get through old Cooke [Coke] this winter: for God 
knows I have not seen him since I packed him up in my trunk 
in Williamsburgh. . . . I do wish the Devil had old Cooke, for 
I am sure I never was so tired of an old dull scoundrel in my 
life.423 
 
 418 See A.E. Dick Howard, 1 The Road from Runnymede: Magna Carta and Constitu-
tionalism in America 119 (Virginia 1968): 
The popularity of Coke in the colonies is of no small significance. Coke himself had 
been at the eye of the storm in the clashes between King and Parliament in the 
early seventeenth century which did so much to shape the English Constitution. 
He rose to high office at the instance of the Crown—he was Speaker of the House 
of Commons and Attorney General under Queen Elizabeth, and James I made 
Coke first his Chief Justice of Common Pleas and then his Chief Justice of King’s 
Bench. During this time Coke gained an unchallenged position as the greatest au-
thority of his time on the laws of England. . . . Having been a champion of the 
Crown’s interests, Coke . . . became instead the defender of the common law. 
See also Brian J. Moline, Early American Legal Education, 42 Washburn L J 775, 786 
(2002) (“[B]y far the most studied text in colonial America was the first volume of Coke’s 
Institutes.”); Payton v New York, 445 US 573, 594 n 36 (1979), quoting Howard, The Road 
from Runnymede at 118–19 (cited in note 418) (“Foremost among the titles to be found in 
private libraries of the time were the works of Coke, the great expounder of Magna Carta, 
and similar books on English liberties.”). 
 419 See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Minor (Aug 30, 1814), in Morris L. Cohen, 
Thomas Jefferson Recommends a Course of Law Study, in Steve Sheppard, ed, 1 The History 
of Legal Education in the United States: Commentaries and Primary Sources 169, 175–76 
(Salem 1999) (recommending Blackstone and Coke). 
 420 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Cooper (Jan 16, 1814), in J. Jefferson 
Looney, ed, 7 The Papers of Thomas Jefferson Retirement Series 124, 127 (Princeton 2010). 
 421 Id at 126. 
 422 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Minor (Aug 30, 1814), in Looney, ed, 7 The 
Papers of Thomas Jefferson Retirement Series 625, 627 (cited in note 420). 
 423 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Page (Dec 25, 1762), in Julian P. Boyd, ed, 
1 The Papers of Thomas Jefferson 3, 5 (Princeton 1950) (brackets in original).	
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Age, though, seems rather to have improved his opinion. 
Asked for advice in 1821 on the best way to approach learning the 
law, Jefferson replied, “1. Begin with Coke’s 4. institutes. [T]hese 
give a compleat body of the law as it stood in the reign of the 1st 
James, an epoch the more interesting to us, as we separated at 
that point from English legislation, and acknolege no subsequent 
statutory alterations.”424 He later commented on Coke, “a sounder 
Whig never wrote nor profounder learning in the orthodox doc-
trines of British liberties.”425 Jefferson assisted others by provid-
ing copies of the mainstays in English legal thought, for example, 
in 1806 presenting a 1736 edition of Hale’s History of the Pleas of 
the Crown to his nephew, Dabney Carr—a lawyer, writer, and fu-
ture justice of the Virginia Supreme Court.426 
Jefferson’s library contained all of the volumes heretofore dis-
cussed.427 In addition to Coke’s Institutes, he had two copies of 
Hale’s History of the Pleas of the Crown (as well as a copy of Hale’s 
History of the Common Law of England). The library boasted a 
first edition of Richard Crompton’s L’Authoritie et Jurisdiction 
des Courts de la Majestie de la Roygne,428 cited by Hale in support 
of the proposition that general warrants were unlawful. His 
shelves housed all four volumes of Blackstone’s Commentaries, as 
well as his reports. Indeed, Jefferson appeared to be almost in di-
alogue with Blackstone, frequently opining on Blackstone’s writ-
ings in his correspondence.429 Blackstone was of such pervasive 
 
 424 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Dabney Terrell (Feb 26, 1821). A transcription is 
archived at http://perma.cc/Z9VD-43S8. 
 425 Kevin Ryan, Lex et Ratio: Coke, the Rule of Law and Executive Power, 31 Vt Bar J 
9, 9 (2005). 
 426 The University of Virginia has a copy that has his bookplate and an inscription 
inside the front board: “Given by Thos. Jefferson to D. Carr, 1806.” 
 427 In 1815, the Library of Congress purchased Jefferson’s private library. Thomas 
Jefferson’s Library (Library of Congress), archived at http://perma.cc/B49Y-XJZW. The 
books that survived the fire of 1851 are currently on display in Washington, DC, while a 
digital catalogue of the original holdings, prepared by Nicholas Trist, can be found at 
http://perma.cc/Y9ZT-TLRH (“Trist’s Catalog”). 
 428 See Trist’s Catalog at *47–49, 52 (cited in note 427). 
 429 See, for example, Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Tyler (May 26, 1810), in 
J. Jefferson Looney, ed, 2 The Papers of Thomas Jefferson Retirement Series 420, 420 
(Princeton 2005): 
I have long lamented with you the depreciation of law science. [T]he opinion 
seems to be that Blackstone is to us what the Alcoran is to the Mahometans, 
that every thing which is necessary is in him, & what is not in him is not neces-
sary. I still lend my counsel & books to such young students as will fix them-
selves in the neighborhood. Coke’s institutes, all, & reports are their first, & 
Blackstone their last book, after an intermediate course of 2. or 3. Years. [I]t is 
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influence that Jefferson worried that his work would become a 
source of litigation should the Committee of the Revised Code 
adopt it in 1776.430 
Jefferson’s reliance on scholars who rejected general war-
rants is notable, not least because his grounding in English trea-
tises and case law became cemented into American law. Between 
1776 and 1778, Jefferson, George Wythe, and Edmund Pendleton 
rewrote the laws of Virginia. To Jefferson fell the responsibility of 
incorporating English common law into the statutory regime.431 
The same legal tracts central to Jefferson’s training and ap-
proach were foundational to many of the Founders’ educations 
and common discourse. Adams’s study of the law included reading 
Coke’s Institutes, as well as Sergeant Hawkins’s Pleas of the 
Crown.432 He referred to Coke as “the oracle of law,” stating that 
whoever could master Coke could become “master of the laws of 
England.”433 John Jay and Theophilus Parsons similarly relied on 
 
nothing more than an elegant digest of what they will then have acquired from 
the real fountains of the law. 
 430 Jefferson’s library also held a copy of St. George Tucker’s commentary on Blackstone, 
which contained notes of reference between the Commentaries and the laws of the federal 
government of the United States. See Trist’s Catalog at *48 (cited in note 427). See also St. 
George Tucker, 1 Blackstone’s Commentaries: with Notes of Reference, to the Constitution 
and Laws, of the Federal Government of the United States; and the Commonwealth of 
Virginia 301 (Birch and Small 1803): 
The case of general warrants, under which term all warrants not comprehended 
within the description of the preceding article may be included, was warmly con-
tested in England about thirty or thirty-five years ago, and after much alterca-
tion they were finally pronounced to be illegal by the common law. The constitu-
tional sanction here given to the same doctrine, and the test which it affords for 
trying the legality of any warrant by which a man may be deprived of his liberty, 
or disturbed in the enjoyment of his property, can not be too highly valued by a 
free people. 
(citation omitted). 
 431 Jefferson focused on the common law and statutes beginning with the Reformation, 
or the end of the reign of Elizabeth I. Wythe did the subsequent statutes. Pendleton focused 
on Virginia laws. When the men gathered to go over the result, they found that Pendleton 
had not simplified the laws, merely copying them out verbatim and omitting certain laws. 
So Wythe and Jefferson did Pendleton’s part, “as well as the shortness of the time would 
admit, and we brought the whole body of British statutes, & laws of Virginia into 127. 
acts, most of them short.” The aim was to eliminate redundancies. Letter from Thomas 
Jefferson to Skelton Jones (July 28, 1809), in J. Jefferson Looney, ed, 1 The Papers of 
Thomas Jefferson Retirement Series 381, 382 (Princeton 2004). 
 432 Diary Entry of Nov 26, 1760, in 2 The Works of John Adams, Second President of 
the United States 45, 47 (Little, Brown 1865). 
 433 Charles R. McKirdy, The Lawyer as Apprentice: Legal Education in Eighteenth 
Century Massachusetts, 28 J Legal Educ 124, 131 (1976). 
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Coke.434 Blackstone’s Commentaries were extremely well received 
in the New World, with some 2,500 copies purchased along the 
Eastern Seaboard prior to the Revolution.435 
The number of prominent colonists and early American lead-
ers who read or had copies of English legal treatises is too extensive 
to list. Even a few examples will suffice: Adams, Samuel Sewall, 
Francis Dana, and Robert Treat Paine from Massachusetts Bay 
Colony; St. George Tucker, Wythe, William Byrd, and Robert 
Carter in the Colony of Virginia; Jay, James Alexander, James 
Montgomery, and Cadwalader Colden in New York; and Gouverneur 
Morris, Benjamin Chew, and James Wilson in Pennsylvania.436 In 
addition to residing in private collections, the monographs were 
widely available in college libraries and, as soon as public librar-
ies came into being, to the public. By 1723, Harvard College had 
copies of Coke’s Institutes. Eventually, versions of the original 
texts, with notations making them relevant to the American con-
text, were published.437 
 
 434 Catherine Drinker Bowen, The Lion and the Throne: The Life and Times of Sir 
Edward Coke 514 (Little, Brown 1957). 
 435 Moline, 42 Washburn L J at 790 (cited in note 418). See also id at 791 (“Many 
nineteenth-century lawyers relied exclusively on the Commentaries to the exclusion of any 
other authorities.”).	
 436 Library catalogs from the late 1600s through the early 1800s, and listings of the 
books held by the private libraries of the Founders, offer a glimpse into the ubiquitous 
nature of English legal scholars in the New World. A national bibliography of books im-
ported in the eighteenth century, for instance, found dozens of copies of Blackstone’s Com-
mentaries, Coke’s First Institute, Hale’s History of the Pleas of the Crown and Pleas of the 
Crown, and Hawkins’s Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown in North America during the late 
colonial period. Herbert A. Johnson, Imported Eighteenth Century Law Treatises in Amer-
ican Libraries, 1700-1799 13–14, 28–30 (Tennessee 1978). Another bibliography similarly 
lists dozens of copies of the same volumes in the colonies. William Hamilton Bryson, A 
Census of Law Books in Colonial Virginia 34, 41–42, 53 (Virginia 1978). 
 For further discussion of the influence of English legal scholars on the Founding gen-
eration, see Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment at 188–89 (cited in note 37); Moline, 42 
Washburn L J at 790 (cited in note 418) (reporting which law books—including Blackstone 
and Coke—were commonly used by early American lawyers); Charles Warren, A History 
of the American Bar 181–90 (Little, Brown 1911) (noting that colonial lawyers routinely 
consulted Coke and Blackstone); Paul M. Hamlin, Legal Education in Colonial New York 
64–65 (NYU 1939) (examining colonial collections and noting the number of orders for 
copies of Blackstone); McKirdy, 28 J Legal Educ at 128–33 (cited in note 433) (highlighting 
the law books available to early American lawyers and readings that would be assigned to 
apprentices); Clement Eaton, A Mirror of the Southern Colonial Lawyer: The Fee Books of 
Patrick Henry, Thomas Jefferson, and Waightstill Avery, 8 Wm & Mary Q 520, 521–22 
(1951) (addressing which law books were used by early American lawyers and noting that 
Jefferson routinely recommended Coke’s Institutes and Blackstone’s Commentaries). 
 437 See generally, for example, Matthew Hale, 1 Historia Placitorum Coronae. The 
History of the Pleas of the Crown (Small 1847) (W.A. Stokes and E. Ingersoll, eds). 
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 The Founders’ reliance on English law and legal tracts pro-
vided a baseline for their expectations. As Englishmen, they came 
to expect that certain norms would be observed in relation to the 
rights that they held under the British constitution. Simultane-
ously, the Founders closely followed the evolution of the common 
law and contemporary legal developments in England. In both re-
gards, general warrants lay beyond the pale. 
 Colonial newspapers covered the sagas of Entick and Wilkes 
with an enthusiasm paralleling that of modern Downton Abbey 
fans. Papers in Connecticut,438 Georgia,439 Massachusetts,440 New 
 
 438 See, for example, New-London Summary 1 (July 1, 1763): 
[Wilkes was discharged from the Tower and] was followed to his own House 
amidst the loud Acclamations of above 10,000 People, who cry’d out, Wilkes and 
Liberty! he was immediately waited on by Lord Temple, and many other Noble-
men and Gentlemen, and great Rejoicings were made in many Parts of the Town. 
Mr. Wilkes immediately wrote several Letters to the Earls of Egremont and 
Halifax, charging them with having robb’d his House, and insisting upon their 
returning the stolen Goods; Mr. Wilkes was going to Prosecute the two Secre-
taries of State for false Imprisonment, and has laid his Damages against each at 
fifty Thousand Pounds. 
 439 See, for example, The Georgia Gazette 3 (July 21, 1763); The Georgia Gazette 2 
(July 28, 1763). 
 440 See, for example, Boston Post-Boy 4 (June 20, 1763): 
[John Wilkes, MP for Aylesbury,] was taken into Custody by four of his Majesty’s 
Messengers, & conducted to his Lordship’s House, from thence was committed 
Prisoner to the Tower, being charged with writing a Piece in the North Briton of 
Saturday the 23d of April last; all his Papers were seized, and afterwards depos-
ited in Lord Halifax’s Office: And we hear that the Papers are under the Examina-
tion of Philip Carteret Webb, Esq; Solicitor of the Treasury, and Lovel Stanhope, 
Esq; Law-Clerk of the Secretary of State’s Office. Mr. W. it is said, disputed the 
Authority of the Messengers the first Time of their coming to his House. 
See also Boston Evening-Post 2 (June 27, 1763) (“Though John Wilkes, Esq; is discharged 
from his imprisonment, on account of his being a member of parliament, yet he is not freed 
from the accusations against him.”); Boston News-Letter 3 (June 30, 1763): 
An authentick Account of the Proceedings against JOHN WILKES, Esq. . . . 
Containing all the Papers relative to this interesting Affair, from that Gentle-
man’s being taken into Custody by his Majesty’s Messengers, to his Discharge 
to the Court of Common Pleas. With an Abstract of that precious Jewel of an 
Englishman, The Habeas Corpus Act. Addressed to all Lovers of Liberty. 
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Hampshire,441 New York,442 North Carolina,443 and Rhode Island444 
provided play-by-play accounts of Wilkes’s arrest, the search of his 
home, and his subsequent imprisonment in the Tower of London. 
The Boston Post-Boy reported that upon Wilkes’s release, “the bells 
of [Guilford], famous for its loyal and constitutional principles, 
rang a peal to liberty.”445 Papers recounted how the crowds 
cheered as they walked with Wilkes from the Tower of London to 
his home.446 Colonial periodicals printed, verbatim, the letters 
that Wilkes subsequently sent to the British secretaries of state, 
demanding the return of his stolen papers.447 Others covered 
Wilkes’s effort to secure “a warrant to search the houses of the 
Earls of Egremont and Halifax, his majesty’s principal Secretar-
ies of State, for goods stolen from the house of said Wilkes. . . . 
[B]ut the sitting justice refused to issue the said warrant.”448 
Throughout the summer and autumn of 1763 and into the winter 
and spring of 1764, papers continued to cover the case in great 
detail.449 Songs were written in his honor. Wilkes was a celebrity.450 
 
 441 See, for example, New-Hampshire Gazette and Historical Chronicle 3 (July 1, 
1763) (noting Wilkes’s arrest by four of his Majesty’s messengers and his conduct to Lord 
Halifax’s house and from there to commitment as a prisoner in the Tower of London, as 
well as the subsequent examination of Wilkes’s papers by the solicitor of the treasury and 
the secretary of the treasury); New-Hampshire Gazette and Historical Chronicle 2 (Sept 
2, 1763). 
 442 See, for example, New-York Gazette 2 (June 20, 1763) (noting that on May 3, John 
Wilkes “was taken into Custody by four of his Majesty’s Messengers, and committed Pris-
oner to the Tower by the Secretaries of State, being charged with writing a Paper pub-
lished in the North Briton”). 
 443 See, for example, The North-Carolina Magazine 188 (Nov 9, 1764). 
 444 See, for example, Providence Gazette and Country Journal 1–2 (July 2, 1763) (car-
rying an article on Wilkes’s arrest as well as the text of his letters to the secretaries of 
state). 
 445 Boston Post-Boy 3 (June 27, 1763). 
 446 See, for example, New-York Gazette 2 (July 4, 1763); Newport Mercury 2 (July 
4, 1763). 
 447 See, for example, Boston Evening-Post 2 (June 27, 1763): 
On my return here from Westminster-hall, where I have been discharged from 
my commitment to the Tower under your Lordships warrant, I find that my 
house has been robbed, and am informed that the stolen goods are in the posses-
sion of one or both of your Lordships, I therefore insist that you do forthwith 
return them. 
See also Providence Gazette and Country Journal 1–2 (July 2, 1763) (reprinting, in addi-
tion, another letter by Wilkes). See also Newport Mercury 2 (July 4, 1763). 
 448 Boston Post-Boy 1 (July 4, 1763). See also The Massachusetts Gazette 2 (June 
30, 1763). 
 449 See, for example, Boston Gazette 2 (Apr 2, 1764); Boston News-Letter 2 (Apr 26, 
1764); Boston Post-Boy & Advertiser 2 (Apr 30, 1764); New-York Mercury 1 (Sept 24, 1764). 
 450 See, for example, New-York Gazette 2 (Feb 6, 1764). 
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Colonial media embraced Wilkes’s fight, and that of Entick, 
in the cause of freedom. Boston newspapers reported that the ver-
dict in Wilkes condemned “the dangerous practice of issuing gen-
eral and unconstitutional warrants,” stating that “no age has pro-
duced a determination of more general and extensive consequence 
to every free born ENGLISHMAN.”451 In North Carolina, a local 
paper praised the Entick trial: “The great candour and impartial-
ity shewn in the trial of Mr. Entick last Friday, gave the highest 
pleasure and satisfaction to all present; and in no part more than 
the ardent desire which was expressed that the Jury would con-
sider the cause simply, as it stood before them.”452 The paper 
lauded, “[T]he whole matter was argued and considered fairly by 
itself, with a strictness of justice that was thought deserving of 
the highest commendation.”453 Bequests to Wilkes were seen “as 
an acknowledgment to him who bravely defended the constitu-
tional liberties of his country, and checked the dangerous pro-
gress of arbitrary power.”454 
Wilkes was hardly the only person affected by the general 
warrant issued in response to North Briton No 45. The incidents 
of arrest, search, and seizure related to the warrant gave rise to 
dozens of trials, which were costly to the Crown and further po-
larized British public opinion.455 Adulation may have centered 
more on concerns related to freedom of the press and the way in 
which seditious libel was used than on general warrants per se, 
but the exercise of promiscuous search and seizure was an im-
portant element in the equation. The court invoked English sub-
jects’ ancient rights, drawing a direct link between general war-
rants and a violation of Magna Carta.456 
News reached the colonists by media and post. While in London, 
Benjamin Franklin, writing to his son, described the crowd that 
gathered for Wilkes’s reelection. The crowd sang and filled the 
 
 451 Boston Gazette 2 (Sept 19, 1763). 
 452 The North-Carolina Magazine 189 (Nov 9, 1764) (mentioning the case of Wilkes 
as well). 
 453 Id. 
 454 The North-Carolina Magazine 164 (Oct 19, 1764). 
 455 For the costs of the trials, see Thomas Erskine May, 2 Constitutional History of 
England since the Accession of George the Third 247 (A.C. Armonstrong and Son 1895). 
For the cases arising out of the incident, in addition to the previously cited cases, see gen-
erally Huckle v Money, 95 Eng Rep 768 (CP 1763); Rex v Wilkes, 95 Eng Rep 737 (CP 1763). 
See also Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment at 444–45 (cited in note 37); Davies, 98 Mich L 
Rev at 563–65 nn 21–25 (cited in note 20); Oldham, 2 The Mansfield Manuscripts at 790, 
826–28 (cited in note 127). 
 456 See Huckle, 95 Eng Rep at 769. 
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streets of London, “requiring gentlemen and ladies of all ranks as 
they passed in their carriages to shout for Wilkes and liberty, 
marking the same words on all their coaches with chalk, and No. 
45 on every door.”457 Franklin continued, “[F]or fifteen miles out 
of town, there was scarce a door or window shutter next the road 
unmarked; and this continued, here and there,” some sixty-four 
miles from London.458 
Deeply cognizant of the rejection of general warrants in Great 
Britain, and having a salient example of the same in Paxton’s 
Case, the colonists viewed promiscuous search and seizure with 
ever-deeper antagonism. A determination by the British Attorney 
General William DeGrey that the authority for writs of assistance 
had not been extended to New England via the 1696 Navigation 
Act,459 and Parliament’s effort to address this deficiency by the in-
troduction of a new statutory provision, did little to stem the tide. 
The vehicle chosen by Westminster was none other than the 
Townshend Revenue Act of 1767. Infamous for its effort to extort 
money from the colonists to pay for the French and Indian War 
(following repeal of the Stamp Act in 1766), the first Townshend 
Act included a provision that gave customs officers the authority 
“to enter houses or warehouses, to search for and seize goods pro-
hibited to be imported or exported . . . or for which any duties are 
payable, or ought to have been paid.”460 The legislation provided 
the highest court in each colony with the authority to issue writs 
of assistance to customs officers.461 The statute did not require 
that the writs incorporate general terms of search and seizure. As 
a matter of practice, colonial courts tended, when they did grant 
writs, to make them specific, as they rejected general warrants as 
illegitimate.462 Practice thus embraced Otis’s position.463 
 
 457 Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Governor Franklin (Apr 16, 1768), in William 
Temple Franklin, ed, 1 Memoirs of the Life and Writings of Benjamin Franklin, LL.D. 161, 
161–62 (printed for H. Colburn 1818). 
 458 Id. 
 459 William de Grey, Opinion of Attorney General De Grey upon Writs of Assistance 
(Aug 20, 1768), archived at http://perma.cc/W3R9-G8KB. 
 460 An Act for Granting Certain Duties in the British Colonies and Plantations in 
America, 7 Geo III, ch 46, § 10 (1766), in 27 Statutes at Large 505, 511–12. 
 461 7 Geo III, ch 46, § 10 (1766), in 27 Statutes at Large 505, 511–12. 
 462 See, for example, Frisbie v Butler, 1 Kirby 213, 215 (Conn Super 1787) (“[T]he 
warrant in the present case, being general, to search all places, and arrest all persons, the 
complainant should suspect, is clearly illegal.”). 
 463 For thoughtful discussion of how this transpired in each of the colonies, and the 
evolution of judicial consensus against general warrants, see Cuddihy, The Fourth Amend-
ment at 506–36 (cited in note 37). 
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Along with practice, American legal treatises written be-
tween 1765 and 1776 adopted the perspective of English legal 
scholars, as well as that articulated by Otis in Paxton’s Case. In 
1767–68, John Dickinson wrote Letters from a Pennsylvania 
Farmer, a series of essays decrying the Townshend Acts. “By the 
late act,” he wrote, 
the officers of the customs [were] impowered to enter into any 
HOUSE, warehouse, shop, cellar, or other place, in the Brit-
ish colonies or plantations in America to search for or seize 
prohibited or unaccustomed goods, etc. on writs granted by 
the superior or supreme court of justice, having jurisdiction 
within such colony or plantation respectively.464 
Dickinson labeled such authority an “engine of oppression.”465 
Whether or not such powers existed in Great Britain did not mat-
ter. “[T]he greatest asserters of the rights of Englishmen,” he in-
veighed, “have always strenuously contended, that such a power 
was dangerous to freedom, and expressly contrary to the common 
law, which ever regarded a man’s house as his castle, or a place of 
perfect security.”466 If this power could destroy liberty in England, 
“it must be utterly destructive to liberty” in the New World—where 
trials for violations would be held before judges who were wholly 
dependent upon the Crown for their positions and who were re-
sponsible for issuing the writs in the first place.467 That such writs 
were open to arbitrary exercise, and that property rights were not 
well protected, added fuel to the fire. 
In 1764, English journalist and political writer Almon simil-
arly condemned general warrants, noting that their rejection was 
not limited to people with doors on their homes.468 He wrote: 
[I]t would be (as Hawkins says) extremely hard, to leave it to 
the discretion of a common officer to arrest what persons, and 
search what houses he thinks fit: and if a Justice cannot le-
gally grant a blank warrant for the arrest of a single person, 
leaving it to the party to fill it up, surely he cannot grant such 
 
 464 John Dickinson, Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania: Letter IX, in William E. 
Leuchtenberg and Bernard Wishy, eds, Empire and Nation 50, 53 (Prentice-Hall 1962) 
(quotation marks and emphasis omitted). 
 465 Id. 
 466 Id at 53–54. 
 467 Id at 54. 
 468 Father of Candor at 47 (cited in note 331). 
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a general warrant, which might have the effect of a hundred 
blank warrants.469 
That the secretary of state engaged in this practice did not 
make it legal—numerous examples in which officials had ensured 
the sufficiency of warrants likewise existed. “In truth,” he wrote, 
there has been no uniform practice in the office, as may be 
seen by the variant and multiform warrants printed from 
thence in Quarto, and privately distributed to trusty friends 
. . . with the inscription of most secret. Much less would prec-
edents only from the time of the Revolution be sufficient to 
justify such an illegal practice.470 
Being a secretary of state—or even a member of the Privy Coun-
cil—did not transform a person into a justice of the peace, who 
alone held the authority to issue a warrant.471 Thus it was “that 
the two grounds suggested as an authority for the issuing of these 
General Warrants, namely, the constant exercise and usage of 
them, and the antiquity of the Secretary of State as a Privy Coun-
sellor,” failed.472 
As with the jurists’ conclusion that the principles of the law 
could not be overcome by efforts by the Crown to levy such powers, 
Almon noted: 
[E]ven if the usage [of general warrants] had been both im-
memorial and uniform, and ten thousand similar warrants 
could have been produced, it would not have been sufficient; 
because, the practice must likewise be agreeable to the prin-
ciples of law, in order to be good, whereas, this is a practice 
inconsistent with, and in direct opposition to, the first and 
clearest principles of law.473 
 
 469 Id. 
 470 Id at 47–48. 
 471 Id at 48–49. 
 472 Father of Candor at 49 (cited in note 331). The author also notes that a warrant 
can never itself be considered precedent, it being not an argument or deliberation, but 
rather an act of the court: 
[W]hat is done without debate, or any argument or consideration had of it, makes 
the authority of a precedent to be of no force in point of law: for, judgments and 
awards, given upon deliberation and debate, only are proofs and arguments of 
weight; and not any sudden act of the court without debate or deliberation. 
Id at 53. 
 473 Id at 49. 
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He added, “[i]n one word, no warrant whatever, in any case or 
crime whatever, that names or describes nobody in certain, is 
good, or can be justified in law, in any circumstances whatever.”474 
Colonists continued to raise their objections to the Crown be-
ing allowed access to their homes. In 1773, the Boston Committee 
of Correspondence issued its first communication to the towns of 
Massachusetts, including among its grievances that the Crown had 
assumed for itself “power too absolute and arbitrary,” as “[p]rivate 
premises are exposed to search.”475 Bolton’s committee of twenty-
one lamented that the Crown could subject their homes to unlim-
ited inspection.476 Towns in Massachusetts quickly formed their 
own committees of correspondence, prompting similar entities to 
be constituted in Connecticut, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and 
South Carolina. By early 1774, the committees had superseded the 
colonial legislatures and Crown officials in all thirteen colonies, 
giving individuals an opportunity to voice their grievances, includ-
ing opposition to promiscuous search and seizure.477 
The First Continental Congress picked up the baton, remon-
strating against the Townshend Acts and other revenue statutes 
as accruing immense power and using the law to subjugate the 
colonies.478 The Continental Congress averred that their rights 
and liberties were being infringed, citing the multiplication of 
“[e]xpensive and oppressive offices.”479 Among their chief concerns 
was that “[t]he Commissioners of the Customs are empowered to 
break open and enter houses without the authority of any Civil 
Magistrate, founded on legal information.”480 
 
 474 Id. Almon also stated that general warrants could not be used for libel, forgery, 
high treason, or other felonies, and suggested that 
where there is even a charge against one particular paper, to seize all, of every 
kind, is extravagant, unreasonable and inquisitorial. It is infamous in theory, 
and downright tyranny and despotism in practice. We can have no positive lib-
erty or privacy, but must enjoy our correspondencies, friendships, papers and 
studies at discretion, that is, at the will and pleasure of the ministers for the 
time being, and of their inferior agents! 
Id at 59. 
 475 The Committees of Correspondence: The Voice of the Patriots (Boston Tea Party 
Ships & Museum), archived at http://perma.cc/4FKV-B88V (quoting the Boston Commit-
tee of Correspondence’s first list of grievances). 
 476 Quincy and Gray, Reports of Cases Argued at 467 (cited in note 372). 
 477 See Committees of Correspondence (cited in note 475). 
 478 Memorial to the Inhabitants of the British Colonies, First Continental Congress (Oct 
21, 1774), reprinted in 1 American Archives: Fourth Series 921, 925 (Clark and Force 1837). 
 479 Id. 
 480 Id. 
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Far from the more modern claim made by some scholars—
that the Crown could enter at will and that it was only once a 
warrant issued that particularity was required—the colonial un-
derstanding was that, outside of narrow conditions, the Crown 
could not enter at all, without a specific warrant issued by a judge. 
C. State Prohibitions 
Like their English predecessors, the newly formed American 
states objected to the use of promiscuous search and seizure. But 
they went beyond English legal theorists’ rejection of the instru-
ments in three important ways.481 
First, the early state constitutions created a positive right—
namely, to be secure in one’s person, house, papers, and effects 
against unreasonable search and seizure. Although, at least since 
1967, the concept of “unreasonable” has become untethered from 
the original meaning,482 the word itself implied something differ-
ent in the eighteenth century. “Unreasonable” translated into 
“against reason,” or against “the Reason of the Common Law.”483 
Because general warrants violated the common law (and were 
thus unreasonable), they were not legal. The right to be secure in 
one’s person, house, papers, and effects thus meant a prohibition 
on promiscuous search or seizure. 
Second, the Founders embraced particularized warrants as 
the only way in which the government could breach the walls of 
the home, outside of active pursuit of felons. 
Third, merely the fact that a warrant was specific was not 
enough. States went to great pains to outline precisely what in-
formation would have to be presented, by whom, which proce-
dures would have to be followed, and who could issue warrants 
for them to be considered valid. These elements provided a base-
line for evaluating the strength of the government’s case for vio-
lating the sanctity of the person, interfering with private prop-
erty, or breaching the walls of the home. 
The nascent state declarations of rights and constitutions in-
corporated these changes before the Fourth Amendment ce-
mented them into federal law. Virginia led the charge.484 
 
 481 See Donohue, The Future of Foreign Intelligence at 84–85 (cited in note 54). 
 482 See generally Katz v United States, 389 US 347 (1967). 
 483 See Part II.C.2. 
 484 New Jersey, New York, Georgia, and South Carolina were the only states not to 
issue or include a declaration of rights in their new constitutions. The New Jersey Consti-
tution of July 2, 1776, written in the shadow of Washington’s loss in New York, which put 
03 DONOHUE ART FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 9/11/2016  8:17 PM 
2016] The Original Fourth Amendment 1265 
 
1. General warrants rejected. 
The fifth Virginia Convention met in May 1776. Jefferson, 
Washington, Patrick Henry, Richard Henry Lee, George Mason, 
Pendleton, Wythe, and other prominent Virginians gathered in 
the House of Burgesses.485 A portrait of George III hung on the 
wall, staring down at those gathered.486 Despite such an immedi-
ate and visceral reminder of the power of the English Crown, the 
delegates voted to adopt a declaration of rights, to adopt a consti-
tution, and to forge alliances with the colonies to make a new 
country.487 Mason became responsible for drafting the Virginia 
Declaration of Rights and, together with James Madison, the 
state constitution.488 The documents became central to the for-
mation of the new republic. Other states looked to them for guid-
ance, even as the US Constitution, and, later, the Bill of Rights, 
echoed their substance. 
The natural rights of man figured largely in the declaration. 
Mason drew from John Locke’s Second Treatise of Government, as 
 
the security of territory at risk, was a hastily conceived document, written in five days and 
adopted in two. There was no statement of rights in the preface. Instead, it laid out the 
structure of the government, included provisions meant to protect freedom of religion, and 
stated that the common law of England and colonial statutory provisions would remain in 
force until altered by future acts of the state legislature. See generally NJ Const of 1776 
(superseded 1844). New York’s Constitution similarly lacked any prefatory statement of 
rights. See generally NY Const of 1777 (superseded 1821). Georgia adopted a temporary 
constitution for the revolutionary government, with the first state constitution issued 
on February 5, 1777. Walter McElreath, A Treatise on the Constitution of Georgia 60–
62 (Harrison 1912). South Carolina similarly introduced a temporary constitution in 
1776 and amended it in 1778. Francis Newton Thorpe, 6 Federal and State Constitutions, 
Colonial Charters, and Other Organic Laws of the States, Territories, and Colonies Now or 
Heretofore Forming the United States of America 3241 (Government Printing Office 1909). 
Neither Georgia nor South Carolina included either a declaration of rights in the prefatory 
material or provisions related to search or seizure, although they did address other rights, 
such as the right to a jury trial, in the text. McElreath, Treatise on the Constitution of 
Georgia at 60–62 (cited in note 484); Thorpe, 6 Federal and State Constitutions at 3241 
(cited in note 484). Two states (Connecticut and Rhode Island) did not adopt a new consti-
tution prior to the 1787 Constitutional Convention, instead operating under their previous 
charters and colonial statutes. See Thorpe, 6 Federal and State Constitutions at 3222 (cited 
in note 484); Francis Newton Thorpe, 1 Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial Char-
ters, and Other Organic Laws of the States, Territories, and Colonies Now or Heretofore 
Forming the United States of America 536 (Government Printing Office 1909). 
 485 See Donohue, The Future of Foreign Intelligence at 85 (cited in note 54). 
 486 The portrait still hangs in the chamber in historic Williamsburg. In the course of 
research for this Article, an archivist verified its presence in 1776 by citing the purchase 
of the portrait by the House of Burgesses and the subsequent restoration of the chamber 
to its state at the time of the Founding. 
 487 See Donohue, The Future of Foreign Intelligence at 85 (cited in note 54). 
 488 Id. 
 1266  The University of Chicago Law Review [83:1181 
   
well as Baron de Montesquieu’s The Spirit of Laws.489 He looked 
to English history and the British constitution, which had wres-
tled with the extent of rights and the duties owed to the Crown. 
From the Grand Remonstrance and beheading of Charles I; 
through the Glorious Revolution, the 1689 English Bill of Rights, 
and the succession of William III and Mary II to the throne; and 
continuing through the restoration of Charles II, the experience 
of Englishmen was one of the gradual institution of rights as held 
against the government. 
Accordingly, Mason highlighted the importance of consent.490 
He asserted the principle of taxation only with representation.491 
He acknowledged the danger of military power, prohibiting the 
presence of a standing army.492 He recognized the prohibition on 
excessive bail and fines.493 The declaration outlawed cruel or un-
usual punishment.494 It established free elections.495 It prohibited 
forfeiture without conviction.496 And it underscored the import-
ance of jury trial.497 
To these rights, Mason added the right, long recognized by 
English legal theorists,498 against “grievous and oppressive” 
search and seizure. To accomplish the last, Mason made general 
 
 489 See id. 
 490 Compare Va Decl of Rights § 7 (1776) with English Bill of Rights, 1 Wm & Mary, 
sess 2, ch 2, cl 3 (1689), in 6 Statutes of the Realm 142, 142. 
 491 Compare Va Decl of Rights § 6 (1776) with English Bill of Rights, 1 Wm & Mary, 
sess 2, ch 2, cl 6 (1689), in 6 Statutes of the Realm 142, 142. 
 492 Compare Va Decl of Rights § 13 (1776) with English Bill of Rights, 1 Wm & Mary, 
sess 2, ch 2, cl 7, 24 (1689), in 6 Statutes of the Realm 142, 142–43. 
 493 Compare Va Decl of Rights § 9 (1776) with English Bill of Rights, 1 Wm & Mary, 
sess 2, ch 2, cl 12, 13, 28 (1689), in 6 Statutes of the Realm 142, 143. 
 494 Compare Va Decl of Rights § 9 (1776) with English Bill of Rights, 1 Wm & Mary, 
sess 2, ch 2, cl 14 (1689), in 6 Statutes of the Realm 142, 143. 
 495 Compare Va Decl of Rights § 6 (1776) with English Bill of Rights, 1 Wm & Mary, 
sess 2, ch 2, cl 9, 26 (1689), in 6 Statutes of the Realm 142, 142–43. 
 496 Compare Va Decl of Rights §§ 6, 8 (1776) with English Bill of Rights, 1 Wm & 
Mary, sess 2, ch 2, cl 15, 30 (1689), in 6 Statutes of the Realm 142, 143. 
 497 Compare Va Decl of Rights § 8 (1776) with English Bill of Rights, 1 Wm & Mary, 
sess 2, ch 2, cl 11, 29 (1689), in 6 Statutes of the Realm 142, 142–43. 
 498 See, for example, Petition of Right, 3 Car I, ch 1, § 3 (1628), in 5 Statutes of the 
Realm 23, 23 (hearkening back to the “great Charter” as the source of the right that “no 
Freeman may be taken or imprisoned or be disseised of his Freehold or Liberties or his 
free Customes or be outlawed or exiled or in any manner destroyed, but by the lawfull 
Judgment of his Peeres or by the Law of the Land”); 3 Car I, ch 1, § 4 (1628), in 5 Statutes 
of the Realm 23, 24 (stating that “no man . . . should be . . . taken nor imprisoned . . . with-
out being brought to aunswere by due pcesse of Lawe”); 3 Car I, ch 1, § 5 (1628), in 5 Stat-
utes of the Realm 23, 24 (noting the exercise of general warrants of arrest as a cause of 
grievance). 
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warrants illegal and specified what particulars would be neces-
sary for a valid warrant.499 To some extent, this was an American 
innovation. Coke, as previously mentioned, had included a clause 
in the 1628 Petition of Right arguing that general warrants for 
arrest violated Magna Carta.500 Despite James II’s later use of 
general warrants, and English legal treatises’ consistent rejection 
of the same, the 1689 English Bill of Rights had not incorporated 
an equivalent clause. 
Mason’s decision to include a prohibition on promiscuous 
search and seizure took an aspect of the common law and turned 
it into a written, guaranteed right, as held against the govern-
ment. It could not be abridged by mere statute. And Mason went 
further. He did not simply prohibit general warrants. He was 
careful to spell out what would have to be done for a specific war-
rant to be valid. 
The Virginia Declaration of Rights stated: 
[G]eneral warrants, whereby an officer or messenger may be 
commanded to search suspected places without evidence of a 
fact committed, or to seize any person or persons not named, 
or whose offense is not particularly described and supported 
by evidence, are grievous and oppressive and ought not to be 
granted.501 
To obtain a warrant, officials would have to present evidence of 
criminal activity to a court. The name of the person on whom the 
warrant would be served would have to be included, as well as the 
illegal activity in question. On June 12, 1776—just one month af-
ter entrusting Mason with the drafting of the declaration—the 
convention adopted it.502 
Pennsylvania followed Virginia’s lead. Some of the foremost 
political figures of the time—George Bryan, James Cannon, 
Franklin, and Jefferson—helped to draft the state constitution. 
Its first article focused on rights. Like the Virginia Declaration, 
 
 499 See Donohue, The Future of Foreign Intelligence at 86 (cited in note 54). 
 500 See Part II.B. 
 501 Va Decl of Rights § 10 (1776). See also Donohue, The Future of Foreign Intelligence 
at 85 (cited in note 54). 
 502 Throughout US history, scholars have noted the relationship between this 
clause and the Fourth Amendment of the US Constitution. See, for example, Leonard 
C. Helderman, The Virginia Bill of Rights, 3 Wash & Lee L Rev 225, 231 n 21 (1942) 
(“Though this section does not contain the ‘unreasonable searches and seizures’ terminol-
ogy of the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, the same field is in all proba-
bility covered by the two provisions.”). See also Donohue, The Future of Foreign Intelli-
gence at 85 (cited in note 54). 
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the Pennsylvania Constitution established the right of “the peo-
ple” to “hold themselves, their houses, papers, and possession free 
from search and seizure.”503 To this, the document added, “war-
rants without oaths or affirmations first made, affording a suffi-
cient foundation for them, and whereby any officer or messenger 
may be commanded or required to search suspected places, or to 
seize any person or persons, his or their property, not particularly 
described, are contrary to that right, and ought not to be 
granted.”504 The first statement thus established a right—the 
right against entry into the home absent a warrant. Pennsylvania 
made general warrants void, even as it established, in the second 
clause, additional requirements for a valid warrant. 
Delaware followed a similar approach. In September 1776, it 
adopted a Declaration of Rights, stating that the absence of an 
oath would render specific warrants “grievous and oppressive,” 
even as it condemned all general warrants as “illegal.”505 The state 
constitution went on to refer to the Declaration of Rights, stating 
that “[n]o article of the declaration of rights and fundamental 
rules of this State, agreed to by this convention . . . ought ever to 
be violated on any presence [sic] whatever.”506 
Overlapping with deliberations in Pennsylvania and Delaware, 
Maryland delegates met between August and November 1776, at 
which time they drafted and approved their state’s first constitu-
tion. A Declaration of Rights constituted the first section.507 It, too, 
emphasized search and seizure. The corresponding clauses took 
several phrases from the Virginia document, further shaping it to 
fit Blackstone’s rejection of general warrants. Article XXIII read: 
That all warrants, without oath or affirmation, to search sus-
pected places, or to seize any person or property, are grievous 
and oppressive; and all general warrants—to search sus-
pected places, or to apprehend suspected persons, without 
 
 503 Pa Const of 1776, Decl of Rights Art X (superseded 1790). 
 504 Pa Const of 1776, Decl of Rights Art X (superseded 1790). 
 505 Del Decl of Rights § 17 (1776): 
That all warrants without oath to search suspected places, or to seize any person 
or his property, are grievous and oppressive; and all general warrants to search 
suspected places, or to apprehend all persons suspected, without naming or de-
scribing the place or any person in special, are illegal and ought not to be 
granted. 
 506 Del Const of 1776 Art XXX (superseded 1792). 
 507 See Md Const of 1776, Decl of Rights (superseded 1851). 
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naming or describing the place, or the person in special—are 
illegal, and ought not to be granted.508 
This language went beyond Virginia’s declaration by requiring 
that the evidence provided for a search be upon oath. It reflected 
Virginia’s use of “grievous and oppressive,” and, like Delaware, it 
used Blackstone’s condemnation of the instruments as “illegal.” 
By doing so, Maryland ensured that, even upon evidence of a 
crime sworn under oath, general warrants would not be allowed. 
North Carolina, which in December 1776 inserted a Declara-
tion of Rights as the first section of its constitution, eliminated 
promiscuous search and seizure across the board. It included a 
section on “general warrants,” in which it made their use for ar-
rest, search, or seizure illegal on the grounds that the instru-
ments were “dangerous to liberty.”509 
The Massachusetts Constitution similarly objected to the use 
of general warrants.510 The language it adopted, like that of New 
Hampshire, was similar to the language that Madison used in 
what became the Fourth Amendment. Authored by Adams, the 
document generates insight into the original meaning of the 
text.511 Adams’s choice of language reflected the legal legacy that 
he inherited, as well as contemporary understandings of the ille-
gality of general warrants and the requirements of specificity. 
2. “Unreasonable” as violating the reason of the common law. 
Like his colleagues in Virginia and Pennsylvania, Adams be-
gan by articulating the underlying right: “Every man has a right 
to be secure from all unreasonable searches and seizures of his 
 
 508 Md Const of 1776, Decl of Rights Art XXIII (superseded 1851). 
 509 NC Const of 1776, Decl of Rights Art XI (superseded 1868) (“[G]eneral warrants—
whereby an officer or messenger may [be] commanded to search suspected places, without 
evidence of the act [committed], or to seize any person or persons, not named, whose of-
fences are not particularly described, and supported by evidence—are dangerous to lib-
erty, and ought not to be granted.”). 
 510 See Donohue, The Future of Foreign Intelligence at 87 (cited in note 54). 
 511 Gregg L. Lint, et al, eds, 8 Papers of John Adams 240 & n 24 (Belknap 1989) (show-
ing that the final text was consistent with Adams’s draft, with the exception of a change 
from “man” to “subject”). Although Professor Lasson was not aware of the authorship of 
the Massachusetts provision when he published his work on the Fourth Amendment in 
1937, scholarship has since definitively established Adams’s role. See, for example, 
Leonard W. Levy, Original Intent and the Framers’ Constitution 238 (MacMillan 1988); 
Davies, 98 Mich L Rev at 658 (cited in note 20); Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment at 605 
(cited in note 37). 
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person, his houses, his papers, and all his possessions.”512 As else-
where, the choice of the word “unreasonable” conveyed a particu-
lar meaning: namely, against reason, or against the reason of the 
common law. The concept stemmed from the contemporary un-
derstanding at the time of the relationship between “reason” and 
the common law. Although disagreement marks the precise 
source of such reason (for example, custom, natural law, or Con-
tinental precepts),513 the basic idea was that the principles inher-
ent in common law had legal force. That which was consistent 
 
 512 Lint, et al, eds, 8 Papers of John Adams at 240 (cited in note 511) (emphasis added). 
See also Donohue, The Future of Foreign Intelligence at 87 (cited in note 54). 
 513 There is disagreement in the modern literature over the precise contours, and 
source, of the reason of the common law. One of the most interesting articles considers late 
medieval Year Book cases and English jurisprudential works, emphasizing the incorpora-
tion of St. Thomas Aquinas’s equation of reason with natural law into jurisprudists’ theo-
retical schemes, noting at the same time that such reasoning never entered into judicial 
opinions. Barbara A. Singer, The Reason of the Common Law, 37 U Miami L Rev 797, 799–
802 (1983). Instead, the courts invoked reason independently to protect the right to life, 
liberty, and property, as well as the due process right to a fair trial and all that it entailed. 
Id at 811–14. If no precedent existed, courts would judge “according to law and reason,” 
making their own precedent. Id at 814. When precedent existed, judges felt compelled, as 
early as the fifteenth century, to follow it, unless the judge determined that precedent ran 
counter to reason, in which case he would set a new precedent or modify the common law. 
Id at 814–15. Judges similarly hearkened to reason when precedent conflicted. Id at 816. 
Custom could become part of the common law only when it, too, comported with reason. 
Id at 818–19. The courts then looked to reason to interpret statutes. Id at 820–22. Profes-
sor Barbara Singer concludes, “Reason truly was the very soul of the common law.” Id at 823. 
 Other commentaries offer a similar understanding of the reason of the common law as 
reflecting a morality manifest in natural law, divine law, justice, or conscience. See, for 
example, Norman Doe, Fundamental Authority in Late Medieval English Law 120, 177 
(Cambridge 1990). In arguing that common-law lawyers equated reason with natural law, 
making their thinking congruent with Roman law and canon law, another scholar suggests 
that English law is more influenced by the ius commune (Continental jurisprudence) than 
has been admitted by some English legal historians. J.W. Tubbs, The Common Law 
Mind: Medieval and Early Modern Conceptions 173–78 (Johns Hopkins 2000). Professor 
H. Jefferson Powell, in contrast, argues that the notion of “resound” derived from French 
sources, equating with that which was reasonable. H. Jefferson Powell, The Moral Tradi-
tion of American Constitutionalism: A Theological Interpretation 77–78 (Duke 1993). Pro-
fessor James Stoner compares “Hale’s idea of common law reason with Hobbes’s concept 
of an absolute sovereign.” See Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Originalist Defense of Substan-
tive Due Process: Magna Carta, Higher-Law Constitutionalism, and the Fifth Amendment, 
58 Emory L J 585, 611 n 137 (2009), citing James Stoner Jr, Common Law and Liberal 
Theory: Coke, Hobbes, and the Origins of American Constitutionalism 131–33 (Kansas 
1992). He suggests a distinction between reason in an Aristotelian sense and an Enlight-
enment ideal: 
[T]he common law proceeds by reason, but by reason that collects and judges 
particulars—by a sort of Aristotelian practical reason—rather than by reason in 
the modern, Enlightenment, analytical sense—the reason that breaks apart and 
reassembles. It stresses continuity rather than novelty, though it demands some 
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with the common law was reasonable and, therefore, legal. That 
which was inconsistent was unreasonable and illegal. General 
warrants, being against the reason of the common law, were thus 
unlawful, or void. 
This interpretation, adopted by the Founders, reflected the 
common-law approach embraced by English scholars. Adams had 
read Coke, Hawkins’s Pleas of the Crown, and other English legal 
treatises.514 In 1610, Coke had asserted in dicta in Dr. Bonham’s 
Case515 that a statute was void if it was “against common right 
and reason,” that is, if it violated the basic principles of common 
law.516 Similarly, in 1628, Coke spoke in Parliament of general 
warrants as being “against reason.”517 The use of “unreasonable” 
as meaning “against reason” reflected a common philosophical 
and legal practice. Locke, in a statement referring back to Dr. 
Bonham’s Case, converted “against reason” to “unreasonable.”518 
 
reason greater than custom alone, for by common law, unreasonable customs 
have no legal force. 
Stoner, Common Law and Liberal Theory at 177 (cited in note 513). But see J.H. Hexter, 
Thomas Hobbes and the Law, 65 Cornell L Rev 471, 479–82 (1980) (describing Hobbes’s 
reference to “the artificial reason of the common law,” and the concept of natural law, as 
being in direct opposition to the ideal of the “reason of the common law”). In his study of 
Bentham and the common-law tradition, Professor Gerald Postema postulates that two 
concepts of reason were embedded in the common law: a “particularist” concept, focused 
on specific cases and contexts, within which “reasoning is analogical, arguing from partic-
ular case to particular case,” discussing similarities and differences; and a broader under-
standing of reason, which emphasizes “general justifying principles . . . instanced in, and 
illustrated by, particular decisions and settled rules,” in which reason is “reflective,” capa-
ble of turning common law into a “rational science based on first principles.” Gerald J. 
Postema, Bentham and the Common Law Tradition 30–38 (Clarendon 1986) (emphasis 
omitted). In another work, Postema suggests that the “artificial reason” of the common 
law “was seen largely as the most reliable procedure for approximating” natural justice, 
bringing him closer to Norman Doe’s position. Gerald J. Postema, Classical Common Law 
Jurisprudence (Part II), 3 Oxford U Commonwealth L J 1, 21 (2003). See also generally 
Gerald J. Postema, Classical Common Law Jurisprudence (Part I), 2 Oxford U Common-
wealth L J 155 (2002). An article published by Professor gJames Whitman in 1991 points 
out the “mingling” of reason, custom, and constitution, noting how customary rights be-
came intertwined with the concept of deductive natural law. He refers to “[t]he eighteenth-
century constitutionalist habit of identifying custom with reason.” James Q. Whitman, 
Why Did the Revolutionary Lawyers Confuse Custom and Reason?, 58 U Chi L Rev 1321, 
1322 (1991). 
 514 Moline, 42 Washburn L J at 783 (cited in note 418). 
 515 77 Eng Rep 646 (CP 1610). 
 516 Id at 652–53. 
 517 Davies, 98 Mich L Rev at 688 n 397 (cited in note 20). 
 518 Id at 689 & n 398, quoting John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government § 13 at 
275 (Cambridge 1988) (Peter Laslett, ed) (“[I]t is unreasonable for Men to be Judges in 
their own Cases.”). 
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Blackstone, too, altered Coke’s phrase of “against reason” to 
“unreasonable.”519 
It was not just Coke and Blackstone to whom Adams heark-
ened for the understanding of general warrants as “against rea-
son” and thus “unreasonable.” Adams’s abstract of Otis’s argu-
ment notes that Otis referred to writs of assistance as being 
“against reason”—a phrase that he converted in the Massachusetts 
Constitution to “unreasonable.”520 
Adams’s more lengthy notes on Otis’s argument draw the 
point even more forcefully. In them, he wrote, “An Act against the 
Constitution is void: . . . and if an Act of Parliament should be 
made, in the very Words of this Petition, it would be void.”521 He 
went on to cite the specific page in Coke’s opinion in Dr. Bonham’s 
Case on which Coke stated that an act is “void” when it is “against 
common right and reason.”522 Adams then noted Otis’s statement 
that the “[r]eason of the Common Law [is] to control an Act of 
Parliament.”523 
Legal tracts of the day made a similar link between unrea-
sonableness (as against the reason of the common law) and ille-
gality. In 1751, A New Law-Dictionary explained that common 
law “[i]s founded upon Reason; and is said to be the Perfection of 
Reason, acquired by long Study, Observation and Experience, and 
refined by Learned Men in all Ages.”524 It explained, “It has been 
observed [that Reason] is the very Life of the Law; and that what 
is contrary to it, is unlawful: When the Reason of the Law once 
ceases, the Law itself generally ceases; because Reason is the 
Foundation of all our Laws.”525 In other words, reason was consid-
ered to be the life of the law, and whatever was contrary to it was 
therefore unlawful.526 As an early nineteenth-century dictionary 
 
 519 Davies, 98 Mich L Rev at 689 (cited in note 20), quoting William Blackstone, 1 
Commentaries on the Laws of England 91 (Chicago 1979). 
 520 See Davies, 98 Mich L Rev at 689–90 (cited in note 20). See also generally John 
Adams, Abstract of the Argument, in Wroth and Zobel, eds, 2 Legal Papers of John Adams 
134 (cited in note 377). 
 521 Davies, 98 Mich L Rev at 690 (cited in note 20), quoting Adams, Minutes of the 
Argument at 127–28 (cited in note 377). 
 522 Davies, 98 Mich L Rev at 690 (cited in note 20), quoting Adams, Abstract of the 
Argument at 144 (cited in note 520). 
 523 Davies, 98 Mich L Rev at 690 (cited in note 20), quoting Adams, Minutes of the 
Argument at 127–28 (cited in note 377). 
 524 Giles Jacob, A New Law-Dictionary at “Common Law” (printed for Lintot 7th ed 
1751) (first emphasis added). 
 525 Id at “Reason.” 
 526 Giles Jacob and T.E. Tomlins, 5 The Law-Dictionary 386 (P. Byrne 1811). 
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noted, “Reason is called the soul of the law; for when the reason 
ceases, the law itself ceases.”527 
Just as legal tracts recognized that which was contrary to rea-
son as unreasonable, or illegal, so too did tracts highlight general 
warrants as being unreasonable and thus a violation of the common 
law. The Law of Arrests, published in London in 1742, for instance, 
noted “the Unreasonableness, and seeming Unwarrantableness of 
[general warrants].”528 This language was consistent with Johnson’s 
Dictionary, the principal English lexicon of the time, which defined 
“unreasonable” as “[n]ot agreeable to reason.”529 
So strong was the pull of the reason of the common law that 
statutes at the time of the Founding had to be read in a manner 
consistent with it. Contemporary legal tracts underscored the 
rule.530 Courts similarly embraced it. Thus, in a dispute in 1774 
over access to a navigable river, a provincial court in Baltimore 
County, Maryland, cited Coke, asserting: “The surest construc-
tion of a statute is by the rule and reason of the common law.”531 
In 1797, the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia recognized the 
rule that statutes were to be interpreted as closely as possible to 
“the reason of the common law.”532 In 1804, the Superior Courts 
of Law and Equity of North Carolina similarly cited Coke’s rule 
of interpreting statutes “as near to the rule and reason of the com-
mon law as may be.”533 It limited how far afield legislatures could 
go.534 The reason of the common law permeated judicial opinions 
over the first decades of the country’s existence.535 
 
 527 John Bouvier, 2 A Law Dictionary, Adapted to the Constitution and Laws of the 
United States of America, and of the Several States of the American Union 325 (T. & J.W. 
Johnson 1839) (emphasis omitted). 
 528 The Law of Arrests at 174 (cited in note 215). 
 529 Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language at “unreasonable” (cited in note 247). 
 530 See, for example, Giles Jacob and T.E. Tomlins, 6 The Law-Dictionary 118–27 (P. 
Byrne 1811) (focusing on constructing statutes consistent with the “reason of the com-
mon law”). 
 531 Harrison v Sterett, 4 H & McH 540, 545 (Md Prov 1774). 
 532 Chichester v Vass, 5 Va (1 Call) 83, 102 (1797). 
 533 Pender v Jones, 3 NC (2 Hayw) 294, 295 (Super L & Eq 1804). 
 534 See, for example, Weatherhead v Lessee of Bledsoes’ Heirs, 2 Tenn (2 Overt) 352, 
354 (1815) (insisting that the reason of the common law trumped alternative readings of 
a statute passed by the legislature); Given v Blann, 3 Blackford 64, 65–66 (Ind 1832) (re-
sponding to the argument before the court that the statute in question had “taken away 
the reason of the common law, and therefore” made the law void not by disputing the 
general rule, but by suggesting that in this case “the reason of the common law” had not 
been impaired). 
 535 See, for example, Wallace v Taliaferro, 6 Va (2 Call) 447, 467 (1800) (arguing “that 
the best construction of a statute, in a doubtful case, is to construe it, as near to the rule 
and reason of the common law as may be”); State v Cheatwood, 20 SCL (2 Hill) 459, 462 
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The eighteenth-century meaning of “unreasonable” thus car-
ried a different meaning than that which currently marks our 
modern, relativistic understanding of the word.536 We now see 
“unreasonable” as suggesting that the behavior in question is in-
appropriate under the circumstances, while “reasonable” tends to 
be understood as appropriate. In the Oxford English Dictionary, 
for instance, “reasonable” means “[n]ot going beyond the limit as-
signed by reason; not extravagant or excessive; moderate.”537 “Un-
reasonable,” in turn, suggests something beyond the appropriate 
limits, or “excessive in amount or degree.”538 
The eighteenth-century construction is a much more formal-
istic framing. According to Samuel Johnson’s A Dictionary of the 
English Language, “reasonable” was understood at the time as 
“agreeable to reason,”539 a formulation that reflected the meaning 
consistent with the reason of the common law. It carried a sense 
 
(SC App L & Eq 1834) (quoting Hawkins for the proposition that “in doubtful cases, the 
reason of the common law ought to govern the construction of a statute”); Hillhouse v 
Chester, 3 Day 166, 178 (Conn 1808) (quoting Coke as writing that “[t]he best construction 
of a statute is to construe it as near the rule and reason of the common law as may be”); 
Middletown Bank v Magill, 5 Conn 28, 31 (1823) (“When a statute directs any thing to be 
done generally, and does not appoint any special manner, it shall be done according to the 
course of the common law. Acts of parliament, in what they are silent, are best expounded 
according to the use and reason of the common law.”) (quotation marks omitted); Cochran’s 
Executors v Davis, 15 Ky (5 Litt) 118, 125 (1824) (quoting Coke as saying that “it is a good 
exposition of a statute, when the reason of the common law is pursued”); Guion’s Lessee v 
Bradley Academy, 12 Tenn (4 Yer) 232, 239 (1833) (“The best construction of a statute is 
to construe it as near to the rule and reason of the common law as may be.”); Smith v 
Mitchell, 24 SCL (Rice) 316, 320 (SC App 1839) (“We must [ ] construe the literal enact-
ments of our limitation act, so as to preserve the principles and reasons of the common 
law, as far as they are left unaltered by the act.”); Taul v Campbell, 15 Tenn (7 Yer) 319, 
328 (1835) (stating that the best construction of a statute is to read it consistent with the 
reason of the common law); McKinney v Reader, 7 Watts 123, 124 (Pa 1838) (“[I]t is whole-
some, in the exposition of a statute, to approach, as near as may be, to the reason of the 
common law. . . . The fathers of the law insisted on this with peculiar emphasis.”); Grand 
Gulf Bank v Barnes, 10 Miss (2 Smedes & M) 165, 170 (1844) (“[T]he best construction of 
a statute is to construe it as near to the rule and reason of the common law as may be.”) 
(citation omitted); Leavenworth v Marshall, 19 Conn 1, 4 (1848) (“[T]he best interpretation 
of a statute, is, to construe it as near to the rule and reason of the common law as may be.”). 
 536 See Donohue, The Future of Foreign Intelligence at 87 (cited in note 54). 
 537 J.A. Simpson and E.S.C. Weiner, eds, 13 Oxford English Dictionary 291 (Clarendon 
2d ed 1989). 
 538 J.A. Simpson and E.S.C. Weiner, eds, 19 Oxford English Dictionary 160 (Clarendon 
2d ed 1989). See also Donohue, The Future of Foreign Intelligence at 87 (cited in note 54). 
 539 Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language at “reasonable” (cited in note 247). 
All of the entries under “reasonable” in the 1768 and 1792 editions are identical to those 
in the 1765 edition. Compare id with Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Lan-
guage at “reasonable” (printed for J.F. & C. Rivington, et al, 10th ed 1792). 
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of being logical and consistent, while “unreasonable” meant “illog-
ical,” or “inconsistent with the common law”—making the action 
illegal.540 In juxtaposition, Johnson’s Dictionary defined “unrea-
sonable” to mean “exorbitant,” or “claiming, or insisting on more 
than is fit.”541 It understood “exorbitant,” in turn, to mean “[d]evi-
ating from the . . . rule established.”542 “Unreasonable” thus car-
ried a quality that meant actually going outside the boundaries of 
a settled rule—in this case, the common-law tenet making general 
warrants void.543 It was not a matter of degree. It was a matter of 
whether it met the standards or not. 
The state constitution went on to describe what would fall 
outside acceptable bounds: 
All warrants, therefore, are contrary to this right, if the cause 
or foundation of them be not previously supported by oath or 
affirmation, and if the order in the warrant to a civil officer, 
to make search in suspected places, or to arrest one or more 
 
 540 Davies, 98 Mich L Rev at 687 (cited in note 20) (observing that “‘reasonable’ usu-
ally connoted logic or consistency, and ‘unreasonable’ connoted illogic or inconsistency”). 
Davies goes on to cite different passages from Johnson’s Dictionary in support of his argu-
ment. Id at 687 n 391.  
 541 Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language at “unreasonable” (cited in note 247). 
This entry differs in subtle but inconsequential ways from the 1765 and 1792 versions. See 
Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language at “unreasonable” (Strahan 3d ed 
1765) (“exorbitant; claiming, or insisting upon more than is fit”); Johnson, A Dictionary of 
the English Language at “unreasonable” (cited in note 539). 
 542 Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language at “exorbitant” (cited in note 247). 
The language is repeated verbatim in the definition from the 1792 dictionary. See Johnson, 
A Dictionary of the English Language at “exorbitant” (cited in note 539). The definition 
provided in 1765 varies a bit more, as it included an additional clause, saying “[g]oing out 
of the prescribed tract.” Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language at “exorbitant” 
(cited in note 541). By eliminating “[g]oing out of the prescribed tract” in the later defini-
tions, there is a slight retreat from the potential of a more rigid understanding, although 
the word “deviate” still encompasses such transgression. 
 543 Davies, 98 Mich L Rev at 686–87 nn 390–91 (cited in note 20). There is a second 
reading of “unreasonable” from the eighteenth century that underscores this meaning. It 
was also used to suggest an excessive quantity, such as an unreasonable amount of time 
or unreasonable distress. Id at 686 n 390. It was thus an issue of degree. See, for example, 
Leach, 19 How St Tr at 1026 (describing one issue in the case as being “whether the de-
fendants detained the plaintiff an unreasonable time”). Johnson’s A Dictionary of the Eng-
lish Language offered one further definition of unreasonable that captured this quality: 
“[g]reater than is fit; immoderate.” Davies, 98 Mich L Rev at 687 n 391 (cited in note 20), 
citing Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language at “unreasonable” (cited in note 247). 
In the meaning of the times, therefore, Adams’s use of “unreasonable” suggested a quality 
of being against reason and therefore violative of the basic principles of the law (precisely 
the manner in which general warrants had been described), as well as excessive, a mean-
ing that was consistent with the contemporary manner in which general warrants were 
viewed. Davies, 98 Mich L Rev at 686–93 (cited in note 20). 
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suspected persons, or to seize their property, be not accompa-
nied with a special designation of the persons or objects of 
search, arrest, or seizure.544 
Warrants lacking the appropriate specificity fell outside 
common-law limits. By placing the rule into the written consti-
tution, Adams secured the right against not just warrantless 
search and seizure, but execution of the same with a warrant 
lacking the requisite particularity. 
In the context of the times, warrantless entry, and entry un-
der general warrants, defined unreasonable search and seizure. 
The right to be protected within one’s home included the right not 
to be subject to promiscuous search and seizure. The government 
thus could not, at will, search an individual’s “person, his houses, 
his papers, and all his possessions.”545 Further criteria were re-
quired for a specific warrant to be valid. 
By using “therefore,” Adams thus tied the requirements of a 
specific warrant to the general protection against government in-
terference.546 The clause continued, “[A]nd no warrant ought to be 
issued but in cases, and with the formalities, prescribed by the 
laws.”547 The supplemental language cemented process into a con-
stitutional requirement. Not only would a warrant with appropri-
ate specificity be required for entry, but it had to be issued con-
sistent with the rule of law. 
Massachusetts, prior to the Founding, had come the furthest 
with regard to instituting specific warrants in place of general 
warrants, paving the way for the subsequent language that 
Madison adopted in the Fourth Amendment.548 It also went the 
furthest in spelling out the criteria that would have to be met 
for the government to conduct lawful search and seizure. 
3. The warrant requirement. 
Yet more states took steps to restrict government powers of 
search and seizure. The parallel clause in the New Hampshire 
Constitution of 1783 replicated the one adopted by Massachusetts 
 
 544 Mass Const Pt 1, Art XIV. See also Davies, 98 Mich L Rev at 684 (cited in note 20); 
Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment at 605–06 (cited in note 37); Donohue, The Future of 
Foreign Intelligence at 87 (cited in note 54). 
 545 Mass Const Pt 1, Art XIV. 
 546 See Donohue, The Future of Foreign Intelligence at 87 (cited in note 54). 
 547 Mass Const Pt 1, Art XIV. See also Donohue, The Future of Foreign Intelligence at 
87–88 (cited in note 54). 
 548 Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment at 527–30, 550–52, 561–69 (cited in note 37). 
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nearly word for word.549 Vermont’s approach mirrored that 
adopted by Pennsylvania, in which the first chapter of its consti-
tution entrenched certain rights.550 As in the Massachusetts and 
New Hampshire constitutions, the relevant clause began with a 
statement: “[T]he people have a right to hold themselves, their 
houses, papers and possessions free from search or seizure.”551 
The sanctity of the home lay at the heart of the protection. In or-
der to be secure, the government’s access to one’s house, papers, 
and possessions must be constrained. Echoing Adams’s structure 
in the Massachusetts document, the Vermont Constitution fol-
lowed with the word “therefore” before detailing the conditions 
required prior to issuance of a warrant: it had to be specific and 
limited, supported by oath or affirmation, and backed by suffi-
cient evidence of criminal activity. Other states followed suit. 
Far from supporting Professor Amar’s 1994 thesis that the 
walls of one’s home could be entered without a warrant—wherein 
the Fourth Amendment requires only that, when a warrant does 
issue, it must be specific—the right established by the Vermont 
Constitution, as well as by the other state constitutions, was that 
the home could not be entered at all, outside of what is now un-
derstood as exigent circumstances, without a warrant meeting 
the specifics listed. The question was not, then, one of more or less 
 
 549 NH Const of 1783, Bill of Rights Art XIX: 
Every subject hath a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches and sei-
zures of his person, his houses, his papers, and all his possessions. All warrants, 
therefore, are contrary to this right, if the cause or foundation of them be not 
previously supported by oath, or affirmation; and if the order in the warrant to 
a civil officer, to make search in suspected places, or to arrest one or more sus-
pected persons, or to seize their property, be not accompanied with a special des-
ignation of the persons or objects of search, arrest, or seizure; and no warrant 
ought to be issued but in cases, and with the formalities prescribed by the laws. 
See also Davies, 98 Mich L Rev at 684 (cited in note 20); Donohue, The Future of Foreign 
Intelligence at 88 (cited in note 54). 
 550 Compare Vt Const of 1777, Decl of Rights Art XI (superseded 1793), with Pa Const 
of 1776, Decl of Rights § 10 (superseded 1790). 
 551 Vt Const of 1777, Decl of Rights Art XI (superseded 1793): 
That the people have a right to hold themselves, their houses, papers and pos-
sessions free from search or seizure; and therefore warrants without oath or af-
firmation first made, affording a sufficient foundation for them, and whereby 
any officer or messenger may be commanded or required to search suspected 
places, or to seize any person or persons, his, her or their property, not particu-
larly described, are contrary to that right, and ought not to be granted. 
See also Donohue, The Future of Foreign Intelligence at 88 (cited in note 54). 
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reasonableness, as Amar asks,552 but what the law allowed. By 
1787, Delaware, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, 
North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and Virginia all explic-
itly prohibited general warrants.553 
The state declarations and constitutions played a critical role 
in the early Republic.554 They made it clear that the use of general 
warrants, in particular, ran contrary to the reason of the common 
law. They simultaneously turned the generalized grievance about 
the amassing of too much power by the Crown into a written guar-
antee against promiscuous search and seizure.555 They elevated 
the status of general warrants as contrary to common law to a 
constitutional tenet, ensuring that any subsequent adaptation of 
the common law to the American context would refrain from in-
fringing the right. They also reflected the Founding generation’s 
concern about individual security, as a concomitant of limited 
government power. If the state governments were to be allowed 
to conduct search or seizure, it could be only under severely con-
strained conditions. 
With this history in mind, Amar’s textual critique of the early 
state constitutions falls short. “If a warrant requirement was in-
tended but not spelled out,” he suggests, “if it simply went without 
saying—we might expect to find at least some early state consti-
tutions making clear what the federal Fourth Amendment left to 
inference. Yet although many states featured language akin to 
the Fourth Amendment, none had a textual warrant require-
ment.”556 What Amar fails to recognize is that each of the state 
provisions was itself part of a broader context that forbade search 
without a warrant. Each provision prohibited warrantless entry, 
as well as general warrants, and laid out further elements that 
would have to be met for a specific warrant to issue. 
 
 552 See, for example, Amar, 107 Harv L Rev at 780 (cited in note 13) (“But who should 
decide what is unreasonable, or for that matter, whether probable cause is truly met? In 
the first instance, of course, the issuing magistrate. But what if the citizen target disa-
grees, and tries to (re)litigate the matter by bringing it before a jury?”); id at 784–85 (“Is 
it not easier to read the words as written, and say that warrantless searches must simply 
be ‘reasonable’? For unlike the seemingly fixed and high standard of ‘probable cause,’ rea-
sonableness obviously does require different levels of cause in different contexts, and not 
always a high probability of success.”). 
 553 See Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment at 608–09 (cited in note 37). 
 554 See Emily Zackin, Looking for Rights in All the Wrong Places: Why State Consti-
tutions Contain America’s Positive Rights 197 (Princeton 2013) (arguing that the state 
constitutions served as the original repositories for the protection of individual rights). 
 555 See Donohue, The Future of Foreign Intelligence at 88 (cited in note 54). 
 556 Amar, 107 Harv L Rev at 763 (cited in note 13). 
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Amar cites four early state cases in support of his assertion,557 
each of which fails inspection. He characterizes the first case as 
“upholding a warrantless seizure of liquors,”558 without noting 
that it dealt with the arrest of an individual in the midst of com-
mitting a felony—in this case, transporting liquor by horse and 
wagon.559 Such seizure had long been recognized as an exception 
to the warrant requirement. 
Amar considers another case, Mayo v Wilson,560 to stand for 
the proposition that New Hampshire’s equivalent Fourth Amend-
ment clauses merely “guard against abuse of warrants issued by 
Magistrates,” without limiting arrest without a warrant.561 But 
that case similarly centered on the arrest of an individual in the 
midst of publicly breaking the law. The court itself recognized the 
exception as applying narrowly to situations in which (a) “a man 
is present when another commits treason, felony or notorious 
breach of the peace”; (b) a breach of the peace has occurred, such 
that “any present may during the continuance of the affray . . . 
restrain any of the offenders, but if the affray be over there must 
be an express warrant”; or (c) “one man dangerously wound[ed] 
another, [such that] any person may arrest him, that he be safely 
kept, till it be known whether the person shall die or not.”562 Ar-
rest absent a warrant could also be made under strong suspicion 
of illegal activities or, for a watchman, when a nightwalker may 
be present at “unreasonable hours” by the common law.563 In other 
words, if done in the course of illegal activity, then arrest without 
a warrant might be valid—although, for private citizens, as for 
public officers, an action in trespass could still be brought, so as 
to limit even these situations. 
The final two cases cited by Amar explicitly refer to the 
Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on general warrants—rather 
cutting against Amar’s thesis that a warrant is not required. In 
Wakely v Hart,564 the court wrote, “[I]f known to have committed 
 
 557 Id at 763 n 11. 
 558 Id. 
 559 Jones v Root, 72 Mass (6 Gray) 435, 436 (1856) (“[W]hen [the officer] stopped the 
wagon, there were several barrels of intoxicating liquor in it, which Harvey Jones was 
illegally engaged in transporting from Thompsonville, Connecticut, to Holyoke.”). 
 560 1 NH 53 (1817). 
 561 Amar, 107 Harv L Rev at 763 n 11 (cited in note 13), quoting Mayo, 1 NH at 60. 
 562 Mayo, 1 NH at 56. 
 563 Id. 
 564 6 Binn 314 (Pa 1814). 
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a felony, and pursued with or without warrant, he may be ar-
rested by any person. . . . These are principles of the common law, 
essential to the welfare of society, and not intended to be altered 
or impaired by the [C]onstitution.”565 Similarly, in Rohan v 
Sawin,566 the Massachusetts state court noted that “[t]he proba-
bility of an escape . . . if the party is not forthwith arrested” 
proved central to the determination of whether an arrest without 
a warrant would be considered valid.567 “The question of reasona-
ble necessity for an immediate arrest, in order to prevent the es-
cape of the party charged with the felony, is one that the officer 
must act upon.”568 The court noted the prohibition of promiscuous 
search and seizure in the Fourth Amendment: 
It has been sometimes contended, that an arrest of this char-
acter, without a warrant, was a violation of the great funda-
mental principles of our national and state constitutions, for-
bidding unreasonable searches and arrests, except by 
warrant founded upon a complaint made under oath. Those 
provisions doubtless had another and different purpose, be-
ing in restraint of general warrants to make searches, and 
requiring warrants to issue solely upon a complaint made un-
der oath. They do not conflict with the authority of constables 
or other peace-officers, or private persons under proper limi-
tations, to arrest without warrant those who have committed 
felonies. The public safety [requires it].569 
While arrest in the course of illegal activity might be valid with-
out a warrant, a search of one’s domicile, absent the same, failed 
constitutional muster. 
III.  CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUE 
The Articles of Confederation, a triumph for those who feared 
the tyranny of George III, proved inadequate to sustain the coun-
try’s economic needs. The national government had no power to 
protect trade among the new states. Without a uniform system of 
currency, saddled by debt, and lacking the ability to raise reve-
nue, the government could neither pay its accounts nor counter-
act inflation. Violence and civil unrest threatened. The country 
 
 565 Id at 318. 
 566 59 Mass (5 Cush) 281 (1850). 
 567 Id at 286. 
 568 Id. 
 569 Id at 284–85. 
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had no national independent judiciary, no head of government to 
handle foreign affairs, and no locus for addressing internal and 
external conflict. Further beset by legislative inefficiencies that 
stemmed from the ability of five states to block any law, as well 
as from a cumbersome amendment process (requiring unanim-
ity), Congress floundered.570 In 1787, state delegates gathered in 
Philadelphia to reevaluate the structure. 
The first aim of the Framers was to augment the power of the 
national government.571 But more power meant an increased risk 
that the authority would be abused. It also raised the question 
whether the rights previously secured by the state constitutions 
for the people would be sufficient to guard against overreach by 
the national government.572 The Framers designed the framework 
to protect rights by adopting a principle of enumerated powers, cre-
ating a delicate balance between the different functions of the gov-
ernment, incorporating federalism, carefully delineating broad 
representation, and ensuring a republican form of government. But 
concern percolated as to whether the structural protections would 
be sufficient to restrain a stronger national government.573 
Mason, who had written the Virginia Declaration of Rights, 
raised his concern five days before the convention adjourned that 
they had failed to address individual rights.574 Almost all of the 
state constitutions had incorporated rights—generally as the first 
clause or article in the text. Mason lamented that the Constitu-
tion had not “been prefaced with a Bill of Rights.”575 He volun-
teered to second a motion to insert a statement of rights at the 
beginning, on the grounds that “[i]t would give great quiet to the 
people.”576 He did not think that it would take more than a few 
hours to draft. Elbridge Gerry agreed and promptly moved for a 
 
 570 For prominent histories of the Articles of Confederation and the problems that the 
country faced, see generally Robert W. Hoffert, A Politics of Tensions: The Articles of Con-
federation and American Political Ideas (Colorado 1992); Merrill Jensen, The New Nation: 
A History of the United States during the Confederation, 1781–1789 (Knopf 1950); Gordon 
S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776–1787 (UNC 1969). 
 571 See Donohue, The Future of Foreign Intelligence at 88–89 (cited in note 54). 
 572 Id at 89. 
 573 See Francis Newton Thorpe, 2 The Constitutional History of the United States 
1765–1895 8 (Da Capo 1970). 
 574 See Donohue, The Future of Foreign Intelligence at 89 (cited in note 54). 
 575 Max Farrand, ed, 2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 587 (Yale 1911). 
 576 Id. On August 31, 1787, Mason had told the convention that he would “sooner chop 
off his right hand than put it to the Constitution as it now stands.” Id at 479. He scribbled 
a list of “objections” on the back of a report prepared by the Committee of Style, which 
included the absence of a bill of rights. Pauline Maier, Ratification: The People Debate the 
Constitution, 1787–1788 43–46 (Simon & Schuster 2010). 
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committee to prepare the document.577 Mason seconded the mo-
tion.578 But Roger Sherman objected, noting that the state decla-
rations of rights were not repealed by the Constitution. Un-
touched, they would prove sufficient for the protection.579 Mason’s 
response to Sherman, that the Supremacy Clause rendered the 
state documents impotent, failed to sway the delegates. Ten 
states voted no, with one (Gerry’s home state of Massachusetts) 
abstaining.580 
Gerry and Mason remained steadfast in their concern. Gerry 
later explained to the Massachusetts state legislature, “My prin-
cipal objections to the [Constitution include] . . . that the system 
is without the security of a bill of rights.”581 Mason similarly com-
plained to his home state, “There is no declaration of rights; and, 
the laws of the general government being paramount to the laws 
and constitutions of the several states, the declarations of rights 
in the separate states are no security.”582 
The decision not to include a bill of rights contributed to grow-
ing unease about the new powers afforded the federal govern-
ment. In September 1787, Lee, from Virginia, and Melancton 
Smith, from New York, attempted to induce Congress to attach a 
bill of rights to the Constitution prior its circulation to the 
states.583 Lee explained that “[u]niversal experience” had shown 
 
 577 Farrand, ed, 2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 at 588 (cited in 
note 575). See also Donohue, The Future of Foreign Intelligence at 89 (cited in note 54). 
 578 Farrand, ed, 2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 at 588 (cited in 
note 575). 
 579 Id. 
 580 Id. 
 581 Letter from Elbridge Gerry to Samuel Adams, President of the Senate of Massachu-
setts, and James Warren, Speaker of the House of Representatives of Massachusetts (Oct 
18, 1787), in James T. Austen, 2 The Life of Elbridge Gerry 42, 42–43 (Wells & Lilly 1829). 
 582 Jonathan Elliot, ed, 1 The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adop-
tion of the Federal Constitution 494 (printed for Elliot 2d ed 1836) (reproducing the objec-
tions of Mason). Asking why a motion for a bill of rights appeared so late in the day, Pro-
fessor Jack Rakove offers an important historical insight. See Jack N. Rakove, Original 
Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the Constitution 317 & n 77 (Vintage 1996). 
Seven weeks prior to the discussion, the Committee of Detail had considered whether a 
preamble would be necessary “for the purpose of designating the ends of government and 
human polities.” Farrand, ed, 2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 at 137 (cited 
in note 575). The Committee answered in the negative, as the Constitution was not meant 
to work upon the natural rights of men not yet in political union, “but upon those rights, 
modified by society, and [ ] interwoven with what we call [ ] the rights of states.” Id (empha-
sis omitted). The document is in Mason’s papers at the Library of Congress. Rakove ex-
plains, “If these documents were regarded less as compilations of legally enforceable civil 
rights than as general reservations of natural rights,” then it made no sense to rewrite the 
1776 Declaration of Independence. Rakove, Original Meanings at 317 (cited in note 582). 
 583 See Donohue, The Future of Foreign Intelligence at 89 (cited in note 54). 
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the need to insert “the most express declarations and reservations 
. . . to protect the just rights and liberty of Mankind from the Si-
lent, powerful, and ever active conspiracy of those who govern.”584 
Resultantly, the Constitution ought to “be bottomed upon a dec-
laration, or Bill of Rights, clearly and precisely stating the princi-
ples upon which the Social Compact is founded.”585 Lee included in 
this concern the right to be secure against “unreasonable searches 
[and] seizures” of one’s “papers, houses, persons, or property.”586 
In the end, Congress did not agree to Lee’s proposal. Instead, 
by unanimous vote, it forwarded the new Constitution to the 
states for ratification.587 
A. Ratification and Reservation 
Scholars have written extensively and well on the state con-
ventions and public debates that accompanied ratification of the 
US Constitution.588 For now, it is sufficient to note that foremost 
among a number of states’ concerns was the importance of amend-
ing the document to include a bill of rights. The question was 
whether one would be required prior to ratification, possibly as 
the result of a second constitutional convention or in the context 
of the state deliberations, in the course of which the Constitution 
might be further amended, or whether it could be addressed after 
ratification. Whether one reads the machinations as a political 
calculation, a battle over the role of popular sovereignty, or a fun-
damental commitment to rights, the issue assumed center stage, 
 
 584 Maier, Ratification at 56 (cited in note 576). See also Donohue, The Future of For-
eign Intelligence at 89 (cited in note 54). 
 585 Maier, Ratification at 56 (cited in note 576). See also Donohue, The Future of For-
eign Intelligence at 89 (cited in note 54). 
 586 John P. Kaminski, et al, eds, Richard Henry Lee’s Proposed Amendments, 27 Sep-
tember 1787 (Virginia, 2009), archived at http://perma.cc/D4UB-9AJE. See also Donohue, 
The Future of Foreign Intelligence at 89 (cited in note 54). 
 587 Roscoe R. Hill, ed, 33 Journals of the Continental Congress 1786–1787 548–49 (GPO 
1936) (entry of Sept 28, 1787). See also Donohue, The Future of Foreign Intelligence at 89 
(cited in note 54). 
 588 See generally, for example, Rakove, Original Meanings (cited in note 582); Maier, 
Ratification (cited in note 576); John P. Kaminski, et al, eds, The Documentary History of 
the Ratification of the Constitution (Wisconsin Historical Society); Philip P. Kurland and 
Ralph Lerner, The Founders’ Constitution (Chicago 1989); Jürgen Heideking, The Consti-
tution before the Judgment Seat: The Prehistory and Ratification of the American Consti-
tution, 1787–1791 (Virginia 2012) (John P. Kaminski and Richard Leffler, eds). The Docu-
mentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution, published since 1976 by the 
Wisconsin Historical Society, is a terrific resource. A digital edition, hosted by the Univer-
sity of Virginia, is archived at http://perma.cc/P699-ZZ5E. 
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particularly in the battleground states.589 Concerns about general 
warrants, and about ensuring that specific warrants contained 
sufficient particularity, figured largely in the conversation, which 
centered on ensuring that the rights of the people would be secure 
against government overreach.590 
Virginia, again, led the way. The depth and breadth of the 
debate that followed was perhaps unsurprising: Virginia was the 
first part of the country that had been permanently settled 
(Jamestown, in 1607),591 the state with the oldest lawmaking 
body (the House of Burgesses),592 and the first entity to issue a 
declaration of rights. 
The outcome of the debate mattered. Virginia was enorm-
ously important and influential, owing in part to its size. As of 
1780, the United States had approximately 2.8 million people. 
More than half a million people lived in Virginia—whose popula-
tion nearly totaled those of the next two most populous states 
combined.593 Virginia played a prominent role in the American 
Revolution and, thereafter, on the national stage. Four of the first 
five presidents (Washington, Jefferson, Madison, and James 
Monroe) were Virginians. Although Virginia had sent seven dele-
gates to the Constitutional Convention, four—Mason, James 
McClurg, Edmund J. Randolph, and Wythe, all prominent fig-
ures—had not signed it.594 The battle lines were drawn, and the 
drama played out at the state convention. 
 
 589 The seven most important states in this regard were Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Virginia. See 
Rakove, Original Meanings at 116–28 (cited in note 582). 
 590 Anti-Federalists immediately focused in on the absence of protection against gen-
eral warrants as one of the most significant gaps in the new Constitution. For scathing 
satires, see One of the Nobility, Political Creed of Every Federalist, New-York Journal 2 
(Dec 12, 1787) (“I believe that it is totally unnecessary to secure the rights of mankind in 
the formation of a constitution.”); The Independent Gazetteer *2 (Oct 6, 1787) (including 
“[g]eneral search warrants” as “[a]mong the blessings of the new-proposed government”). 
 591 Brendan Wolfe, Early Jamestown Settlement (Virginia Foundation for the Human-
ities, May 30, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/X7T4-HSRR. 
 592 Matthew S. Gottlieb, House of Burgesses (Virginia Foundation for the Humanities, 
Mar 24, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/MC66-SZ2K. 
 593 Pennsylvania had a population of approximately 327,000, and North Carolina had 
a population of approximately 270,000. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the 
United States: Colonial Times to 1970 1168 (Bureau of the Census 1975). 
 594 Virginia had the second-highest number of representatives at the convention; the 
only state to send more delegates than Virginia was Pennsylvania, with eight delegates. 
See generally Letter from Edmund Randolph to Joseph Prentis, Speaker of the Virginia 
House of Delegates (Oct 16, 1787), in Paul Leicester Ford, ed, Pamphlets on the Constitu-
tion of the United States, Published during Its Discussion by the People 1787–1788 261 
(1888) (discussing the prominence of the Virginia delegation). John Blair, James Madison 
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Virginia’s charismatic former governor, Patrick Henry, let 
loose—and what a tour de force it was. Even Jefferson, who de-
plored Henry’s legal acumen and held a long-lasting grudge 
against the man, acknowledged that he was “the greatest orator 
that ever lived.”595 Henry began, “[O]ur rights and privileges are 
endangered, and the sovereignty of the states will be relin-
quished. . . . [A]ll your immunities and franchises, all pretensions 
to human rights and privileges, are rendered insecure, if not lost” 
by the new Constitution.596 Such “tame relinquishment of rights” 
was not “worthy of freemen.”597 Henry asked: 
When these harpies are aided by excisemen, who may search, 
at any time, your houses, and most secret recesses, will the 
people hear it? If you think so, you differ from me. Where I 
thought there was a possibility of such mischiefs, I would 
grant power with a niggardly hand.598 
What was needed was a bill of rights to secure the people against 
the federal government.599 
Henry pointed out that Virginia had not been content with a 
structure that divided power among the legislative, executive, 
and judicial branches. Nor had Virginia relied on direct represen-
tation. To the contrary, the state had introduced a declaration of 
rights as an added protection. What was good for the goose was 
good for the gander. Henry continued: 
If you give up [state power], without a bill of rights, you will 
exhibit the most absurd thing to mankind that ever the world 
saw—a government that has abandoned all its powers . . . 
without check, limitation, or control. . . . You have a bill of 
rights to defend you against the state government, which is 
 
Jr, and Washington were the Virginians who signed the document. McClurg and Wythe left 
the convention early. Mason and Randolph refused to sign the final document. Id at 271. 
 595 Maier, Ratification at 230 n 47 (cited in note 576), citing Stan V. Henkels, 
Jefferson’s Recollections of Patrick Henry, 34 Pa Magazine Hist & Biography 385, 387 
(1910) (reproducing a letter from Jefferson to William Wirt that was written at Monticello 
on August 4, 1805). 
 596  Jonathan Elliot, ed, 3 The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adop-
tion of the Federal Constitution 44 (printed for Elliot 2d ed 1836). See also Donohue, The 
Future of Foreign Intelligence at 89 (cited in note 54). 
 597 Elliot, ed, 3 The Debates in the Several State Conventions at 44 (cited in note 596). 
 598 Id at 58. See also Donohue, The Future of Foreign Intelligence at 89 (cited in note 54). 
 599 Elliot, ed, 3 The Debates in the Several State Conventions at 445 (cited in note 596) 
(“Mr. Chairman, the necessity of a bill of rights appears to me to be greater in this govern-
ment than ever it was in any government before.”). 
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bereaved of all power, and yet you have none against Con-
gress, though in full and exclusive possession of all power!600 
Why, indeed, had the Convention not included a bill of rights? 
“Is it because it will consume too much paper?” Henry asked, 
tongue in cheek.601 Under the Virginia Constitution, the govern-
ment was “restrained from issuing general warrants to search 
suspected places, or seize persons not named, without evidence of 
the commission of a fact, &c.”602 But under the federal Constitu-
tion being contemplated, 
[t]he officers of congress may come upon you now, fortified 
with all the terrors of paramount federal authority. Excise-
men may come in multitudes; for the limitation of their num-
bers no man knows. They may, unless the general govern-
ment be restrained by a bill of rights, or some similar 
restriction, go into your cellars and rooms, and search, ran-
sack, and measure, every thing you eat, drink, and wear. 
They ought to be restrained within proper bounds.603 
General warrants, for Henry, earned a special place of shame. 
He stated: 
I feel myself distressed because the necessity of securing our 
personal rights seems not to have pervaded the minds of 
men; for many other valuable things are omitted:—for in-
stance, general warrants, by which an officer may search sus-
pected places, without evidence of the commission of a fact, 
or seize any person without evidence of his crime, ought to be 
prohibited.604 
The problem was that citizens’ property could be seized “in the 
most arbitrary manner, without any evidence or reason.”605 Eve-
rything sacred could “be searched and ransacked by the strong 
hand of power.”606 
 
 600 Id at 446. 
 601 Id at 448. 
 602 Id. 
 603 Elliot, ed, 3 The Debates in the Several State Conventions at 448–49 (cited in 
note 596). See also Donohue, The Future of Foreign Intelligence at 90 (cited in note 54). 
 604 Elliot, ed, 3 The Debates in the Several State Conventions at 588 (cited in note 596). 
 605 Id. 
 606 Id. 
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Others in Virginia shared Henry’s concerns.607 Accordingly, 
the state convention appointed the Wythe Committee.608 It pro-
posed adoption of a new bill of rights—essentially, a revised list 
of the entitlements detailed in the Virginia Declaration of Rights. 
Unanimously approved, the draft bill of rights was forwarded, 
along with the ratification of the US Constitution, to the federal 
legislature.609 The ratification document recommended that 
“there be a declaration or bill of rights asserting, and securing 
from encroachment, the essential and unalienable rights of the 
people.”610 
In the proposed text, Virginia established a right against un-
reasonable search and seizure. To ensure this right, the document 
prohibited not just general warrants, but specific warrants lack-
ing the requisite particularity. Proposed Article XIV read: 
That every freeman has a right to be secure from all unrea-
sonable searches and seizures of his person, his papers, and 
property; all warrants, therefore, to search suspected places, 
or seize any freeman, his papers, or property, without infor-
mation on oath (or affirmation of a person religiously scrup-
ulous of taking an oath) of legal and sufficient cause, are 
grievous and oppressive; and all general warrants to search 
suspected places, or to apprehend any suspected person, 
without specially naming or describing the place or person, 
are dangerous, and ought not to be granted.611 
Without the guarantee of a bill of rights, it is highly question-
able whether the Virginia delegates would have ratified the US 
Constitution.612 The state convention resolved to enjoin Virginia’s 
representatives in Congress “to exert all their influence, and use 
all reasonable and legal methods, to obtain a ratification of” the 
clause.613 Even once the draft bill of rights had been passed and 
attached to the ratification document, the vote was narrow: dele-
gates approved it 89–79, providing those in support of the new 
Constitution only a five-vote margin.614 
 
 607 Donohue, The Future of Foreign Intelligence at 90 (cited in note 54). 
 608 Id. 
 609 Elliot, ed, 3 The Debates in the Several State Conventions at 662–63 (cited in 
note 596). 
 610 Id at 657. 
 611 Id at 658 (emphasis added). 
 612 See Donohue, The Future of Foreign Intelligence at 90 (cited in note 54). 
 613 Elliot, ed, 3 The Debates in the Several State Conventions at 661 (cited in note 596). 
 614 Id at 654. See also Donohue, The Future of Foreign Intelligence at 90 (cited in 
note 54). 
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New York passed the Constitution by an even narrower mar-
gin: 30–27.615 Heated public debate over the failure of the Consti-
tution to prohibit general warrants surrounded the convention. 
Writing in the New-York Journal in November 1787, a “Son of 
Liberty” outlined “a few of the curses which will be entailed on the 
people of America, by this preposterous and newfangled system, 
if they are ever so infatuated as to receive it.”616 The fourth item 
in the list read: 
Men of all ranks and conditions, subject to have their houses 
searched by officers, acting under the sanction of general 
warrants, their private papers seized, and themselves 
dragged to prison, under various pretences, whenever the 
fear of their lordly masters shall suggest, that they are plot-
ting mischief against their arbitrary conduct.617 
Promiscuous search and seizure gave the government the ability 
to target political opponents. And by silencing criticism, the in-
struments freed the government to act badly. 
The convention took the critique to heart. As part of their for-
mal ratification—and not just as an accompanying document—
New York entered the statement: 
That every freeman has a right to be secure from all unrea-
sonable searches and seizures of his person, his papers, or his 
property; and therefore, that all warrants to search suspected 
places, or seize any freeman, his papers, or property, without 
information, upon oath or affirmation, of sufficient cause, are 
grievous and oppressive; and that all general warrants (or 
such in which the place or person suspected are not particu-
larly designated) are dangerous, and ought not to be 
granted.618 
The language tracked that of the earlier state constitutions. The 
right against unreasonable search and seizure meant that the 
government could not enter the home without a warrant meeting 
the particulars laid out in the text. 
 
 615 Jonathan Elliot, ed, 2 The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adop-
tion of the Federal Constitution 413 (printed for Elliot 2d ed 1836). See also Donohue, The 
Future of Foreign Intelligence at 91 (cited in note 54). 
 616 A Son of Liberty, New-York Journal *2 (Nov 8, 1787). See also Donohue, The Fu-
ture of Foreign Intelligence at 91 (cited in note 54). 
 617 A Son of Liberty, New-York Journal at *2 (cited in note 616). See also Donohue, 
The Future of Foreign Intelligence at 91 (cited in note 54). 
 618 Elliot, ed, 1 The Debates in the Several State Conventions at 328 (cited in note 582) 
(emphasis added). 
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Not only did New York incorporate a prohibition on general 
warrants in its actual ratification document, but the state de-
clared that it was only with the understanding that new language 
would be added to take account of the right against promiscuous 
search and seizure, as well as others outlined in the ratification 
instrument, that it agreed to the new Constitution.619 
Further underscoring its commitment to protecting individ-
ual liberty, New York included a clause that, with certain excep-
tions, required its military to remain within state borders until 
the matter had been settled.620 The threat was clear.621 
Virginia and New York were battleground states. Had they 
not ratified the Constitution, the experiment would have failed.622 
Approximately 3.9 million people lived in the country at the time. 
About one quarter of the population lived in the two states.623 A 
lack of their presence would have threatened geographic continu-
ity. Both states evinced serious concerns about the new agree-
ment. For Virginia, the hot button was individual rights. In New 
York, antifederalism dominated. In both discussions, the lack of 
protections against promiscuous search and seizure loomed large. 
The failure of the drafters to include a statement outlawing gen-
eral warrants and laying out the particulars that would have to 
be met for the government to have access to citizens’ homes was 
an important issue. 
 
 619 Id at 329. See also Donohue, The Future of Foreign Intelligence at 91 (cited in note 
54). The document read: 
Under [this] impression[ ], and declaring that the rights aforesaid cannot be 
abridged or violated, and that the explanations aforesaid are consistent with the 
said Constitution, and in confidence that the amendments which shall have been 
proposed to the said Constitution will receive an early and mature consideration, 
— We, the said delegates, in the name and in the behalf of the people of the state 
of New York, do, by these presents, assent to and ratify the said Constitution. 
Elliot, ed, 1 The Debates in the Several State Conventions at 329 (cited in note 582). 
 620 Elliot, ed, 1 The Debates in the Several State Conventions at 329 (cited in note 582) 
(“In full confidence, nevertheless, that, until a convention shall be called and convened for 
proposing amendments to the said Constitution, the militia of this state will not be con-
tinued in service out of this state for a longer term than six weeks, without the consent of 
the legislature thereof.”). See also Donohue, The Future of Foreign Intelligence at 92 (cited 
in note 54). 
 621 See Donohue, The Future of Foreign Intelligence at 92 (cited in note 54). 
 622 Id. 
 623 According to the 1790 Census, Virginia was the most populous state, with 747,610 
people, while New York had 340,120 people. Return of the Whole Number of Persons within 
the Several Districts of the United States, according to “An Act Providing for the Enumer-
ation of the Inhabitants of the United States” 3 (Childs & Swaine 1791). 
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Other states also insisted on the inclusion of a bill of rights 
within which general warrants played a role. In declaring the 
right against unreasonable search and seizure, Rhode Island 
adopted language in the body of its ratification document that was 
identical to that used by New York, substituting only the word 
“person” for “freeman.”624 Like New York, Rhode Island ratified 
the document on the condition that the Constitution would later 
be amended to take account of its concerns. Like New York, Rhode 
Island indicated that it would largely retain its militia within 
state borders until a federal declaration of rights had been en-
acted.625 Rhode Island’s ratification vote was the slimmest of any 
state. It passed 34–32.626 
Maryland delegates were required to report the proceedings 
of the Constitutional Convention to the state legislature. State 
Attorney General Luther Martin, a graduate of the College of 
New Jersey (later Princeton) and a delegate to the Constitutional 
Convention, walked out two weeks before the Philadelphia meet-
ing adjourned. He explained his decision to leave the Constitu-
tional Convention to the Maryland House of Assembly: the new 
federal government would prove too powerful.627 He objected to 
the ability of federal officers, through excise, to have access to cit-
izens’ private lives.628 
Martin’s concerns were picked up in the public discussion by 
“A Farmer and Planter,” an Anti-Federalist writing under a pen 
name, who published his objections in the Maryland Journal. 
“The excise-officers have power to enter your houses at all times, 
by night or day, and if you refuse them entrance, they can, under 
pretence of searching for exciseable goods, . . . break open your 
doors, chests, trunks, desks, boxes, and rummage your houses 
 
 624 See 2 Documentary History of the Constitution of the States of America, 1786–1870 
313–14 (US Department of State 1894). 
 625 Id. 
 626 See Ronald L. Watts, Darrel R. Reid, and Dwight Herperger, Parallel Accords: The 
American Precedent 46 (Queen’s 1990). 
 627 See Luther Martin, The Genuine Information Delivered to the Legislature of the 
State of Maryland Relative to the Proceedings of the General Convention Lately Held at Phil-
adelphia, in Herbert J. Storing, ed, 2 The Complete Anti-Federalist 19, 78 (Chicago 1981). 
 628 See id at 27, 54–55. Martin first gave a speech to the Maryland legislature in au-
tumn 1787. He then expanded his remarks, which the Maryland Gazette began printing 
toward the end of the year. The final installment was released in February. In April 1788, 
Eleazar Oswald printed the entire series as the pamphlet The Genuine Information, De-
livered to the Legislature of Maryland. See Maier, Ratification at 90 (cited in note 576). 
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from bottom to top.”629 The Anti-Federalist made an impassioned 
plea, “What do you think of a law to let loose such a set of vile 
officers among you!”630 He asked: 
Do you expect the Congress excise-officers will be any better, 
if God, in his anger, should think it proper to punish us for our 
ignorance, and sins of ingratitude to him, after carrying us 
through the late war, and giving us liberty, and now so tamely 
to give it up by adopting this aristocratical government?631 
These arguments did not prevent Maryland from ratifying 
the Constitution, but they did lead to the state convention consid-
ering a series of amendments. Delegates supported the additional 
clauses. Although the Constitution passed, unamended, by a 
nearly six-to-one ratio, the convention voted to remand the 
amendments to Congress for inclusion in the Constitution.632 One 
of the relevant clauses read: 
That all warrants without oath, or affirmation of a person 
conscientiously scrupulous of taking an oath, to search sus-
pected places, or seize any person or his property, are griev-
ous and oppressive; and all general warrants to search sus-
pected places, or to apprehend any person suspected, without 
naming or describing the place or person in special, are dan-
gerous, and ought not to be granted.633 
The notes of Maryland’s state convention underscored the im-
portance of this provision: 
This amendment was considered indispensable by many of 
the committee; for, Congress having the power of laying ex-
cises, (the horror of a free people,) by which our dwelling-
houses, those castles considered so sacred by the English law, 
will be laid open to the insolence and oppression of office, 
there could be no constitutional check provided that would 
prove so effectual a safeguard to our citizens.634 
 
 629 Essay by a Farmer and Planter, in Herbert J. Storing, ed, 5 The Complete Anti-
Federalist 74, 75 (Chicago 1981). 
 630 Id at 76. 
 631 Id. 
 632 See Elliot, ed, 2 The Debates in the Several State Conventions at 549 (cited in 
note 615) (“Sentiments highly favorable to amendments were expressed, and a general 
murmur of approbation seemed to arise from all parts of the house, expressive of a desire 
to consider amendments.”). 
 633 Id at 551. 
 634 Id. 
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The convention went on to recognize, “General warrants, too, the 
great engine by which power may destroy those individuals who 
resist usurpation, are also hereby forbidden to those magistrates 
who are to administer the general government.”635 Without 
amendments to the federal Constitution, the liberty and happi-
ness of the people stood endangered.636 
The subject was broached in other state conventions as well. 
In Massachusetts, Abraham Holmes, from Plymouth County, 
noted that the framers of the state constitution had taken “par-
ticular care to prevent” general warrants from being issued. He 
could not conceive “why it should be esteemed so much more safe 
to intrust Congress with the power of enacting laws, which it was 
deemed so unsafe to intrust our state legislature with.”637 Holmes 
voted against ratification. 
North Carolina delegates similarly raised concerns about the 
absence of explicit protections for rights in the Constitution, stat-
ing that “a declaration of rights, asserting and securing from en-
croachments the great principles of civil and religious liberty, and 
the unalienable rights of the people . . . ought to be laid before 
Congress.”638 The state convention included in its proposed decla-
ration of rights, “That every freeman has a right to be secure from 
all unreasonable searches and seizures of his person, his papers 
and property.”639 Like the other states, North Carolina tied pro-
tection of this right to outlawing general warrants and adding the 
particular requirements for specific warrants that would make 
them valid. The text continued, “[A]ll warrants, therefore, to 
search suspected places, or to apprehend any suspected person, 
without specially naming or describing the place or person, are 
dangerous, and ought not to be granted.”640 
One of the liveliest public discussions of general warrants 
and the failure of the Constitution to prohibit them occurred in 
Pennsylvania. The Anti-Federalist Samuel Bryan repeatedly 
made this point, drawing a contrast between the rights secured 
to the citizens through Pennsylvania’s own constitution and the 
lack of any protections in the proposed document. In October 
 
 635 Id at 551–52. 
 636 Elliot, ed, 2 The Debates in the Several State Conventions at 555 (cited in note 615). 
 637 Id at 111–12. 
 638 Elliot, ed, 1 The Debates in the Several State Conventions at 331–32 (cited in 
note 582). 
 639 Jonathan Elliot, ed, 4 The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adop-
tion of the Federal Constitution 244 (Franklin 2d ed 1888). 
 640 Id. 
03 DONOHUE ART FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 9/11/2016  8:17 PM 
2016] The Original Fourth Amendment 1293 
 
1787, he began his letter to “the Freemen of Pennsylvania,” “Per-
mit one of yourselves to put you in mind of certain liberties and 
privileges secured to you by the constitution of this common-
wealth, and to beg your serious attention to . . . the plan of the 
federal government submitted to your consideration.”641 First 
among his concerns was the lack of a protection against govern-
ment interference: “Your present frame of government secures 
you a right to hold yourselves, houses, papers and possessions free 
from search and seizure.”642 He continued, “[T]herefore warrants 
granted without oaths or affirmations first made, affording suffi-
cient foundation for them, whereby any officer or messenger may 
be commanded or required to search your houses or seize your 
persons or property, not particularly described in such warrant, 
shall not be granted.”643 
It was not, as Professor Amar has much more recently ar-
gued, that the government could enter, search, and seize at will. 
It was that the government could not do so at all without a suffi-
ciently particularized warrant. Bryan went on to critique the sep-
aration and balance of powers, suggesting that the problem with 
relying on structure alone was that there was “no declaration of 
personal rights, premised in most free constitutions.”644 
Not everyone at the Founding wanted to include a bill of 
rights. Federalists, led by Alexander Hamilton (the only New 
Yorker to sign the Constitution), Wilson (a Scottish Pennsylva-
nian who had studied law under Dickinson), and James Iredell 
(from North Carolina), argued against the explicit inclusion of 
rights.645 These men were no less influenced by English experi-
ence.646 They simply took a different lesson from it. It was not that 
powers such as those encapsulated in general warrants ought to 
be allowed—it was that the structure had been designed to pre-
vent the government from having the authority to issue such in-
struments in the first place. 
 
 641 Centinel, Independent Gazetteer (Oct 5, 1787) (“Centinel I”), in John P. Kaminski, 
et al, eds, 2 The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution Digital Edition 
*158, 158 (Virginia 2009). 
 642 Id. 
 643 Id (emphasis added). 
 644 Id at *166. 
 645 See Joseph Postell, Securing Liberty: The Purpose and Importance of the Bill of 
Rights (Heritage Foundation, Dec 14, 2007), archived at http://perma.cc/F4QJ-MS55. 
 646 Hamilton’s writing in The Federalist demonstrates a prior knowledge of Coke and 
Blackstone, as well as Montesquieu and others. See Moline, 42 Washburn L J at 785 (cited 
in note 418). 
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In trying to convince his fellow New Yorkers to vote for the 
Constitution, Hamilton noted in Federalist 84 that the purpose of 
a bill of rights in English history was to form an agreement be-
tween the Crown and its subjects, abridging royal prerogative.647 
Magna Carta, the Petition of Right crafted by Coke and assented 
to by Charles I, the Declaration of Right presented in 1688 to 
William of Orange—all of these had recognized the rights held 
by individuals as against the King. In America, however, there 
would be no monarch. Sovereignty resided in the people. It was 
therefore unnecessary to enact a bill of rights. 
Iredell further explained during the North Carolina ratifying 
convention that unlike England, where no instrument could 
abridge the authority of Parliament, the United States had a writ-
ten constitution which would act to constrain the federal govern-
ment.648 “Of what use,” he asked, “can a bill of rights be in [the 
US] Constitution, where the people expressly declare how much 
power they do give, and consequently retain all they do not?”649 
And he went further, suggesting that a bill of rights would be not 
only unnecessary but also “absurd and dangerous.”650 
Hamilton agreed. His rationale in Federalist 84 was that a 
bill of rights “would contain various exceptions to powers which 
are not granted; and on this very account, would afford a colour-
able pretext to claim more than were granted.”651 The national 
government was to be one of limited, enumerated authorities. By 
asserting a specific right, such as the right against unreasonable 
search and seizure, the assumption would shift to suggest that 
anything not listed as a right was not protected. Hamilton ex-
plained, “[W]hy declare that things shall not be done which there 
is no power to do?”652 For Hamilton, an enumeration of specific 
rights was meaningless. Rights must be understood in context, 
subject to popular demands. There was no point in establishing a 
right without a corresponding power. It was to the Constitution 
 
 647 Federalist 84 (Hamilton), in The Federalist 575, 578 (Wesleyan 1961) (Jacob E. 
Cooke, ed) (“It has been several times truly remarked, that bills of rights are in their 
origin, stipulations between kings and their subjects, abridgements of prerogative in favor 
of privilege, reservations of rights not surrendered to the prince.”). 
 648 Elliot, ed, 4 The Debates in the Several State Conventions at 148–49 (cited in 
note 639). 
 649 Id at 148. 
 650 Id at 149. 
 651 Federalist 84 at 579 (cited in note 647). 
 652 Id. 
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itself one should look for a bill of rights. The structure would pro-
tect rights.653 
One of the most persuasive arguments against a bill of rights 
was that of a shifting burden of proof. At the heart of the concern 
was the fear that the introduction of such clauses would flip the 
presumption of the Constitution. As initially written, the Consti-
tution placed the burden of demonstrating federal power to act on 
Congress and the president. In October 1787, Wilson argued dur-
ing the first state ratification debate in Pennsylvania—a dis-
course that brought him to national prominence as a spokesman 
for the Federalist cause—that “it would have been superfluous 
and absurd to have stipulated with a fœderal body of our own cre-
ation, that we should enjoy those privileges of which we are not 
divested.”654 By calling out specific rights, there would be a nar-
rowing of rights to reflect only those listed. Federal powers would 
be conceived broadly, with those defending the rights bearing the 
burden of showing that the written provision had been invaded.655 
Wilson’s remarks proved prescient. It would be difficult to 
look at the doctrine that has since ensued without observing the 
tendency of courts to limit rights to those expressly declared or 
implied in the Bill of Rights. Nevertheless, the Federalist argu-
ments did not override Anti-Federalist concerns about the grow-
ing power of the federal government. 
Bryan, writing as Centinel, argued in response to Wilson’s 
speech that the Constitution had failed to recognize “that the peo-
ple have a right to hold themselves, their houses, papers and pos-
sessions free from search or seizure.”656 Centinel continued: 
therefore warrants without oaths or affirmations first made, 
affording a sufficient foundation for them, and whereby any 
officer or messenger may be commanded or required to search 
suspected places, or to seize any person or his property, not 
 
 653 Id at 581. 
 654 Speech of James Wilson (Oct 6, 1787), in John P. Kaminski, et al, eds, 13 The 
Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution Digital Edition *337, 339–40 
(Virginia 2009). 
 655 See Federalist 84 at 579–80 (cited in note 647). 
 656 Centinel, Philadelphia Freeman’s Journal (Oct 24, 1787) (“Centinel II”), in Kaminski, 
et al, eds, 13 The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution Digital Edition 
*457, 466–67 (cited in note 654). 
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particularly described, are contrary to that right and ought 
not to be granted.657 
To protect the right, a warrant would require particularity. 
As explained by another Anti-Federalist writing as Brutus 
(likely Robert Yates),658 the issue was one of personal liberty. The 
purpose of entering into a political union was to protect individu-
als. In doing so, it was not necessary “that individuals should re-
linquish all their natural rights.”659 Of some of these, individuals 
could not be divested. Other rights were not necessary to give up 
to attain the object of government. They should be retained, for 
surrendering them “would counteract the very end of government, 
to wit, the common good.”660 The “Federal Farmer,” whose identity 
has not been established (although scholars point to Lee or 
Melancton Smith as the likely author),661 wrote two pamphlets an-
alyzing and arguing against the Constitution. He shared Brutus’s 
concept of the rights at stake, noting, “There are other essential 
rights, which we have justly understood to be the rights of freemen; 
as freedom from hasty and unreasonable search warrants, war-
rants not founded on oath, and not issued with due caution, for 
searching and seizing men’s papers, property, and persons.”662 
 
 657 Id at *467 (emphasis added). The day before Wilson’s speech, Bryan had argued 
that the proposed Constitution divested Pennsylvanians of their existing liberties and 
privileges: 
Your present frame of government, secures you a right to hold yourselves, 
houses, papers and possessions free from search and seizure, and therefore war-
rants granted without oaths or affirmations first made, affording sufficient foun-
dation for them, whereby any officer or messenger may be commanded or re-
quired to search your houses or seize your persons or property, not particularly 
described in such warrant. 
Centinel I at *258 (cited in note 641). The right to be free from “general warrant” was now 
imperiled. 
 658 Jackson Turner Main, The Antifederalists, Critics of the Constitution 1781-1788 
287 (Quadrangle 1961). 
 659 Brutus, New-York Journal (Nov 1, 1787) (“Brutus II”), in John P. Kaminski, et al, 
eds, 19 The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution Digital Edition 
*154, 155 (Virginia 2009). 
 660 Id. 
 661 See Saul Cornell, The Other Founders: Anti-Federalism & the Dissenting Tradition 
in America, 1788–1829 88 (UNC 1999). 
 662 Observations Leading to a Fair Examination of the System of Government Pro-
posed by the Late Convention; and to Several Essential and Necessary Alternations in It. 
In a Number of Letters from the Federal Farmer to the Republican, in Storing, ed, 2 The 
Complete Anti-Federalist 214, 249 (cited in note 627). See also id at 262: 
The following, I think, will be allowed to be unalienable or fundamental rights 
in the United States: . . . No man is held to answer a crime charged upon him 
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Brutus recognized that governments tend to expand their 
powers to invade the rights of the people. This, indeed, had been 
the salient lesson from English experience. England’s “[M]agna 
[C]harta and bill of rights have long been the boast, as well as the 
security of that nation.”663 The Founders had taken this so seri-
ously to heart that with regard to the state constitutions, “there 
is not one of them but what is either founded on a declaration or 
bill of rights, or has certain express reservation of rights interwo-
ven in the body of them.”664 It was thus “astonishing” that the se-
curity of the rights of the people could be found nowhere in the 
Constitution.665 
General warrants stood as the foremost example of the 
abridgement of individual liberty rights. Brutus explained, “For 
the security of liberty, it has been declared [t]hat all warrants, 
without oath or affirmation, to search suspected places, or seize 
any person, his papers or property, are grievous and oppres-
sive.”666 This provision, he argued, was “as necessary under the 
general government as under that of the individual states; for the 
power” of the federal government “is as complete to the purpose 
of . . . granting search warrants, and seizing persons, papers, or 
property, in certain cases” as the authority of the states to do so.667 
Although the Federalists had a strong argument—one that 
has, as an empirical matter, largely played out in the intervening 
centuries—it was the protection of the liberty interests at stake 
that ultimately won the day. There was little question following 
the state conventions that Congress would have to incorporate a 
bill of rights into the Constitution for the United States to survive. 
Six of the original thirteen states had recommended changes to 
the Constitution. Several had stated outright that this meant that 
the document would have to be amended to include a declaration 
of rights. Even in states that did not include an overt demand for 
a bill of rights in their final ratification decision, a vigorous debate 
about whether to institute one marked the public discourse.668 Of 
 
till it be substantially described to him; and he is subject to no unreasonable 
searches or seizures of his person, papers or effects. 
 663 Brutus II at *156 (cited in note 659). 
 664 Id. 
 665 Id. 
 666 Id. 
 667 Brutus II at *157 (cited in note 659). 
 668 See Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment at 680–82 (cited in note 37). In Pennsylvania, 
for instance, during the state convention, Robert Whitehill introduced a bill of rights that 
would have outlawed general warrants. His proposal built on the Virginia Declaration of 
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the rights articulated, one of the most important and consistent 
objections was the failure of the original Constitution to outlaw 
promiscuous search and seizure. 
B. Adopting the Fourth Amendment 
On September 28, 1789, the first session of the First Congress 
passed a resolution reflecting state concerns over the lack of a bill 
of rights: 
The conventions of a number of the States, having at the time 
of their adopting the Constitution, expressed a desire, in or-
der to prevent misconstruction or abuse of its powers, that 
further declaratory and restrictive clauses should be added: 
And as extending the ground of public confidence in the Gov-
ernment, will best insure the beneficent ends of its institu-
tion. Resolved . . . that the following Articles be proposed to 
the Legislatures of the several States, as amendments to the 
Constitution of the United States.669 
The task of drafting the bill of rights fell to Madison, one of the 
principal architects of the Constitution. 
1. Drafting the text. 
Although Madison had objected to any constitutional amend-
ments prior to ratification on the grounds that they would cause 
friction between the states and potentially contribute to a disso-
lution of the Union, by the time of the congressional resolution, 
he believed that amendments would “serve the double purpose of 
satisfying the minds of well meaning opponents, and of providing 
additional guards in favour of liberty.”670 In particular, he sup-
ported adding new measures to protect “the rights of conscience, 
the freedom of the press, trials by jury, [and] exemption from gen-
eral warrants.”671 
 
Rights, going further to state that not only “ought not” such warrants be granted, but that 
they “shall not” be approved. Id at 682. Although the convention voted two to one against 
including a bill of rights, the Anti-Federalists went on to publish the proposed document 
as a pamphlet. Similar initiatives failed in Massachusetts. Id. 
 669 Helen E. Veit, Kenneth R. Bowling, and Charlene Bangs Bickford, eds, Creating 
the Bill of Rights 3 (Johns Hopkins 1991). 
 670 Robert Allen Rutland, James Madison: The Founding Father 47 (MacMillan 1987). 
 671 Id at 48. See also Veit, Bowling, and Bickford, eds, Creating the Bill of Rights at 
85 (cited in note 669). 
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On May 4, 1789, Madison informed the House of Represent-
atives that he intended to introduce amendments.672 Just over a 
month later, he made good on his promise, citing the debt owed to 
those who ratified the Constitution to secure “the liberty for 
which they valiantly fought and honorably bled.”673 He enjoined 
his colleagues to “expressly declare the great rights of mankind 
secured under [the] Constitution.”674 Madison presented a draft of 
what is now the Fourth Amendment: 
The rights of the people to be secured in their persons, their 
houses, their papers, and their other property, from all un-
reasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated by 
warrants issued without probable cause, supported by oath 
or affirmation, or not particularly describing the places to be 
searched, or the persons or things to be seized.675 
A few observations about this initial language can be made. 
 First, the comma after “persons” separated the individual 
from objects related to them. There were thus dual rights at stake: 
security of the person and security of personal property. Support-
ing this interpretation is the establishment of “rights” in the plu-
ral. It was not just one right at stake, but two. In adopting this 
approach, Madison tracked the approach taken by Vermont, 
which had similarly separated out “themselves” from “their 
houses, papers, and possessions.”676 
Second, the language generally followed the contours of the 
Massachusetts Constitution, which also began by establishing a 
right (albeit in the singular).677 In both, the clause protected 
 
 672 1 Annals of Cong 247 (May 4, 1789). 
 673 Id at 432 (June 8, 1789). 
 674 Id. Madison noted, “I believe that the great mass of the people who opposed [the 
Constitution] disliked it because it did not contain effectual provisions against encroach-
ments on particular rights, and those safeguards which they have been long accustomed 
to have interposed between them and the magistrate who exercises the sovereign power.” 
Id at 433. 
 675 Id at 434–35; 1 Congressional Register 428 (June 8, 1789). See also The Daily Ad-
vertiser 2 (June 12, 1789); New-York Daily Gazette 574 (June 13, 1789). 
 676 Vt Const of 1777, Decl of Rights Art XI (superseded 1793). 
 677 Mass Const Pt 1, Art XIV: 
Every subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches and sei-
zures of his person, his houses, his papers, and all his possessions. All warrants, 
therefore, are contrary to this right, if the cause or foundation of them be not 
previously supported by oath or affirmation, and if the order in the warrant to a 
civil officer, to make search in suspected places, or to arrest one or more suspected 
persons, or to seize their property, be not accompanied with a special designation 
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against “all unreasonable searches and seizures” of one’s person, 
house, papers, and things (“property” for Madison, “possessions” 
for Adams).678 And both clauses required an oath or affirmation, 
as well as particularization regarding the place to be searched or 
persons or property to be seized. 
Third, some scholars insist that Madison’s initial draft 
demonstrates that he was primarily concerned with prohibiting 
general warrants, and not necessarily with requiring warrants 
under all circumstances.679 The text does dwell on the particulars 
that would be required, rejecting warrants that failed to reflect 
“probable cause,” were not “supported by oath or affirmation,” or 
did not particularly describe “the places to be searched, or the 
persons or things to be seized.”680 This reading also is consistent 
with Madison’s concern, which he had previously voiced, that the 
Constitution had not included a ban against general warrants. He 
again raised this point when he introduced the amendments, cit-
ing the risk that the “General Government” might abuse its au-
thority to collect revenue by issuing general warrants in support 
of the necessity of the new measures.681 
Cutting against this interpretation, though, is the formula-
tion itself: unlike Virginia’s statement in its Declaration of 
Rights, for instance, which clearly established that general war-
rants were “grievous and oppressive,” Madison’s draft of the 
Fourth Amendment started from the right itself.682 By leading 
with “unreasonable,” the clause invoked a broader prohibition 
against warrantless entry, as recognized in the common law. 
For Madison, “the great object” common to the states “in mak-
ing declarations in favor of particular rights” had been 
to limit and qualify the powers of Government, by excepting 
out of the grant of power those cases in which the Govern-
ment ought not to act, or to act only in a particular mode. 
They point these exceptions sometimes against the abuse of 
the executive power, sometimes against the legislative, and, 
 
of the persons or objects of search, arrest, or seizure; and no warrant ought to be 
issued but in cases, and with the formalities, prescribed by the laws. 
 678 Compare Mass Const Pt 1, Art XIV, with 1 Annals of Cong 434–35 (June 8, 1789). 
 679 See, for example, Robert M. Bloom, Warrant Requirement – The Burger Court Ap-
proach, 53 U Colo L Rev 691, 696 (1982); Lasson, The History and Development of the 
Fourth Amendment at 103 (cited in note 33). 
 680 1 Annals of Cong 434–35 (June 8, 1789). 
 681 Id at 437–38. 
 682 See text accompanying notes 501 and 512. 
03 DONOHUE ART FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 9/11/2016  8:17 PM 
2016] The Original Fourth Amendment 1301 
 
in some cases, against the community itself; or, in other 
words, against the majority in favor of the minority.683 
The legislature—not the executive branch—posed the greatest 
danger to personal liberty. Accordingly, Madison proposed that 
the rights be added to Article I, § 9, a section of the Constitution 
that, unlike Article I, § 8 (which enumerates Congress’s powers), 
places limits on the legislative power.684 As federal powers were 
to stem from the legislature, with the executive merely carrying 
them into execution, Madison’s understanding was that the pro-
tection against overreach ought to be located in Article I. 
The House of Representatives did not immediately take 
Madison’s amendments on board. A number of members consid-
ered it to be an untimely interruption of more important ques-
tions.685 But on July 21, 1789, Madison reintroduced the 
measures.686 He requested that the House reconvene as a Com-
mittee of the Whole House to debate the provisions.687 Instead, the 
House decided to direct the amendments to the Committee of 
Eleven, chaired by Delaware’s John Vining.688 
The Committee changed Madison’s language that protected 
“persons, houses, papers, and other property,” to “persons, houses, 
papers, and effects.”689 In making this alteration, the Committee 
extended the meaning beyond personal property or possessions 
(as implied in “other property”) to include commercial items and 
goods.690 
In addition to this alteration, the Committee removed the 
words “all unreasonable searches and seizures” apparently by 
mistake—or so Egbert Benson later claimed during the House de-
bate, when the clauses were simply reinstated as “the right of the 
 
 683 1 Annals of Cong 454 (June 13, 1789). 
 684 1 Congressional Register 427 (June 8, 1789). 
 685 See id at 437, 440. 
 686 1 Annals of Cong 660 (July 21, 1789). 
 687 Id. 
 688 Id at 665. The House was divided, with thirty-four in favor of removing discussion 
of the amendments from the Committee of the Whole and fifteen against it. Id at 664. 
 689 US Const Amend IX (emphasis added). See also Donohue, The Future of Foreign 
Intelligence at 93 (cited in note 54). 
 690 See Davies, 98 Mich L Rev at 708 n 461 (cited in note 20). Johnson’s A Dictionary 
of the English Language defined “effects” as “[g]oods; moveables.” Johnson, A Dictionary 
of the English Language at “effects” (cited in note 247). A general dictionary from 1730 
defined it as “the goods of a merchant, tradesman, &c.” N. Bailey, Dictionarium Britan-
nicum at “effects” (printed for T. Cox 1736). See also Donohue, The Future of Foreign 
Intelligence at 93 (cited in note 54). 
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people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable seizures and searches.”691 
The Committee also put “secured” into the present tense (“se-
cure”).692 It went on to agree to the balance of the clause, as well 
as Madison’s intent to insert the clause into Article I, § 9, as a 
limit on the legislature.693 
It took nearly a month of steady pressure from Madison for 
Congress to consider the amendments as unanimously agreed 
to by the Committee.694 The House then met for two weeks to 
debate the report as a Committee of the Whole, and then to dis-
cuss the report of the Committee of the Whole as the House of 
Representatives.695 
 
 691 See 1 Annals of Cong 753 (Aug 17, 1789) (reintroducing the text as “The right of 
the people to be secured in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, shall not be violated 
by warrants issuing without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and not 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized”). 
Professor Davies also states that it was simply a “mistake.” Davies, 98 Mich L Rev at 715 
(cited in note 20), citing Neil H. Cogan, ed, The Complete Bill of Rights: The Drafts, De-
bates, Sources, and Origins § 6.1.1.4.a at 334 (Oxford 2d ed 1997). Professor Cuddihy takes 
a slightly stronger position, hinting at the intentional omission of the clause by noting that 
the Vining Committee “excised the phrase” before it was reinserted by Benson of New York 
on August 13. Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment at 694 (cited in note 37). Professor 
Leonard Levy echoes Cuddihy’s position, writing that the clause was “deleted.” Levy, 
Original Intent at 243 (cited in note 511). Davies takes particular care to separate his 
position from those of Cuddihy and Levy. Davies, 98 Mich L Rev at 715 (cited in note 20). 
From the text of the congressional debate alone, there is little to go on to determine which 
party has the stronger argument, although Benson “presumed there was a mistake in the 
wording of [the] clause,” quickly moving that it be amended, and the vote carried. 1 Annals 
of Cong 753 (Aug 17, 1789). Although the Annals of Congress attributes reinsertion of the 
clause to Gerry, numerous other sources attribute it to Benson. See, for example, Cogan, 
ed, The Complete Bill of Rights § 6.2.1.2.b at 347 (cited in note 691) (quoting the August 
18, 1789 edition of the Daily Advertiser as saying that Benson moved to insert “against 
unreasonable searches and seizures” and noting, “This was carried. The question was then 
put on the amendment and carried”); id § 6.2.1.2.c at 347 (quoting the August 19, 1789 
edition of the New-York Daily Gazette as saying that Benson moved to insert “against un-
reasonable searches and seizures” and noting that “[t]his was carried”); id § 6.2.1.2.d at 
347 (quoting the August 22, 1789 edition of the Gazette of the United States as stating that 
Benson added “against unreasonable seizures, and searches” and noting that “[t]his was 
carried”). See also Davies, 98 Mich L Rev at 717–18 (cited in note 20) (arguing that the 
clause was added by Benson). 
 692 Cogan, ed, The Complete Bill of Rights § 6.1.1.2 at 334 (cited in note 691) (quoting 
the House Committee of Eleven Report from July 28, 1789, as providing, in the text of the 
amendment, “the rights of the people to be secure in their person, houses, papers and 
effects”). 
 693 Id. 
 694 2 Congressional Register 226 (Aug 17, 1789).  
 695 See 1 Annals of Cong 703–80 (Aug 13–24, 1789) (presenting a discussion that be-
gan August 13, 1789, and concluded August 24, 1789). 
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The House made four revisions to what would become the 
Fourth Amendment. In addition to Benson’s reinsertion of “un-
reasonable searches and seizures,” Gerry seemingly altered “by 
warrants issuing” to “no warrant shall issue.”696 This change 
largely clarified the language without broadening or narrowing 
the specified rights. Samuel Livermore continued Gerry’s addi-
tion, adding “and not” between “affirmation” and “particularly,” 
thus making the clause an independent declaration.697 The pro-
gressive nature of this change calls into question subsequent in-
terpretations of the Fourth Amendment that suggest a disconnect 
between the warrant requirement and the prohibition against 
general warrants. 
Finally, although Madison objected, Sherman moved to relo-
cate the Bill of Rights to a separate appendix.698 He voiced concern 
that changes to the body of the Constitution could impact the 
state ratification agreements, which had been premised on the 
then-existing text.699 Sherman further suggested that by placing 
the material in the middle of the document and leaving the sig-
natures from the Philadelphia Convention at the end, it implied 
that they had agreed to the amendments, which they had not.700 
The House of Representatives thereafter completed its con-
sideration of the other clauses and directed a Committee of Three 
(Benson, Sherman, and Theodore Sedgwick) to determine the or-
der of the amendments.701 The Committee reported back to the 
 
 696 See Davies, 98 Mich L Rev at 717–18 (cited in note 20). This alteration is at-
tributed to Benson in the Congressional Register. See 2 Congressional Register 226 (Aug 
17, 1789). Robert Bloom also attributes it to Benson. Bloom, 53 U Colo L Rev at 696 (cited 
in note 679). However, other sources, which carry slightly more sway, place authorship 
with Gerry. See, for example, See, for example, Cogan, ed, The Complete Bill of Rights 
§ 6.2.1.2.d at 347 (cited in note 691) (quoting the August 22, 1789 edition of the Gazette of 
the United States as attributing the proposed amendment altering “by warrants issuing” 
to “and no warrant shall issue” to Gerry and noting, “This was negatived”); 1 Journal of 
the House of Representatives of the United States 108 (Aug 21, 1789) (“[R]ead and debated 
. . . agreed to by the House, two-thirds of the members present concurring.”). 
 697 2 Congressional Register 226 (Aug 17, 1789). Although the changes recommended 
by Benson and Livermore were removed by the House from the draft bill of rights, they 
were subsequently reinstated by the Committee of Three. The Senate retained the clauses. 
Thorpe, 2 The Constitutional History of the United States at 257 (cited in note 573). 
 698 1 Annals of Cong 707–08 (Aug 13, 1789) (recording Sherman’s argument and 
Madison’s objections). See also Donohue, The Future of Foreign Intelligence at 93 (cited 
in note 54). 
 699 1 Annals of Cong 707–08 (Aug 13, 1789). 
 700 Id. 
 701 1 Journal of the House of Representatives of the United States 112 (Aug 22, 1789). 
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House on August 24 with a seventeen-point document, which was 
then sent to the Senate.702 
Although the Senate made changes to other amendments, the 
only alteration it made to the clause on search and seizure related 
to punctuation.703 The text returned to the House as the sixth 
amendment. The House apparently rejected the Benson Commit-
tee paragraph, but following a conference committee, the House 
withdrew its objections.704 Accordingly, on September 25, 1789, 
via a joint resolution of Congress, the federal government sent 
twelve amendments to the state legislatures.705 The sixth clause 
declared: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but 
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched and the per-
sons or things to be seized.706 
Notably, by retaining the word “place” in the singular and the 
clause “persons or things” in the plural, the drafters reflected a con-
temporary understanding of the illegitimacy of “multiple-specific 
search warrants.”707 Such instruments may meet the require-
ments that a particular person be named and that the charge be 
made under oath or affirmation and supported by probable cause, 
but numerous places could then be searched. Such instruments 
were considered invalid. They had been used by the Crown prior 
to the Revolution, but legal treatises developed at the time the 
Fourth Amendment was adopted repudiated the idea that multi-
ple locations could be searched, impliedly restricting search to a 
specific location.708 Warrants allowing multiple houses to be 
searched were unreasonable, even if the multiple houses were 
 
 702 Journal of the First Session of the Senate of the United States of America 104–05 
(Aug 24, 1789) (Greenleaf 1789). 
 703 See Cogan, ed, The Complete Bill of Rights § 6.1.1.12 at 337 (cited in note 691) 
(quoting a Senate resolution included in a Senate pamphlet from September 9, 1789). 
 704 1 Journal of the House of Representatives of the United States 115–16 (Sept 21, 
1789); id at 121 (Sept 24, 1789); Journal of the First Session of the Senate of the United 
States of America 86 (Sept 24, 1789) (Greenleaf 1789). 
 705 Journal of the First Session of the Senate of the United States of America 88 (Sept 
25, 1789) (Greenleaf 1789); Cogan, ed, The Complete Bill of Rights § 6.1.1.22 at 337 (cited 
in note 691) (quoting an enrolled resolution from September 28, 1789). 
 706 1 Stat 21, 97–98 (1789). 
 707 See Donohue, The Future of Foreign Intelligence at 94 (cited in note 54). 
 708 See Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment at 740 n 260 (cited in note 37). 
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specified. State legislation followed suit: by 1789, most states had 
adopted statutes that required specific warrants, limiting search 
to single locations.709 
Madison’s wording is particular in another regard: although 
the right extends, in the first part of the Fourth Amendment, to 
the people to be secure in their (plural) “houses,” the warrant is 
limited to “particularly describing the place” to be searched.710 Un-
like contemporary understandings, in which “place” can be under-
stood in broad terms—at times synonymous with “space”711—in 
1789, it was understood as a “particular portion of space.”712 By 
adopting language that required a warrant “particularly describ-
ing” a “place,” Congress restricted such searches not just to a sin-
gle home or warehouse but, potentially, to a smaller subsection of 
such a structure.713 
The first two clauses never garnered sufficient votes from the 
states to become law.714 As a result, what had been the sixth 
amendment became the Fourth Amendment. On December 15, 
1791, Virginia became the eleventh state to ratify the first ten 
amendments to the Constitution, making their addition official.715 
2. Judicial affirmation. 
Not long after the Fourth Amendment entered into law, a 
number of cases reiterated that the purpose of the Amendment 
was to protect individuals against general warrants, as well as 
warrants lacking sufficient particularity.716 
The first such case was Conner v Commonwealth.717 In 
Pennsylvania, Article IX, § 8 of the state constitution stated 
that no warrant shall be issued “to seize any person . . . without 
 
 709 See id at 631 (noting that even as early as 1777 to 1779, specific warrants had 
become “the standard method of search and seizure” in Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New 
Jersey, and Delaware); id at 637–58 (discussing the broader political and intellectual con-
text for the gradual entrenchment of specific warrants). See also Donohue, The Future of 
Foreign Intelligence at 94 (cited in note 54). 
 710 US Const Amend IV. 
 711 Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment at 742 (cited in note 37). 
 712 Id, quoting Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language at “place” (cited in 
note 247). 
 713 For further support of this point, see Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment at 739–42 
(cited in note 37). 
 714 See Thorpe, 2 The Constitutional History of the United States at 260 (cited in 
note 573). 
 715 Id at 261. 
 716 See Donohue, The Future of Foreign Intelligence at 94 (cited in note 54). 
 717 3 Binney 38 (Pa 1810). 
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probable cause supported by oath or affirmation.”718 The president 
judge of the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland County 
nevertheless issued a general warrant for the arrest of an indi-
vidual whom it was rumored had forged bank notes.719 The judge 
confronted the claim that “public safety” required a waiver of the 
specificity otherwise required by the law, leaving it to the magis-
trate to determine when such an exception would apply.720 
“It appears to me,” Chief Justice William Tilghman stated, 
“that if this be the true construction, the provision in the consti-
tution is a dead letter.”721 His rationale was straightforward: “[I]n 
every instance, the magistrate who issued the warrant, would say 
that he thought it a case of necessity.”722 The judge noted that by 
insisting on the particulars, felons may on occasion escape. “This 
must have been very well known to the framers of our constitu-
tion,” he surmised, “but they thought it better that the guilty 
should sometimes escape, than that every individual should be 
subject to vexation and oppression.”723 
In 1825, William Rawle, the US district attorney for Pennsy-
lvania, explained in his treatise on US constitutional law that 
“[t]he term unreasonable is used to indicate that the sanction of a 
legal warrant is to be obtained, before searches or seizures are 
made.”724 
Courts in Connecticut took a similar stance. In Grumon v Ray-
mond,725 a case involving a warrant that empowered the authori-
ties to search every suspected house within the town of Wilton, the 
court said, “This is a general search-warrant, which has always 
been determined to be illegal, not only in cases of searching for 
stolen goods, but in all other cases.”726 In parallel, a case in New 
York affirmed that only particularity in a warrant would justify 
the breaking open of a suspect’s home.727 
 
 718 Pa Const of 1790 Art IX, § 8 (superseded 1838). 
 719 Conner, 3 Binney at 43. 
 720 See id. 
 721 Id. 
 722 Id. 
 723 Conner, 3 Binney at 43–44. 
 724 William Rawle, A View of the Constitution of the United States of America 127 
(Philip Nicklin 2d ed 1829). The clause continues: “[B]ut when upon probable cause, sup-
ported by oath or affirmation, such a warrant is issued, not only may other effects, but the 
papers of the accused be taken into the custody of the law.” Id. 
 725 1 Conn 39 (1814). 
 726 Id at 42. 
 727 See Bell v Clapp, 10 Johns 263, 265–66 (NY 1813). 
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In 1868, Thomas Cooley, chief justice of the Michigan Su-
preme Court, reiterated the importance of the Fourth Amend-
ment’s prohibition on using a warrant to obtain evidence of 
guilt.728 Further, he noted: 
[F]ound also in many State constitutions, [the Fourth 
Amendment] would clearly preclude the seizure of one’s pa-
pers in order to obtain evidence against him; and the spirit of 
the fifth amendment—that no person shall be compelled in a 
criminal case to give evidence against himself—would also 
forbid such seizure.729 
While it was true that, with a warrant, an officer following the 
writ’s command was protected from legal penalties, any deviation 
from the warrant itself—such as searching in places not named 
or seizing persons or articles not specified—placed the officer out-
side the protection of the law. In all other cases “the law favors 
the complete and undisturbed dominion of every man over his 
own premises, and protects him therein with such jealousy that 
he may defend his possession against intruders, in person or by 
his servants or guests, even to the extent of taking the life of the 
intruder.”730 
 
 728 Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations Which Rest upon the 
Legislative Power of the States of the American Union 431–32 (Little, Brown 7th ed 1903): 
The warrant is not allowed for the purpose of obtaining evidence of an intended 
crime; but only after lawful evidence of an offence actually committed. Nor even 
then is it allowable to invade one’s privacy for the sole purpose of obtaining evi-
dence against him, except in a few special cases where that which is the subject 
of the crime is supposed to be concealed, and the public or the complainant has 
an interest in it or in its destruction. 
(citations omitted). Cooley specified the particular circumstances under which search war-
rants could issue, including for stolen goods, items smuggled into the country in violation 
of revenue laws, gaming or counterfeiting materials, lottery tickets, prohibited liquors, 
obscene books and papers held in preparation for sale, and explosive and dangerous ma-
terial proving a threat to public safety. Id at 432. Cooley explained: 
[I]t is better oftentimes that crime should go unpunished than that the citizen 
should be liable to have his premises invaded, his desks broken open, his private 
books, letters, and papers exposed to prying curiosity, and to the misconstruc-
tions of ignorant and suspicious persons, –– and all this under the direction of a 
mere ministerial officer. 
Id. He added later, “Letters and sealed packages subject to letter postage in the mail can 
be opened and examined only under like warrant, issued upon similar oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the thing to be seized, as is required when papers are subjected to 
search in one’s own household.” Id at 432 n 2. 
 729 Id at 431 n 4, citing State v Slamon, 73 Vt 212 (1901) (holding that the seizure of 
a letter in the course of searching for stolen goods under a warrant violated the Constitution). 
 730 Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations at 434 (cited in note 728). 
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Congress similarly recognized the role of the Fourth Amend-
ment, not once legislating against it. In 1789, for instance, it 
passed an act requiring customs officers to first approach a justice 
of the peace to obtain a warrant, demonstrate evidence under 
oath, and particularly describe the dwelling-house, store, build-
ing, or other place they would like to enter prior to conducting a 
search for goods subject to duty.731 
C. The Rise and Fall of the “Mere Evidence” Rule 
The Supreme Court later articulated a broad understanding 
of the scope of the Fourth Amendment, extending its protection of 
“papers” to include not just private documents and correspond-
ence but also one’s business records.732 While the 1886 case of 
Boyd v United States733 is commonly credited with being the first 
articulation of what became the “mere evidence” rule—and, at 
times, discounted as part of Lochner-era thinking734—it was far 
from the first articulation of a canon that found its roots, like the 
prohibition against general warrants, in English law. Even a few 
 
 731 Act of July 31, 1789, 1 Stat 29, 43 (repealed 1790): 
And be it further enacted, That every collector, naval officer and surveyor, or 
other person specially appointed by either of them for that purpose, shall have 
full power and authority, to enter any ship or vessel, in which they shall have 
reason to suspect any goods, wares or merchandise subject to duty shall be con-
cealed; and therein to search for, seize, and secure any such goods, wares or 
merchandise; and if they shall have cause to suspect a concealment thereof, in 
any particular dwelling-house, store, building, or other place, they or either of 
them shall, upon application on oath or affirmation to any justice of the peace, 
be entitled to a warrant to enter such house, store, or other place (in the day 
time only) and there to search for such goods, and if any shall be found, to seize 
and secure the same for trial. 
(emphasis omitted). Amar points to this law in support of the opposite proposition—that 
is, the proposition that the First Congress passed laws that did not require warrants—
despite the text’s clear meaning to the contrary. See, for example, Amar, The Law of the 
Land at 234 n 12 (cited in note 13); Amar, 107 Harv L Rev at 766 (cited in note 13). For 
this reason, I include the text in full. 
 732 See Boyd v United States, 116 US 616, 617, 638 (1886). 
 733 116 US 616 (1886). 
 734 See, for example, Akhil Reed Amar, The Constitution and Criminal Procedure: 
First Principles 22 (Yale 1997) (stating that Boyd “took root in a judicial era that we now 
know by the name Lochner, and the spirit inspiring Boyd and its progeny was indeed akin 
to Lochner’s spirit: a person has a right to his property, and it is unreasonable to use his 
property against him in a criminal proceeding”) (citations omitted); Amar, 107 Harv L Rev 
at 787–88 (cited in note 13) (writing about Boyd as a product of Lochner); Davies, 98 Mich 
L Rev at 726 (cited in note 20) (classifying Boyd as “a clear example of judicial resistance 
to the emergence of heightened government regulation”). 
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cases help to illustrate the limits articulated by English courts on 
how far the Crown could go in obtaining private papers. 
Perhaps the most famous example stems from what has come 
to be known as Purnell’s Case.735 During the reign of George II, 
two young Oxford students, Whitmore and Dawes, spoke “trea-
sonable words in the street.”736 For this, they were sentenced to 
pay a fine, to undergo two years’ imprisonment, to provide secu-
rity for their future behavior, “and to go round immediately to all 
the Courts in Westminster Hall, with a paper on their foreheads 
denoting their crime.”737 In addition, the government directed John 
Purnell, the vice-chancellor of Oxford, to impose academic punish-
ment on the students.738 He appears not to have done so. As a con-
sequence, the attorney general ex officio issued an information 
against him for failing to carry out his responsibilities.739 As part of 
the misdemeanor prosecution, at 9:00 p.m. on the final day of the 
term, the attorney general, without an affidavit, moved the court 
for a rule to require the university to open its records to the Crown, 
in order to furnish evidence against the vice-chancellor.740 
The court, uneasy with the request, demanded that the attor-
ney general show cause.741 Purnell, in turn, refused to supply the 
documents—a decision that the university supported on the 
grounds of “[n]emo tenetur seipsum accusare”: “The law will not 
tempt a man to make shipwreck of his conscience, in order to dis-
culpate himself.”742 Further, “in no case has the Court ever inter-
posed in a criminal prosecution to . . . force such inspection.”743 
Chief Justice William Lee delivered the opinion of the King’s 
Bench, citing precedent in support of the proposition that the 
Crown could not compel an individual to incriminate himself.744 
As part of his critique of general warrants, Almon too refer-
enced the prohibition on obtaining individuals’ papers in order to 
develop evidence against an individual prior to any charge. How 
could the law of England countenance that, upon a general warrant, 
 
 735 The King v Dr. Purnell, 96 Eng Rep 20 (KB 1748). 
 736 The King v Whitmore, 96 Eng Rep 20, 20 (KB 1748). 
 737 Id. 
 738 Id. 
 739 Purnell’s Case, 96 Eng Rep at 20. See also Previous Vice-Chancellors (Oxford), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/HW8W-Q8JL (listing John Purnell as vice-chancellor of Oxford 
University from 1747 to 1750). 
 740 Purnell’s Case, 96 Eng Rep at 20. 
 741 Id. 
 742 Id. 
 743 Id at 21. 
 744 Purnell’s Case, 96 Eng Rep at 23. 
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any common fellows . . . upon their own imaginations, or the 
surmises of their acquaintance, or upon other worse and 
more dangerous intimations, may, with a strong hand, seize 
and carry off all his papers; and then at his trial produce 
these papers, thus taken by force from him, in evidence 
against himself[?]745 
The problem, as in Purnell’s Case, was one of self-incrimination: 
“This would be making a man give evidence against and accuse 
himself, with a vengeance.”746 It was against the “ancient com-
mon law of the Land” to allow the government such access to 
one’s papers.747 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Boyd hearkened back to the 
reasoning of the English cases, to colonial concerns regarding gen-
eral warrants, and to Cooley’s comments noting the close relation-
ship between the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. In Boyd, the 
Court struck down a statute that allowed for a court order com-
pelling the production of a business invoice.748 Citing Chief Justice 
Pratt’s remarks in Entick, Justice Joseph Bradley, on behalf of 
seven justices, reasoned that the seizure of the papers in question 
amounted to a violation of the right against self-incrimination.749 
Any such Fifth Amendment violation, in turn, could be under-
stood as an “unreasonable search” under the Fourth Amend-
ment.750 Whenever the claim to papers was based solely on their 
potential utility as evidence in a criminal proceeding, the search—
and seizure—were presumptively unreasonable.751 
The ruling—that the Fourth Amendment permitted searches 
and seizures only when the government had a superior claim of 
title to the items seized—became known as the “mere evidence 
rule.”752 The Court drew the line at the point at which a search for 
 
 745 Father of Candor at 55 (cited in note 331). 
 746 Id at 55–56. 
 747 Id at 56. See also id at 77–78: 
I take it to be most clear, as the law now stands, a General Warrant is good in 
no case whatever, for the apprehension of persons or papers, or both; and that a 
Particular, or any Warrant, for seizing the papers, is likewise, as the law now 
stands, good in no case whatever: and consequently, that none of all his ingen-
ious contrivances before stated, for eluding the law, would be, if attempted, 
worth one single straw. 
 748 Boyd, 116 US at 638. 
 749 Id at 630. 
 750 Id at 633. 
 751 Id at 629–30. 
 752 See Warden v Hayden, 387 US 294, 308 (1967). 
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specific items became an effort to access or to generate information 
that could then be used to convict individuals of wrongdoing: 
The search for and seizure of stolen or forfeited goods, or 
goods liable to duties and concealed to avoid the payment 
thereof, are totally different things from a search for and sei-
zure of a man’s private books and papers for the purpose of 
obtaining information therein contained, or of using them as 
evidence against him. The two things differ toto coelo. In the 
one case, the government is entitled to the possession of the 
property; in the other it is not.753 
The rule mirrored the prohibition on general warrants: the gov-
ernment could neither rummage around in one’s personal docu-
ments nor comb through one’s business records to uncover evi-
dence of criminal behavior. The principles laid out in Entick 
affected “the very essence of constitutional liberty and security,” 
Bradley wrote.754 “[T]hey apply to all invasions on the part of the 
government and its employes of the sanctity of a man’s home and 
the privacies of life.” 755 The Court continued: 
It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his 
drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offense; but it is 
the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, per-
sonal liberty and private property, where that right has never 
been forfeited by his conviction of some public offense.756 
The first clause of the Fourth Amendment did not narrowly serve 
as a prelude to the Warrant Clause. It carried its own weight, un-
derscoring that individuals’ persons, papers, and effects were im-
mune from government examination and interference.757 
Thirty-five years later, the Supreme Court solidified the 
mere-evidence rule in Gouled v United States.758 The case chal-
lenged two types of searches. In the first, an Army intelligence 
 
 753 Boyd, 116 US at 623. 
 754 Id at 630. 
 755 Id. 
 756 Id. 
 757 See Lasson, The History and Development of the Fourth Amendment at 103 (cited 
in note 33); Note, The Life and Times of Boyd v. United States (1886-1976), 76 Mich L Rev 
184, 185–88 (1977). 
 758 255 US 298 (1921). See also United States v Lefkowitz, 285 US 452, 464–65 (1932) 
(“Respondents’ papers were wanted by the officers solely for use as evidence of crime. . . . 
They could not lawfully be searched for and taken even under a search warrant issued 
upon ample evidence and precisely describing such things and disclosing exactly where 
they were.”). But see Burdeau v McDowell, 256 US 465, 470–72, 475–76 (1921) (holding 
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officer, pretending to call on a government contractor, Felix 
Gouled, for social purposes, surreptitiously removed documents 
from Gouled’s office that were later used as evidence of conspiracy 
to defraud the government.759 In the second search, a US commis-
sioner, based on the affidavit of an agent of the DOJ, approved a 
warrant stating that Gouled’s office contained property that had 
been used “as a means of committing a felony, to wit: . . . as a 
means for the bribery” of a government employee.760 The Court 
found each instrument to be a violation of the defendant’s Fourth 
Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure, as 
well as his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.761 
In the first search, 
if for a Government officer to obtain entrance to a man’s 
house or office by force or by an illegal threat or show of force, 
amounting to coercion . . . would be an unreasonable and 
therefore a prohibited search and seizure . . . it is impossible 
to successfully contend that a like search and seizure would 
be a reasonable one if only admission were obtained by 
stealth, instead of by force or coercion.762 
In either instance, the security and privacy of the home or office, 
and of the papers of the owner, would be equally invaded.763 With 
regard to self-incrimination, the Court noted that whether an in-
dividual “be obliged to supply evidence against himself or whether 
such evidence be obtained by an illegal search of his premises and 
seizure of his private papers” mattered naught.764 “In either case,” 
the Court explained, “he is the unwilling source of the evidence,” 
which the Fifth Amendment forbids.765 
In regard to the second search, since the time of the Found-
ing, specific warrants could be used to obtain “stolen or forfeited 
property, . . . counterfeit coin, burglars’ tools and weapons, imple-
ments of gambling,” and the like.766 But they could not be used as 
 
admissible papers obtained when company officials and a private detective entered a pri-
vate office and opened the target’s safes and desk drawers because the company later pro-
vided the documents to federal authorities). 
 759 Gouled, 255 US at 304–05. 
 760 Id at 307 (ellipsis in original). The warrant was issued under the Act of June 15, 
1917, 40 Stat 217, 228. See Gouled, 255 US at 303. 
 761 Gouled, 255 US at 305–06. 
 762 Id at 305.  
 763 Id at 305–06. 
 764 Id at 306. 
 765 Gouled, 255 US at 306. 
 766 Id at 308. 
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a means of gaining access to the home “solely for the purpose of 
making search to secure evidence to be used against him in a 
criminal or penal proceeding.”767 The Court was at pains here to 
recognize the prohibition on general warrants that had marked 
the Founding. A general warrant, allowing the government to 
snoop around inside a home or office to potentially find evidence 
of wrongdoing, would not be allowed. 
The mere-evidence rule proved unworkable in practice, not 
least because the distinction between evidence and the instru-
mentality of a crime was hard to maintain. The Supreme Court 
gradually chipped away at the edges. It excluded corporations.768 
It expanded the definition of “instrumentalities” to include any 
property used in the course of criminal activity.769 And it deter-
mined that if individuals were legally required to maintain rec-
ords, the government could search, seize, and admit the records 
as evidence during trial.770 In 1966, it sidestepped the rule alto-
gether to find that a forced blood test did not run afoul of the Fifth 
Amendment, distinguishing between testimonial and physical ev-
idence in the course of the opinion.771 
The following year the Court explicitly repudiated the mere-
evidence rule in Warden v Hayden,772 a case that centered on the 
search of a suspected bank robber’s home in the course of a hot 
pursuit.773 The Court found that neither the entry without a war-
rant to search for the suspect nor the immediate search of his per-
son was invalid.774 “The permissible scope of the search,” the 
Court wrote, “must, [ ] at the least, be as broad as may reasonably 
be necessary to prevent the dangers that the suspect at large in 
 
 767 Id at 309. See also Boyd, 116 US at 623–24. 
 768 See Hale v Henkel, 201 US 43, 74–75 (1906). See also United States v White, 322 
US 694, 703–04 (1944) (holding that the Fifth Amendment does not shield collective enti-
ties from subpoenas, as long as the existence of the organization is independent from that 
of its individual members). 
 769 Marron v United States, 275 US 192, 198–99 (1927) (holding that a ledger involved 
in the sale of illegal alcohol could be seized, just as the alcohol could be, because “it was 
none the less a part of the outfit or equipment actually used to commit the offense”). 
 770 Shapiro v United States, 335 US 1, 18–20 (1948). 
 771 Schmerber v California, 384 US 757, 761 (1966): 
We hold that the privilege protects an accused only from being compelled to tes-
tify against himself, or otherwise provide the State with evidence of a testimo-
nial or communicative nature, and that the withdrawal of blood and use of the 
analysis in question in this case did not involve compulsion to these ends. 
(citation omitted). 
 772 387 US 294 (1967). 
 773 Id at 294–95. 
 774 Id at 296–97. 
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the house may resist or escape.”775 It relied on the Schmerber v 
California776 test, eschewing the property-based approach of the 
Founders in favor of a regime centered on privacy.777 The Court 
noted that the Fourth Amendment “was a reaction to the evils of 
the use of the general warrant in England and the writs of assis-
tance in the Colonies.”778 The aim, the Court recognized, was to 
protect the sanctity of the home.779 The way the Fourth Amend-
ment did this was by prohibiting all “unreasonable” searches and 
seizures, as well as by requiring particularity.780 
Even as it reversed the mere-evidence articulation of Boyd, 
the Court recognized the underlying protections that the Court 
had been trying preserve in Boyd: the prohibition on general war-
rants at the heart of the Fourth Amendment.781 
The understanding of the Fourth Amendment articulated by 
Amar and Taylor, which suggests that the home can be breached 
to search for evidence absent a warrant, fails to appreciate the 
context of the times. It was because of the sanctity of the home 
that warrantless entry, as well as the use of general warrants, 
was prohibited. The only time that the government could trespass 
on the privacies of life to conduct a search or seizure was either 
in the context of the arrest of a known felon or when a warrant 
with sufficient particularity issued. To the extent that this history 
has hitherto been lost, it is a loss, indeed, for our understanding 
of the original meaning of the Constitution. 
IV.  ANIMATING ARGUMENTS 
Why, precisely, did the Founding generation reject general 
warrants? Are there common concerns among the arguments that 
Coke, Hale, and Blackstone articulated; that Otis raised in Paxton’s 
Case; and that animated the state prohibitions on general war-
rants, later coming to fruition in the Fourth Amendment? These 
are difficult questions. Even legislative histories of narrow 
 
 775 Id at 299. 
 776 384 US 757 (1966). 
 777 Hayden, 387 US at 306–07. 
 778 Id at 301. For an interesting discussion of the transformation of Fourth and Fifth 
Amendment jurisprudence in the early to mid-twentieth century, see generally Note, 76 
Mich L Rev 184 (cited in note 757). 
 779 Hayden, 387 US at 301. 
 780 Id. 
 781 See Note, 76 Mich L Rev at 186–87 (cited in note 757) (emphasizing that the Boyd 
Court saw itself as implementing the rule laid out by Pratt in Entick). 
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clauses within statutes may prove impossible to reconstruct accu-
rately. Like the Founding generation, those enacting such provi-
sions may evince numerous concerns. Nevertheless, there are 
some concerns that recurred—across time and the Atlantic, 
throughout the colonies and the Founding of the country—that 
are worth noting. 
Perhaps most importantly, that an Englishman’s home was 
his castle figured largely in English law and early American doc-
uments.782 The guarantee against general warrants and warrant-
less entry thus found root in the right of an individual to be secure 
against unwelcome intrusion.783 
This Article has already quoted phrases citing this principle 
in the English treatises, cases, and parliamentary debates.784 In 
America, “Cato Uticensis” argued that ratification of the Consti-
tution would force the country “to see the doors of [their] houses, 
the impenetrable castles . . . fly open.”785 Anti-Federalists worried 
that federal excise powers would result in exposing “houses, those 
castles considered sacred by the English law . . . to . . . insolence 
and oppression.”786 “A Farmer” considered the home to be a man’s 
“sanctuary.”787 
Outside of active pursuit of a felon, or a sufficiently high 
standard of suspicion of involvement in illegal activity supported 
by a warrant, individuals had the right to be secure within their 
own homes against government intrusion. 
This approach encapsulated two deeper concerns. The first 
centered on what one should be forced to reveal to the government 
or to others.788 The home encircled family and friends. Within it, 
one built intimate relations, contemplated spiritual matters, and 
found solace.789 The ability to be unguarded created an oppor-
tunity for honesty, reflection, and growth. Almon addressed the 
“absolute illegality of the seizure of papers” on grounds of priv-
acy.790 No gentleman in England would rest easy “in his bed, if he 
 
 782 See Donohue, The Future of Foreign Intelligence at 99 (cited in note 54). 
 783 See Brutus II at *157 (cited in note 659). 
 784 See, for example, Father of Candor at 58 (cited in note 331). 
 785 Cato Uticensis, Virginia Independent Chronicle (Oct 10, 1787), in John P. Kaminski, 
et al, eds, 8 The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution Digital Edition 
*70, 75 (Virginia 2009). 
 786 Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment at 687–88 (cited in note 37). 
 787 Essays by a Farmer (I), in Storing, ed, 5 The Complete Anti-Federalist 5, 14 (cited 
in note 629).  
 788 See Donohue, The Future of Foreign Intelligence at 99 (cited in note 54). 
 789 Id. 
 790 Father of Candor at 54 (cited in note 331). 
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thought, that for every loose and unguarded, or supposed libelous 
expression . . . he was liable not only to be taken up himself, but 
every secret of his family made subject to the inspection of a whole 
Secretary of State’s Office.”791 Almon’s concerns included giving the 
Crown access to private affairs. “Many gentlemen have secret cor-
respondences, which they keep from their wives, their relations, 
and their bosom friends,” he explained.792 “Every body has some 
private papers, that he would not on any account have revealed.”793 
Business records did not remove the privacy implications of 
the government gaining access to individuals’ private lives: 
A lawyer hath frequently the papers and securities of his cli-
ents; a merchant or agent, of his correspondents. What then, 
can be more excruciating torture, than to have the lowest of 
mankind, such fellows as Mooney, Watson, and the rest of 
them, enter suddenly into his house, and forcibly carry away 
his scrutores, with all of his papers of every kind, under a 
pretence of law, because the Attorney general had, ex officio, 
filed an information against the author, printer and pub-
lisher of some pamphlet or weekly paper, and somebody had 
told one of these greyhounds that this gentleman was 
thought by some people to be the author!794 
An Englishman’s castle, therefore, could be breached only with 
due process of the law. Absent legal constraints, it made no sense 
to speak of individual liberty. One was inherently not free if the 
government could, at any time without specific cause, enter into 
one’s home, seize one’s person, examine one’s papers, or take one’s 
property away. “Such a vexatious authority in the crown, is incon-
sistent with every idea of liberty.”795 
Nor was society free if all of one’s associates could thereby be 
implicated. Accordingly, Almon argued that papers seized by the 
government “are immediately to be thrown into the hands of some 
clerks, of much curiosity . . . who will . . . naturally amuse them-
selves with the perusal of all private letters, memorandums, se-
crets and intrigues, of the gentleman himself, and of all his 
friends and acquaintances of both sexes.”796 Wilkes’s patron, Lord 
Grenville-Temple, similarly expressed alarm that the momentum 
 
 791 Id at 55. 
 792 Id at 54. 
 793 Id. 
 794 Father of Candor at 54 (cited in note 331). 
 795 Id at 55. 
 796 Id at 54–55. 
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of the disclosure went beyond the individual whose papers were 
seized, to all those with whom the person was in correspondence.797 
The second concern underlying the assertion that a man’s 
home was his castle was the potential harm that could result—as 
a personal matter and as a broader structural point—from giving 
the government untrammeled access.798 
Rather than having information indicating that the individ-
ual to be searched or seized was engaged in illegal activity, evi-
dence of which justified breaching the right to be secure in one’s 
home, general warrants violated the right in order to uncover evi-
dence.799 In doing so, the instrument turned the concept of inno-
cent until proven guilty on its head.800 Guilt was presumed, with 
innocence established only after a search.801 
The central point made by eighteenth-century contemporar-
ies was that by inverting the principle, the government could tar-
get people without any evidence of criminal activity. Such power 
was vulnerable to abuse.802 The government could use the instru-
ment against citizens to prevent political opposition, to consoli-
date economic or political control, or to stifle ideas contrary to 
those held by government officials.803 
That some of the information obtained might, in itself, be inno-
cent mattered naught. Eighteenth-century arguments recognized 
the potential for broad powers of search to combine information 
from different sources to build a case against individuals the gov-
ernment did not like.804 The risk was that otherwise-innocent activ-
ity, combined with other information, might look very different. 
This information then could be used to cast aspersions, poten-
tially to the point of persons being found guilty of criminal acts in 
which they did not engage. In Britain, parliamentarians consid-
ered powers of search in this way to be even more concerning than 
powers of arrest: 
 
 797 Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment at 460 (cited in note 37), citing A Letter to the 
Right Honourable the Earls of Engremont and Halifax, His Majesty’s Principal Secretaries 
of State, on the Seizure of Papers. 6–7, 10–11(printed for J. Williams 1763), and 25 The 
Scots Magazine 396 (July 1763). See also Donohue, The Future of Foreign Intelligence at 
103 (cited in note 54). 
 798 See Donohue, The Future of Foreign Intelligence at 103 (cited in note 54). 
 799 See, for example, Brief of James Otis at *3 (cited in note 391). See also Donohue, 
The Future of Foreign Intelligence at 105 (cited in note 54). 
 800 Donohue, The Future of Foreign Intelligence at 105 (cited in note 54). 
 801 Id. 
 802 Id. 
 803 Id. 
 804 See, for example, Wilkes, 19 How St Tr at 1166. 
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[I]f a general warrant for seizing the authors, printers, and 
publishers of a libel, seditious and treasonable in the eye of a 
minister, be liable to objection, one for seizing their papers is 
still more so, since papers may be treated in a manner highly 
injurious to their owners before they can get into the hands 
of a minister, who, to glut his revenge, may combine or disjoin 
them, so as to make of them engines capable of working the 
destruction of the most innocent persons.805 
Other information obtained in the course of executing a gen-
eral warrant had the potential to embarrass the person to whom 
the information pertained. In 1721, Sergeant Hawkins explained 
that general warrants may prove “highly prejudicial to the Repu-
tation as well as the Liberty of the Party.”806 This concern again 
arose in Parliament in 1765, when one member noted that 
even a particular warrant to seize seditious papers alone, 
without mentioning the titles of them, may prove highly det-
rimental, since in that case all a man’s papers must be indis-
criminately examined, and such examination may bring 
things to light which it may not concern the public to know, 
and which yet it may prove highly detrimental to the owners 
to have made public.807 
American legal scholars later agreed with Parliament that 
“even when conducted in the discreetest [sic] manner,” the execu-
tion of a general warrant “might injure the most virtuous in their 
reputation and fortune.”808 While, alone, it may not suffice to cre-
ate a right to seize innocent people, such an instrument could nev-
ertheless “throw in the way of messengers a temptation to inquire 
into the life and character of persons.”809 
Beyond the collection of private or embarrassing information, 
giving the government insight into one’s private affairs raised the 
potential that information obtained could be used as leverage. It 
 
 805 Herbert Broom and George L. Denman, Constitutional Law Viewed in Relation to 
Common Law, and Exemplified by Cases 608 (Maxwell & Son 2d ed 1885). 
 806 Hawkins, 2 A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown at 84 (cited in note 211). 
 807 Broom and Denman, Constitutional Law Viewed in Relation to Common Law at 608 
(cited in note 805) (discussing a debate in Parliament). Even particular warrants were of 
concern, because the examination of papers could bring matters to light that the public had 
no right to know, and yet which could prove “highly detrimental to the owner to have made 
public.” Id. See also Donohue, The Future of Foreign Intelligence at 106 (cited in note 54). 
 808 Broom and Denman, Constitutional Law Viewed in Relation to Common Law at 
608 (cited in note 805). 
 809 Id. 
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could be made public to defame political adversaries. Even with-
out criminal penalties, it could harm an individual’s reputation 
and standing in the community. The Founders sought to protect 
against information being misused in this way. 
As a structural matter, the consolidation of such power in one 
place caused even greater alarm. The Founders embraced the con-
cern expressed in Leach that the ability to use general warrants 
as a way around the restrictions on search and seizure could “be 
productive of great oppression.”810 Chief Justice Pratt similarly 
stated in Wilkes that “a discretionary power given to [officers] to 
search wherever their suspicions may chance to fall . . . is totally 
subversive to the liberty of the subject.”811 
The Father of Candor, in turn, warned that to allow general 
warrants in any case might “amuse the public with the sound of 
liberty,” while in reality allowing them to enjoy none.812 “If such 
warrants were to be allowed legally justifiable in any instances, 
it would be exceedingly difficult, nay, impossible, to restrain Min-
isters from grievously oppressing any man they did not like, un-
der many pretences, from time to time . . . without any motive of 
public good.”813 The liberty of the subject was at stake.814 Each 
step, however small, mattered. He explained, “Tyranny grows by 
degrees.”815 
Otis used the case of the customs officer attempting to exact 
revenge as an illustration of the potential for such powers to be 
misused.816 Dickinson’s Letters of a Pennsylvania Farmer simi-
larly denounced the writs as being vulnerable to arbitrary use.817 
Following the Founding, the state constitutional conventions, 
as well as the ratification debates, similarly recognized the dan-
ger posed by promiscuous search and seizure. Henry railed 
against the arbitrary way in which the government could search 
and seize an individual’s private papers.818 One of the first state 
 
 810 Leach, 19 How St Tr at 1024. 
 811 Wilkes, 19 How St Tr at 1167. 
 812 Father of Candor at 50 (cited in note 331). 
 813 Id. 
 814 Id at 50–51. 
 815 Id at 51. 
 816 Brief of James Otis at *3 (cited in note 391). 
 817 Dickinson, Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania: Letter IX at 50 (cited in note 464). 
See also Donohue, The Future of Foreign Intelligence at 110 (cited in note 54). 
 818 Elliot, ed, 3 The Debates in the Several State Conventions at 588 (cited in note 596): 
[G]eneral warrants, by which an officer may search suspected places, without 
evidence of the commission of a fact, or seize any person without evidence of his 
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courts to confront general warrants following the adoption of the 
Bill of Rights stated that general warrants “would open a door for 
the gratification of the most malignant passions, if such process 
issued by a magistrate should screen him from damages.”819 Oth-
ers echoed Parliament’s concern that general warrants “throw in 
the way of messengers a temptation to inquire into the life and 
character of persons.”820 
It was not that the country did not face great dangers from 
within and without: in 1787, the future of the country hung in the 
balance. During the Constitutional Convention, Oliver Ellsworth 
insisted that creation of a new federal structure was essential to 
national security.821 Soon afterward, Hamilton explained: 
The principal purposes to be answered by Union are these—
The common defence of the members—the preservation of 
the public peace as well against internal convulsions as ex-
ternal attacks—the regulation of commerce with other na-
tions and between the States—the superintendence of our in-
tercourse, political and commercial, with foreign countries.822 
To address these needs, Hamilton wrote, military capabilities 
must be made available to the national government: “The author-
ities essential to the common defence are these—to raise armies—
to build and equip fleets—to prescribe rules for the government 
of both—to direct their operations—to provide for their sup-
port.”823 He advocated these powers, “[b]ecause it is impossible to 
foresee or define the extent and variety of national exigencies, or 
the correspondent extent & variety of the means which may be 
necessary to satisfy them.”824 
Yet even with this understanding—that the country was un-
der threat, and that to face these threats, the national government 
must be given broad military powers—the Founding generation 
 
crime, ought to be prohibited. As these are admitted, any man may be seized, 
any property may be taken, in the most arbitrary manner. 
See also text accompanying notes 595–606. 
 819 Grumon, 1 Conn at 44. 
 820 Broom and Denman, Constitutional Law Viewed in Relation to Common Law at 
608 (cited in note 805).  
 821 Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787: Saturday, June 30 (TeachingAmeri-
canHistory.org), archived at http://perma.cc/UV7V-BQM4 (transcribing the remarks of 
Ellsworth). 
 822 Federalist 23 (Hamilton), in The Federalist 146, 146–47 (cited in note 647). 
 823 Id at 147. 
 824 Id (emphasis omitted). 
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did not provide the legislature with the authority to use general 
warrants for national security or the common defense.825 
Part of the reason for this stemmed, perhaps, from history. 
The English Crown had appealed to necessity in justification of 
expanding its use of general warrants. Almon explained, 
The greatest part [ ] of the warrants offered in proof of [pro-
miscuous search and seizure] were issued in the times of re-
bellion; when men are not likely to call in question such a 
proceeding, the extremity of the case making them wink at 
all irregularities, for the sake of supporting the protestant 
establishment itself. And yet, bad men, as one may easily fig-
ure to one self, will be apt to lay stress upon such acts of ne-
cessity, as precedents for their doing the like in ordinary 
cases, and to gratify personal pique, and therefore such ex-
cesses of power are dangerous in example, and should never 
be excused.826 
Accordingly, the Founders did not allow the government to in-
trude upon the sanctity of the home without sufficient cause. 
They did not create special exceptions for libel, treason, or either 
specific or general threats to the state. Nor did they endorse any 
exceptions for customs.827 To the contrary, state after state re-
fused to ratify the Constitution until extracting a guarantee that 
further provisions would be added, including those prohibiting 
general warrants and requiring certain particulars before any 
specific warrant could issue.828 
That initially the Fourth Amendment was to be placed in Ar-
ticle I, § 9 underscores the Founders’ intent to restrict Congress 
from being able to abridge the people’s right to be secure in their 
homes from unwanted government intrusion. When the First 
Congress moved the clause that now forms the Fourth Amend-
ment to an appendix, it was because it did not make sense to in-
sert it into the main body, to which the members of the Conven-
tion had previously affixed their signatures. As a substantive 
matter, all agreed that what is now the Fourth Amendment would 
 
 825 For a history of the term “national security” and the evolution of the concept in US 
history, see generally Laura K. Donohue, The Limits of National Security, 48 Am Crim L 
Rev 1573 (2011). 
 826 Father of Candor at 49 (cited in note 331). 
 827 See Bostock v Saunders, 95 Eng Rep 1141, 1145 (KB 1773). 
 828 See Part III.A. 
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limit the legislature, as well as be an additional protection to en-
sure that the executive would not—because it could not—inter-
fere with individuals’ private homes and lives.829 
The Founders’ concern went beyond the amassing of tyranni-
cal power in one place to the impact such an accumulation of 
power would have on the separation of powers. General warrants 
gave power to the executive branch, without constraint on how 
the power could be used. General warrants amounted to the pro-
verbial fox guarding the hen house.830 
Legal doctrine had long recognized the inherent conflict of in-
terest. Nemo iudex in causa sua: no one ought to be a judge in his 
own cause.831 In the interests of fairness and justice, one of the 
central principles of common law was to minimize the risk of par-
tiality: anyone with a stake in the outcome risked making a deci-
sion in their own favor. Thus it was in Dr. Bonham’s Case that 
Coke stated that a college of physicians given the authority, under 
statute, to punish those who practiced medicine without a license 
could not simultaneously act as “judges, ministers, and parties.”832 
Hawkins also highlighted the danger of general warrants, in that 
they provided the officer with the full authority to determine 
whom and where to search and what to seize.833 For the same rea-
son, Hale condemned any information filed by the attorney gen-
eral ex officio, without even an oath, allegedly stating of the legal 
sufficiency of such instruments that “[i]f ever they came in dis-
pute, they could not stand, but must necessarily fall to the 
ground.”834 Lord Mansfield underscored the point in Leach, recog-
nizing that general warrants violated the common law, not least 
because officers should not have the discretion to set the bounda-
ries of their own authority.835 
The Founding generation agreed with their brethren’s con-
cerns. The Father of Candor condemned Henry VII as “one of the 
 
 829 See Part III.B. 
 830 Donohue, The Future of Foreign Intelligence at 111 (cited in note 54). 
 831 See id. 
 832 Dr. Bonham’s Case, 77 Eng Rep at 652. The Supreme Court frequently cites this 
case in support of the proposition. Adrian Vermeule, Contra Nemo Iudex in Sua Causa: 
The Limits of Impartiality, 122 Yale L J 384, 386 n 6 (2012). But see generally id (arguing 
for limits on the principle). See also Donohue, The Future of Foreign Intelligence at 111 
(cited in note 54). 
 833 See Hawkins, 2 A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown at 81–82 (cited in note 211). 
See also Donohue, The Future of Foreign Intelligence at 111 (cited in note 54). 
 834 Father of Candor at 8 (cited in note 331) (quoting Hale). 
 835 Leach, 19 How St Tr at 1027. See also Donohue, The Future of Foreign Intelligence 
at 111 (cited in note 54). 
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worst Princes” England ever knew, not least for giving officers of 
the state the authority “to summon, try and punish, of their own 
mere discretion and authority, any persons who shall be accused 
of the offences therein very generally named and described.”836 He 
decried the potential for the attorney general to issue an infor-
mation upon his own authority, underscoring the potential costs 
borne by individuals who should fall under his gaze: 
It is a power that is, in my apprehension, very alarming; and 
a thinking man cannot refrain from surprise, that a free peo-
ple should suffer so odious a prerogative to exist. It has been, 
and may most certainly be again, the means of great perse-
cution. In truth, it seems to be a power necessary for no good 
purpose, and capable of being put to a very bad one.837 
Judges in Pennsylvania and Virginia attacked the writs issued 
under the Townshend Act of 1767 on the same grounds, stating 
that officers should not be given the authority to exercise their 
own discretion.838 Justice William Henry Drayton, a Charleston 
judge, and Henry, from Virginia, both repeatedly opposed allow-
ing officers to exercise discretion in search and arrest decisions.839 
The principle became intimately connected with the Fourth 
Amendment. It provided context for the text. As one mid-twentieth-
century scholar explained after reading the text of the Fourth 
Amendment to the Massachusetts Historical Society, “No public 
officer, therefore, in this country, can be supplied with a general 
warrant for use on occasion, he to be the judge of the occasion. 
About that there can hardly be a question.”840 
The Founders’ fundamental insight was that the executive 
branch could not be impartial when its interests were involved.841 
 
 836 Father of Candor at 7 (cited in note 331). 
 837 Id at 8–9. 
 838 O.M. Dickerson, Writs of Assistance as a Cause of the American Revolution, in 
Richard Morris, ed, The Era of the American Revolution 40, 60–61, 69 (Columbia 1939). 
 839 See William Henry Drayton, A Letter from “Freeman” of South Carolina to the 
Deputies of North America, Assembled in the High Court of Congress at Philadelphia, in 
R.W. Gibbes, ed, Documentary History of the American Revolution 11, 15 (D. Appleton & 
Co 1855); Elliot, ed, 3 The Debates in the Several State Conventions at 578–88 (cited in 
note 596); Davies, 98 Mich L Rev at 581–82 (cited in note 20). But see Gibbes, ed, Docu-
mentary History of the American Revolution at 11 (cited in note 839) (questioning the at-
tribution of the “Freeman” letter to Drayton). See also Donohue, The Future of Foreign 
Intelligence at 111 (cited in note 54). 
 840 George G. Wolkins, Writs of Assistance in England, in 66 Proceedings of the Mas-
sachusetts Historical Society 357, 358 (Massachusetts Historical Society 1942) (emphasis 
added). See also Donohue, The Future of Foreign Intelligence at 111 (cited in note 54). 
 841 See Donohue, The Future of Foreign Intelligence at 111 (cited in note 54). 
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Therefore, it was restrained from entering the home at will, ab-
sent emergency circumstances surrounding the commission of a 
felony. The only way it could enter was under a warrant issued 
by the judiciary. If citizens were to give the executive branch the 
freedom to set the limits of its own authority, the risk that it 
would claim ever more power for itself was significant. A warrant 
lacking specificity gave the government the ability to determine 
whom to target, where to look, and what to seize.842 The implica-
tion reached beyond the relationship between the federal govern-
ment and individual citizens: it threatened the relationship be-
tween the branches as well, with structural implications.843 The 
executive could use the power to overcome carefully thought-out 
checks and balances.844 
There was another way in which general warrants altered 
the powers of the judiciary: it was not just the potential use or 
misuse of the information vis-à-vis the legislature or the courts, 
but the fact that the judiciary had been cleaved away from the 
process. It was the duty of magistrates and judges to determine 
whether sufficient cause had been demonstrated to waive rights 
otherwise held by the citizens. In his Commentaries on the Laws 
of England, Blackstone raised this point: “[I]t is the duty of the 
magistrate, and ought not be left to the officer, to judge of the 
ground of suspicion.”845 Henry similarly inveighed that by insert-
ing the judiciary into the process, evidence and reason could play 
a role in mitigating the “strong hand of power.”846 By removing 
judges from these determinations, their power, their authority, 
was reduced. 
A parallel concern centered on the impact of general warrants 
on federalism. State and local governments, no less than individ-
ual citizens or the other branches of government, could find their 
role—and their ability to provide a check on the executive—un-
dermined by the accumulation of information. Henry and others 
raised this concern, as federal power expanded in the new Consti-
tution. The Founders were further concerned about turning law 
enforcement into spies, and about the impact that this would have 
on the social and cultural structures of the representative regime. 
 
 842 Id. 
 843 Id at 111–12. 
 844 See id. 
 845 Blackstone, 4 Commentaries at 288 (cited in note 230).  
 846 Elliot, ed, 3 The Debates in the Several State Conventions at 174 (cited in note 596). 
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CONCLUSION 
Members of the Founding generation saw themselves as en-
titled to their rights as Englishmen. Among these was the right 
to be secure in one’s home. To protect this right, outside of limited 
conditions, the Crown was prevented from entering without a 
warrant. Efforts to grant the King’s officers broader access gener-
ated friction between English subjects and the Crown. Treatises, 
such as Coke’s Institutes, Hale’s History of the Pleas of the Crown, 
and Sergeant Hawkins’s Pleas of the Crown, condemned the prac-
tice and laid the groundwork for jurists’ condemnation of general 
warrants. By 1768, the Court of Common Pleas, the Court of the 
King’s Bench, members of Parliament, and the public had come 
to reject the granting of general warrants as an exercise of tyran-
nical power. As Chief Justice Pratt explained, “To enter a man’s 
house by virtue of a nameless warrant, in order to procure evi-
dence, is worse than the Spanish Inquisition, a law under which 
no Englishman would wish to live an hour.”847 
The Framers studied English legal thought and shared ju-
rists’ rejection of general warrants. If anything, they were even 
more hostile to government interference than their countrymen 
overseas. During the French and Indian War, the Crown’s use of 
writs of assistance contributed to growing tension between the col-
onies and Great Britain.848 Paxton’s Case became an exercise in line 
drawing, as Otis roundly rejected the use of the instruments.849 
Upon independence, many of the new states included a con-
stitutional prohibition on promiscuous search and seizure.850 The 
purpose was to codify the common-law understanding of the con-
ditions under which the government could enter the home.851 That 
it had been the common law that had limited the ability of the 
Crown to intrude without a specific warrant mattered. Since the 
early seventeenth century, jurists had recognized that the mon-
arch lacked the authority to alter common law or statutory provi-
sions.852 Precisely how far Parliament could go in authorizing 
 
 847 Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment at 447 (cited in note 37), quoting Huckle v 
Money, 95 Eng Rep 768, 769 (CP 1763). 
 848 See Part II.A. 
 849 See Part II.B. 
 850 See Part II.C. 
 851 Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations at 424 (cited in note 728). 
 852 Case of Proclamations, 12 Coke Rep 74 (1610), reprinted in George Brodie, 1 A 
Constitutional History of the British Empire 532, 533 (Longmans 1866) (“[T]he king, by 
his proclamation or other ways, cannot change any part of the common law, or statute law, 
or the customs of the realm.”). 
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broader search authorities, however, was less certain. The Fram-
ers sought to ensure that the common-law understanding did not 
become subsumed by the American adaptation. 
In his formidable recitation of the history of the Fourth 
Amendment, Professor Cuddihy emphasizes the importance of 
the Founders’ actions in adopting the Fourth Amendment.853 He 
considers the decision to be a significant departure from English 
experience.854 The intended placement of the clause in Article I, 
§ 9 reflects this claim. The challenge to the prohibition on promis-
cuous search and seizure would come not from the executive, 
which had no independent authority to breach the walls of the 
home, but from the legislature, which might seek to do so in car-
rying into effect its other powers. The Fourth Amendment cem-
ented a particularized warrant requirement into the law. 
Some scholars may not feel that fidelity to the original mean-
ing of the Constitution, or to the text introduced by the Founders, 
matters.855 The initial meaning, it could be argued, is no longer 
relevant. More persuasive and important are the ways in which 
Supreme Court doctrine has adapted the application of the 
Fourth Amendment to a changing context. There are a number of 
difficulties with this approach, each deserving of a fuller discus-
sion than can be done in a conclusion. For now, a brief discussion 
will suffice. 
First, living constitutionalism allows for the application of 
new rules of construction. But however incremental such changes 
might be, surely they cannot mean that the protections created at 
the Founding cease to exist or—even more unlikely—that the lan-
guage of the Fourth Amendment means the opposite of what it 
meant when it was enacted. 
Second, a living constitutionalist approach to the Fourth 
Amendment that allows for general search and seizure absent a 
warrant fails to appreciate the strength of the arguments on 
 
 853 See Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment at 599–723 (cited in note 37). See also Cloud, 
Book Review, 63 U Chi L Rev at 1714–15 (cited in note 20) (noting this aspect of Cuddihy’s 
work). 
 854 See Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment at 437–576 (cited in note 37). 
 855 See, for example, Sklansky, 100 Colum L Rev at 1809–13 (cited in note 20) (arguing 
that instead of understanding “unreasonable searches and seizures” in light of eighteenth-
century common law, emphasis should be placed on the Supreme Court’s traditional Fourth 
Amendment doctrine and stare decisis); Missouri v Holland, 252 US 416, 433 (1920) (“[Con-
stitutional questions] must be considered in the light of our whole experience and not 
merely in that of what was said a hundred years ago.”); Charles A. Reich, Mr. Justice Black 
and the Living Constitution, 76 Harv L Rev 673, 735 (1963) (“There is no such thing as a 
constitutional provision with a static meaning.”). 
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which the Founders relied. The rationale for rejecting general 
warrants related to the individual right in question, as well as to 
potential harms to the constitutional structure. The reasons for 
the Founders’ concerns have not dissipated. They remain as rele-
vant, if not more so, today. 
Third, and relatedly, as illustrated in the Federalist–Anti-
Federalist debate over the insertion of the Bill of Rights, one of 
the Founders’ principal concerns was that by naming specific 
rights, other rights would not be guaranteed going forward. 
Wherever one stood on the question, the understanding was that, 
at a minimum, the rights articulated in the amendments would 
be protected. They thus represent a baseline, a de minimis level, 
for rights moving forward.856 
Fourth, the prohibition on promiscuous search and seizure 
derived from common law. At least some common-law rules could 
be altered by statute—certainly, the history of general warrants 
demonstrates that the Crown attempted to do this with some reg-
ularity, starting with the Tudors. By inserting a prohibition on 
the same into the Constitution—particularly in Article I, § 9, as a 
limit on the legislature—the Founders sought to ensure that no 
further encroachments could occur. 
The Court, over time, has struggled with how to understand 
the Fourth Amendment and the relationship between its two 
clauses.857 Nevertheless, it appears to be moving away from the 
proposition that the Fourth Amendment does not embody a war-
rant requirement, and to be recognizing that the presence or ab-
sence of a warrant is central to understanding whether a search 
 
 856 This is the position recently adopted by Justice Scalia in United States v Jones, 
132 S Ct 945 (2012), in which he postulated that constitutional interpretation cannot be 
used to read rights that existed at the Founding out of existence. Id at 950–51. At most, 
the rules of construction must be understood to apply the original principles to the con-
temporary context—not to contravene the basic meaning of the clause. Scalia cited Entick, 
noting that the Court had described it as a “monument of English freedom undoubtedly 
familiar to every American statesman at the time the Constitution was adopted, and con-
sidered to be the true and ultimate expression of constitutional law with regard to search 
and seizure.” Id at 949 (quotation marks omitted). Scalia explained, “At bottom, we must 
‘assur[e] preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed when the 
Fourth Amendment was adopted.’” Id at 950 (brackets in original). 
 857 See, for example, Bloom, 53 U Colo L Rev at 692 (cited in note 679): 
The Supreme Court has at times interpreted the first clause, the reasonableness 
clause, as distinct from the second clause, the warrant clause, so that in deter-
mining whether a search was reasonable a warrant would be but one of the many 
factors to consider. . . . At other times the Court has interpreted the reasonable-
ness clause in conjunction with the warrant clause and has held that generally 
a warrant is necessary for a search to be reasonable. 
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is reasonable. In the 2013 case Florida v Jardines,858 Justice 
Scalia, writing for the Court, concluded that whether or not the 
police first obtained a warrant before taking a police dog trained 
to identify narcotics inside the curtilage of the home went di-
rectly to the question whether the search in question was reason-
able.859 That same year, in Missouri v McNeely,860 Justice Sonia 
Sotomayor, joined by a number of her colleagues, considered the 
absence of a warrant to obtain a blood test to be essential to an-
swering whether a search was reasonable.861 Similarly, in 2014 in 
Riley v California,862 the Court considered the absence of a war-
rant to be relevant in ascertaining the reasonableness of the 
search.863 The Court did note that “the exigencies of” a situation 
may bring a warrantless search within constitutional bounds, but 
this exception was no different than that which the Founding gen-
eration recognized as part of their common-law legacy.864 
Scholars’ contrary insistence that the Fourth Amendment 
does not entail a general protection against government entry 
into the home does more than just fail to appreciate the context. 
It contradicts the meaning of the text itself, which carefully lays 
out the conditions that must be met by the government before it 
may intrude on one’s person, home, papers, and effects. Reclaim-
ing this meaning is essential for understanding the scope of the 
original Fourth Amendment. 
 
 858 133 S Ct 1409 (2013). 
 859 Id at 1411–12.  
 860 133 S Ct 1552 (2013). 
 861 Id at 1558. 
 862 134 S Ct 2473 (2014). 
 863 Id at 2482. See also Vernonia School District 47J v Acton, 515 US 646, 653 (1995) 
(“Where a search is undertaken by law enforcement officials to discover evidence of crim-
inal wrongdoing . . . reasonableness generally requires the obtaining of a judicial war-
rant.”); Silverman v United States, 365 US 505, 511 (1961) (stating that the Fourth 
Amendment “stands [for] the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free 
from unreasonable governmental intrusion”). 
 864 Riley, 134 S Ct at 2494, citing Kentucky v King, 131 S Ct 1839, 1856 (2011), quoting 
Mincey v Arizona, 437 US 385, 394 (1978). 
